Dimensions of Nationalism: Structure of Nationalist Attitudes in Hungary and Yugoslavia

by Bojan Todosijević

Abstract
Nationalism is often conceived as internally homogenous, unidimensional, and temporary stable ideology, distinctively specific for certain groups (nations), as expressed in the familiar distinction between the 'Eastern' and 'Western' nationalism. The paper critically examines to what extent such generalizations are theoretically and empirically justified. The empirical analysis deals with comparison of the number, content, and interrelationships of nationalist attitudes dimensions between Hungary and Yugoslavia. The results showed that national attitudes are multidimensional, but that the number and content of dimensions varies in two countries. In the Yugoslavian sample dimensions of romantic and ethnocentric nationalism tend to converge into a single nationalist-ethnocentric dimension. National attitudes in Hungary can be described along three dimensions: national discrimination, romantic nationalism, and national closedness. Implications of the obtained results for theorizing nationalism are discussed.

Introduction
When someone describes certain group, say a nation, as being non-democratic, authoritarian, collectivist, envious, and full of hatred toward others, and contrasted with other nation, described as democratic, egalitarian, civic, and individualist, it is usually justified to conclude that we are dealing with prejudices and ethnocentrism. If we read that certain nationalism is non-democratic, authoritarian, collectivist, based on envy and hatred of others, while another is described as democratic, egalitarian, civic, individualist, we should conclude that we deal with theories of nationalism. It has been a common practice in this field to portray nationalisms in stereotypical way, as internally homogenous ideologies distinctively specific for certain groups (nations).

In this paper I examine to what extent such generalisations are justified, and argue that they occasionally less resemble scientific analysis than stereotyping. The analysis is based on theoretical considerations and on analysis of empirical data.

Eastern vs. Western Nationalism
A number of authors attempted to bring some order in the complex reality of nationalist ideologies and practices by introducing classifications of nationalisms according to various criteria (e.g., Kohn, 1945, Greenfeld, 1992, Hall, 1995, Sugar, 1969, Smith, 1991). However, their classifications differ in many respects. While some authors present theoretically informed complex classifications (e.g., Sugar, 1969, Hall, 1995), others often impose Manichean division in two groups usually labelled as civic vs. ethnic or Eastern vs. Western nationalisms.

These dichotomous typologies will be contested in this paper partly for their questionable usefulness as analytical tools, and partly for their use in a reified way and as
value judgements. In general terms my argument is similar to Brubaker’s (1997) critique of the ‘Eastern vs. Western’ division of nationalism. However, Brubaker is more concerned with the conceptual confusion that the division is both based and engenders. In this paper the emphasis is more on the correspondence of the empirical reality and concepts used to represent and analyse it. More concretely, the focus is on the assumed internal homogeneity and unidimensionality of nationalist ideologies.  

Examples of the dichotomous categorisation of nationalism are taken from theories of Kohn, Greenfeld, and Gellner. These authors do not represent an exhaustive list, but rather illustrative examples.

According to Kohn (1945), distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalism should be made. Western nationalism, as appeared in England, France, United States, is described as related to notions of individual liberty, rational cosmopolitanism, without much sentimental attachment to the past. On the other side, Eastern nationalism emerged in a ‘backward state of political and social development’, and developed in organic, mystical, authoritarian forms. The aim of Eastern nationalism was not to transform existing states into people’s state, but rather to redraw political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands (Kohn, 1945). Different social and intellectual influences shaped these two varieties of nationalisms, but psychological factors were also important. When the Eastern nationalists saw that the ideology they imported from the West did not function so well as in the exporting countries, it "wounded pride of the native educated class" and produced the "inferiority complex" (Kohn, 1945, p. 165).

Greenfeld’s (1992) opinion about different nationalisms belongs to the same genera as Kohn’s, though it is expressed in more extreme manner. In her view, individualistic, liberal, and civic nationalism was invented in England, and thereafter had been exported to other places world-wide. England served as a model of both successful nationalism and modernisation. However, very few of the future nations were sufficiently sophisticated to comprehend appropriately the idea of nationalism as conceived and practised in England (USA is one of only few successful exceptions). Instead to realise that the key point in nationalism is the **sovereignty** of people (meaning democratisation, downward redistribution of political power), the Easterners thought that nationalism is about the **uniqueness** of sovereign people (Greenfeld, 1992). The result was that in the Eastern Europe and elsewhere developed collectivist, ethnic nationalism, divorced from democratic ingredients. Besides this ‘semantic mistake’ in transplanting the idea of nationalism from England, psychological factors were of crucial importance, just as in Kohn’s view. Greenfeld (1992) labels this psychological element as **resentment**, i.e., the “psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred”, what “fostered particularistic pride and xenophobia” in ‘Eastern’ nationalisms.

Traces of this type of reasoning could be found also in Gellner’s writings on nationalism (e.g., 1994, 1983), though in more moderate and qualified form. For example, Gellner (1994) in his story on four time zones in Europe describes those from the ‘third zone’

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1 In the literature the term ‘types’ is usually used, what implies the discontinuity between nationalisms. However, I use the term ‘unidimensionality’ to imply the more realistic assumption that nationalism can be more or less ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’. This change actually gives those theories more chances to be empirically validated.

2 Contrast this view of ‘Eastern’ nationalism with the more elaborated classification and description by Sugar (1969). The latter found that common element in Eastern and Western nationalisms was precisely the "revolutionary force aiming at transferring sovereignty from the rulers to the people”, they both were egalitarian, anticlerical and constitutional.
as particularly prone to use violence and be brutal (p. 30), as if violence is used only by one side in a conflict. In his fictitious example of "Ruritanians" in Megalomania Gellner also implies feelings of inferiority as driving force of minority nationalisms.

For present purposes, three implicit assumptions of such arguments should be noted. The first is the presumed unidimensionality of nationalisms. It is assumed that nationalisms could be compared along the single dimension, i.e., the degree of 'civics' and 'democracy-ness'. Some authors connect this notion with the idea of progressive historical development, namely that a nation’s position on this dimension corresponds to its degree of development or backwardness in other social, political and intellectual spheres (particularly noticeable in Kohn and Greenfeld). The other relevant underlying assumption, which makes this kind of theorising similar to stereotyping, is the assumed internal homogeneity of nationalisms. English nationalists, for example, are presented as if they were all alike within group, but completely different in comparison with, say, Ruritanian nationalists. In the subsequent sections of the paper will be critically examined these two hidden but rather important assumptions. Additionally, labelling nationalism as civic or ethnic implies temporal stability of its character. It suggests that, for example, English nationalism has been constantly ‘civic’ during the last two hundred years.

An important methodological difficulty in criticising the described theoretical position is that it is rarely clear what is meant by saying, for example, that 'Western nationalism' is civic, inclusive, democratic. It could be interpreted in a sense that there existed a single nationalist movement uniformly characterised by the ‘civic’ understanding of nationhood. It could also mean that dominant political elites or power-holders held such views, or that some important intellectuals expressed such ideas. It could also refer to legal regulations concerning citizenship. It could mean the absence of ethnic conflicts, either in general, or those supported by the state, or nationalist leaders, or spontaneously emerging among masses. Moreover, it could mean that members of a nation overwhelmingly held attitudes that could be described as the ‘civic nationalist attitudes'.

The view of nationalisms as internally homogeneous, unidimensional, and temporally stable can be discredited by presenting two sorts of evidence. One concerns divergent political, intellectual, institutional, and other traditions within both ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ nationalisms. This will include also some hints about their temporal changeability. Empirical analysis of popularly held nationalist attitudes is another sort of evidence. The paper presents a comparative analysis of the structure of nationalist attitudes in Hungary and Yugoslavia, countries in which, according to the named writers, grows the ethnic species of nationalism.

**Multifaceted Traditions: Nationalisms are ethnic and civic**

The division of nationalisms in civic and ethnic kind is often based on historical examination of various subjectively selected cases and sources. This practice could be contested on various grounds, e.g., regarding the representativeness of the selected 'sample' of writers, or regarding the superficial attention paid to the non-western European developments. Fortunately, there are some authors who present more diversified descriptions of various nationalisms.

Mann (1992) includes in his definition of nationalism both ethnocentric and statist elements, and therefore is able to detect ethnocentric elements in, for example, English nationalism. He writes that in 18th century the English portrayed themselves in contrast to French, as, for example, more sincere, blunt, hard working, while the features of decadence and idleness were ascribed to the French (p. 152). Common place was that the “English moral
virtue lay in the qualities of its ‘people’” (p. 153), though who qualifies as the people in the political sense was contested (the end of the 18th century). For example, in 1832 only about 20-25 % of males received a right to vote in England. Therefore, Mann reformulates the self-adorning claim of the English nationalists that “the power was vested in the people”, in the sense that “the power was vested in the propertied people” (p. 153). In his words, “Britain was ruled by ... a class-nation” (p. 154) This suggests that the English nationalism, even if ethnically inclusive, besides widespread ethnocentrism, was exclusive in class terms, and that it was therefore democratic in rather peculiar way.

Mann also argues that in the late 18th century France existed also petty bourgeois radicals and cultural nationalists (Mann, 1992, p. 151), not only civic nationalists. In similar way Smith (1991) speaks about ‘puritan ethnic nationalism’ in Britain. American nationalism contains also elements of xenophobia, ethnocentrism and racism. Josiah Strong can be quoted as an illustration. He argued in 1885 that “it is the mission of the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ to bear the ideals of civil liberty and spiritual Christianity to peoples in remote areas of the world”. Though this view is ‘inclusive’, it demands expansion and dominance over the others, on the basis of the presumed superiority, i.e., it is a clear example of ethnocentrism. Furthermore, it is not clear how the history of slavery and segregation is compatible with the tradition of ‘democratic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism.

‘Eastern’ nationalism is frequently condemned for its presumed violent character. However, Mann relates violence of nationalism to political factors, not geography (Mann, 1992, 1995). In his view, violent character of state-subverting nationalist movements is largely influenced by the authoritarian and repressive character of central authorities, not so much by supposed ethnic character of specific nationalist discourse or tradition. Mann's point would seem self-evident if it would not be so often forgotten that nationalism is about the redistribution of political power. Aggressiveness with which new aspirants for political power enter the conflict is related to the willingness of power-holders to use violence for the defence of the status quo. For the same reason, i.e. because it represented political change not welcomed by the authorities, the French Revolution was rather violent historical episode in spite of the ‘civic’ French nationalism.

Part of the Greenfeld’s problematic distinction of the Western and Eastern nationalism comes from the confusion of the ethnic and democratising dimensions of nationalism (democratising in the sense of downward class redistribution of some power). More clear picture would emerge if the two dimensions are conceived as being independent, as in Figure 1.

In this model, ethnic dimension refers to the salience of the ethnic component, while democracy dimension refers to the request for greater political participation of lower social classes. Adherents of the Eastern vs. Western division of nationalism would group all Western nationalisms into the democratic/civic quadrant, while the Eastern ones would presumably fit the ethnic-non-democratic quadrant. However, the reality seems a bit more complex.

The English nationalism of the 19th century could be described as relatively non-democratic, for the political participation was restricted to ‘propertied’ strata in Mann’s terms (Mann, 1992). Nationalisms of the 1848, and some anti-colonial nationalisms as well could be generally included into the category of democratic and ethnic kind.

Serbian nationalism (shown in italics) can serve as an illustration of historical changes in the character of a single nationalism. According to Sugar (1969), Serbian nationalism started as a popular movement in 1804 (at the time did not exist any Serbian elite), i.e., it was democratic, but also ethnic in the sense of the anti-Ottoman resistance. Pašić’s nationalism at
the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century was also democratic and popular, but less ethnically defined (Stokes, 1990). Between the two World Wars Serbian nationalism was rather non-democratic, led by bureaucracy and bourgeoisie, but also rather civic, in the sense of assimilationist practices, aimed at, for example, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims of Bosnia. Serbian nationalism in the 1990's could be taken as an example of a non-democratic and ethnic nationalism. Of course, this model suffers of similar problems as the unidimensional Greenfeldian distinction, namely assumes internal homogeneity where it does not necessarily exists. However, it also illustrates the utility of having more complex models, since, as Hall argues (1995), complex reality has to be represented by complex models.
Figure 1 Two hypothetical dimensions of nationalism with examples from Western and Eastern Nationalisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalisms of 1848</td>
<td>French nationalism (idealised)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian nationalism 1804</td>
<td>Pašić's nationalism in Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian nationalism 1990s</td>
<td>Serbian nationalism between two WWs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German nationalism (standard view)</td>
<td>English nationalism 18-19th century</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even this brief and sketchy illustration of multifaceted traditions in ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ nationalisms shows their considerable heterogeneity, both in the sense of simultaneously existing different streams within nationalist movements, and in the sense of temporal changeability.

**Empirical research on the dimensionality of nationalist attitudes**

If one agrees with Connor (e.g., 1994, 1993) that nationalism is essentially a mass phenomenon, than it is also necessary to examine the popular nationalist attitudes. First, will be reviewed basic empirical findings concerning the dimensionality of nationalist attitudes obtained internationally, and in the former Yugoslavia. Afterwards follows the comparison of the structure of nationalist attitudes obtained on the samples from Yugoslavia and Hungary.

It is possible to differentiate two general models of the structure of nationalist attitudes. According to one, national attitudes form a single cumulative dimension, while according to the other nationalist attitudes form a multidimensional structure.

Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993), for example, present evidence that patriotism, nationalism and ethnocentrism are ordered in the continuum of rejecting outgroups, i.e., that different forms of out-group rejection can be regarded as steps in a "single cumulative dimension of ethnic attitudes" (p. 21). According to Dekker and Malova (1997), national attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy of empirically distinguishable attitudes, ordered according to the degree of extremeness: national feeling, national liking, national pride,
national preference, national superiority and nationalism. If these unidimensional models would be confirmed in cross-cultural studies, it would justify to a certain extent comparison of various nationalisms (actually of attitudinal distributions’ parameters in compared populations) as being more or less ‘ethnic’. But, at the same time these models are based on the variance within the examined groups, i.e., the examined nationalisms are internally heterogeneous.

Various authors conceive nationalist attitudes as sets of more or less related attitudinal dimensions. Kosterman and Feschbach (1989) conducted a study in the USA on an ad hoc sample (N=239) of mainly college students who completed the 120-item Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire, in order to investigate "the multidimensionality of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes". The resulting six factors were labelled 1. Patriotism, i.e., general positive evaluation and affect for America, 2. Nationalism, or "America-first" or American-superiority" opinions, 3. Internationalism, consisted of items that apply to world sharing or global welfare (p.264), 4. Civil Liberties, 5. World Government and 6. Smugness. Their hypothesis on multidimensionality of nationalist attitudes in the USA was confirmed, as well as the distinctiveness and independence of the nationalist, patriotic, and internationalist attitudes.

Forbes (1985) factor analysed various measures of nationalist attitudes on the samples of French and English Canadians. He concluded that "(a) positive attitudes towards one's own nation (patriotism, defensive nationalism, national loyalty, etc.) are not the same as (b) negative attitudes towards outgroups (xenophobia, aggressive nationalism, chauvinism, etc.), but "nationalism" should not be defined in such a way to suggest that these are independent dimensions of variation" (p.135). In other words, it means that in Canada nationalist and ethnocentric attitudes are related.

On the basis of a survey in Yugoslavia Rot and Havelka (1973) distinguished five forms of national attachment:

1. ethnocentrism (or exclusive national attachment) - exclusive attachment to one's own nation, viewing the nation as being exceptional and superior; 2. national idealisation (or salient national attachment) - emphasising the significance of national attachment per se; 3. divided national attachment - simultaneous attachment to one's own nation and to a mankind and support for inter-national co-operation; 4. attachment to humanity - emphasising the priority of attachment to the general human community over narrow national attachment; 5. absence of any national attachment - denying the importance and value of any kind of national attachment. (p. 262).

Correlation between these attitudes indicated that they tend to group into three broader orientations: 1. international orientation, consisted of the divided national attachment and of the attachment to humanity; 2. national orientation, consisted of ethnocentrism and national idealisation, and 3. absence of national orientation, which is in moderate negative correlation with national idealisation and in positive with attachment to humanity. In a follow-up research Đurić (1980) confirmed the previous results, but it was found that five forms of national attachment tend to form two dimensions on the higher level: international and ethnocentric orientation.

This brief review of the selected relevant studies allows the following generalisations: 1. ethnic/nationalist attitudes are multidimensional, repeated confirmation received dimensions of ethnocentric nationalism, patriotism and internationalism; 2. some of the

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3 Their model is actually more complicated, because they include also negative and neutral national attitudes, regional attitudes, etc. (Dekker and Malova, 1997).
discovered dimensions show relative stability over time and across societies; and 3. there is a tendency existence of primary factors to converge towards a more general factor of nationalist attitudes. The two presented empirical models (single cumulative dimension and several more or less related dimensions) seem compatible rather than mutually exclusive. It is supported by frequently reported intercorrelations between specific national attitudes. However, variations in the number, character and interrelatedness of the national attitudes dimensions could be used as an useful source of information about the relationships between attitudes and socio-political processes. For example, Kosterman and Feschbach's (1989) findings about the superiority component in the American nationalist attitudes could be related to American social and political history and contemporary mass ideology.

The following comparison of the number, content and interrelationships of nationalist attitudes dimensions between Hungary and Yugoslavia is based on this logic.

Structure of Nationalist Attitudes in Hungary and Yugoslavia

The empirical part of this research is focused on the differences and similarities in latent structure of nationalist attitudes between samples from Szeged, Hungary and from Subotica, Yugoslavia. It is mainly descriptive study and is based on the comparison of the extracted factors and their qualitative interpretation. The results should help in evaluating the hypothesis on unidimensionality and intra-national homogeneity of the nationalist attitudes.  

Method

Nationalism scale

The analysis is based on the 17-item Nationalism-scale. It is a Likert-form scale, with six possible degrees of dis/agreement. Answer were coded in the way that lower numbers represent stronger agreement. This is important to remember because of the interpretation of the direction of significant relationships.

Respondents

The Nationalism scale was one of several instruments applied in a broader survey conducted in 1992. Two ad hoc samples of approximately 400 respondents were secondary school and university students from Subotica, Yugoslavia and Szeged, Hungary. Questionnaires were administered during regular classes, and its filling lasted approximately 40 minutes. Full anonymity for respondents was secured.

Later analysis showed that the samples are similar according to most socio-demographic variables. Hungarian sample is nationally homogeneous, while the sample from Subotica is consisted of six nationalities, with the relative majority (42%) of ethnic Hungarians. Proportions of the nationalities in this sample approximate the proportions of nationalities in secondary schools in Subotica.

Analysis

The core of the study is factor analysis of the Nationalism scale on both samples. Initial factor extraction solution is Principal Components (PC) method. Criterion for the

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4 It is important to note that this is secondary data analysis. The data were collected for other purpose, and the analysed Nationalism scale was not constructed for the problem addressed in this research. Therefore, the results should be taken more as indicative of certain relationships than as a conclusive evidence.
number of factors for extraction is the Scree-test. Extracted factors were rotated in Oblimin terminal solution.

Results

The results will be presented in several steps: factor analysis on the sample from Subotica with brief factor interpretation is the first step. More detailed interpretation and comparison will be given after the results for the Hungarian sample. Afterwards follows the interpretation and comparison of the Oblimin rotated factors and their intercorrelations.

Extraction of principal components

According to the Scree test, 2 and 3 factors were extracted in the Yugoslavian and Hungarian samples respectively. Table 1 shows eigenvalues and corresponding raw and cumulative percentages of the explained variance.

Table 1  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Yugoslavian sample</th>
<th>Hungarian sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>% of variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in Table 1 and the structure of first principal components in two samples (PC columns, Table 2), suggest the following interpretation:

1. There is a strong evidence about the existence of one general dimension underlying the variability of answers to the Nationalism scale in both samples. However, this dimension is considerably more emphasised in the Yugoslavian. In both samples all variables significantly correlate with the first principal component, but the loadings are generally higher in the Yugoslavian sample, ranging from .78 to .51, while in Hungarian sample the range is from .70 to .42.

2. It can be interpreted as a result of the process of qualitative homogenisation of nationalist/ethnic attitudes, since this dimension accounts for nearly 50% of variance more in the Yugoslavian sample (47.2% comparing to 31.7%). Qualitative homogenisation refers to the unidimensionality of nationalist attitudes. It does not mean the respondents have similar attitudes, it only indicates that the source of variation in nationalist attitudes is rather homogenised.

3. In the Hungarian sample, three extracted factors are explaining 51.5% of the total variance. The first factor is also greater than the others, but relative importance of other factors aside the first one is greater than in the Yugoslavian case.

4. The order of variables according to their loading by the first component differs in two samples (Table 2). Higher loading of items 13, 3 and 6 in Yugoslavian sample suggests that this dimension is more determined by the individual's identification with his/her nation or ethnic group (13). Thus, is can be named as a general ethno-nationalist orientation, with the emphasis on national closedness and exclusiveness. In the Hungarian sample there is a greater influence of subjectively experienced ethnic/national identity (items 9, 15, 12) while national closedness and exclusiveness are less emphasised (relatively low loading of items 3,
Thus, in the Szeged sample this scale measured a sort of 'patriotic' or 'romantic' nationalism, because of the emphasis on the national feelings and identity. It seems that in the former case the underlying emotion is distrust in out-groups, and in the latter national identity and pride. However, the difference is marginal and both can be subsumed under the general ethno-nationalist orientation.

**Oblimin rotated factors**

**Subotica sample**

The first Oblimin factor (Table 2) consists of several groups of items: one expressing the identification with nation or ethnic group (items 13, 12, 15, 10), the second demanding discriminative rights (11, 17), the third expressing national closedness (3, 5), and belief in national inequality. It seems that the factor can be named *ethnocentric nationalism*, because all items can be interpreted as expressions of the ethnocentric orientation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Yugoslav sample</th>
<th>Hungarian sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC F1 F2</td>
<td>PC F1 F2 F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 It is nonsense that all nations are equal. Some peoples are more, some less honourable.</td>
<td>.57 .66</td>
<td>.55 .63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 To be without a nation is like to be without a family.</td>
<td>.71 -.64</td>
<td>.58 -.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 It is not good to be too open towards other nations.</td>
<td>.68 .73</td>
<td>.45 .72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Every nation should live in its own state.</td>
<td>.63 -.36</td>
<td>.44 .71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Nationally mixed marriages are determined to failure.</td>
<td>.69 .55</td>
<td>.42 .65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 An important thing children should learn in schools is to love their nation.</td>
<td>.73 -.74</td>
<td>.57 -.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Feeling of national attachment is one of the most valuable feelings one could ever experience.</td>
<td>.70 -.99</td>
<td>.54 -.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 One should be reserved and cautious towards other nations, even when they appear to be friendly.</td>
<td>.75 -.51</td>
<td>.56 .62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 One should respect his nation and its tradition.</td>
<td>.74 -.75</td>
<td>.70 -.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 All great deeds are inspired by the national feelings.</td>
<td>.64 .51</td>
<td>.52 .48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 In our country our nation should be privileged regarding the employment.</td>
<td>.75 .75</td>
<td>.58 .36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 One's most important characteristics come from his nationality.</td>
<td>.68 .75</td>
<td>.63 .38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 One's destiny equals with the nation's destiny.</td>
<td>.75 .67</td>
<td>.58 -.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Renewal of our national ideals is our most important task.</td>
<td>.78 -.60</td>
<td>.70 -.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Putting our nation above others is nothing evil, it is just an expression of love for our people.</td>
<td>.69 .54</td>
<td>.61 .52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 One should always put national interests above the personal ones.</td>
<td>.64 -.65</td>
<td>.55 -.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 National majority should always have more political rights than minorities.</td>
<td>.51 .68</td>
<td>.48 .65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Loadings above .30 shown.*
The second factor consists of two groups of variables. Items 7, 6, 2, 9, 16, and 14 express positive feelings or attachment towards nation, and items 8 and 4 closedness or exclusiveness. However, the first group of items has higher loadings, so the proposed alternative labels for the factor are romantic nationalism, or national attachment.

High correlation between the two factors ($r=-.64$) suggests that to a great extent they have common foundation, perhaps general ethno-nationalist orientation (negative sign is because of the negative projections of items on the Factor 2). These results suggest that in this sample ethnocentric, exclusive, nationalism largely merged with presumably more benevolent, romantic nationalism.

**Szeged sample**

The first factor is quite clear in meaning, and can be interpreted as ethnic/national discrimination, or ethnocentrism alternatively. The second factor is defined by the items which express positive attachment and feelings towards one's nation and its traditions, the importance of national identity and necessity to support national interests. The factor is similar to the second factor from the Yugoslavian sample, and is labelled in the same way, as romantic nationalism, or alternatively, positive national attachment.

The third factor is also well defined, and expresses various requests for national closedness and exclusiveness. Accordingly, it is named as national closedness. While those high in the first factor (discrimination) would be more likely to support active discriminatory policies towards out-groups, those high in this factor would rather tend to avoid contacts with them.

Correlation between factors in the Szeged sample (Table 3) are significant but quite moderate in magnitude. Positive association between factors 1 and 3 (discrimination and closedness) is an expected result, as well as association between romantic nationalism and the other two factors (negative sign is because of negative projections of the items on the factor 2).

**Table 3 Correlation between nationalism factors in the Szeged sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1 Ethnic/national discrimination</th>
<th>Factor 2 Romantic nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2 Romantic nationalism</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3 National closedness</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings on the Szeged sample could be summarised in the following points: a) hypothesis on the multidimensionality of nationalist attitudes is confirmed; b) obtained are three relatively independent attitudinal dimensions; c) the findings are in accordance with results from reviewed studies conducted in different countries.

**Table 4 Extracted factors in the Subotica and Szeged samples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yugoslavian sample</th>
<th>Hungarian sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ethnocentric nationalism</td>
<td>1. National/ethnic discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Romantic nationalism</td>
<td>2. Romantic nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. National closedness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although there are some similarities between factors from the two samples, there are also important differences:

1. In the sample from Yugoslavia, there are two factors, while in the Hungarian three. The extracted factors are:
2. In the Yugoslavian sample factors are more correlated;
3. In Yugoslavian sample there is evident fusion or convergence of ethnocentric and romantic nationalist attitudes;
4. The first factors in both samples contain ethnocentric elements, but in the Yugoslavian sample it is more determined by the identification with the in-group, while in the Hungarian sample by the discrimination of out-group.

Factor analysis in this study is used with the purpose of "the identification of reliable dimensions of individual differences" (Powell & Royce, 1981, p.819). The identified reliable dimensions of individual differences in nationalist attitudes are relatively different in the two samples. The main obtained qualitative difference could be subsumed under the category of factor convergence, which "refers to the coalescence of two or more previously independent factors" (Powell & Royce, 1981, p.820). The interpretation of the fusion and qualitative homogenisation of nationalist attitudes in the Yugoslavian sample is based on the following results:

1. Greater intercorrelations between the items in the Yugoslavian sample (matrix of item intercorrelations is not presented);
2. Differences in absolute and relative size of the eigenvalues between the samples;
3. Number and pattern of Oblimin factors: in the Yugoslavian sample extracted are two strongly correlated factors, while in the Hungarian sample three relatively independent factors.

It seems that during the time, as the interethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia were escalating, the fine distinctions within the area of nationalist attitudes have been lost, and that attitudes in population became polarised and homogenised. Acceptance of any national attachment started to mean the acceptance of simplified nationalist/ethnocentric views. Resistance towards the acceptance of ethnocentric orientations started to imply avoiding and/or denying of any national/ethnic feelings. Previously found attitudes like patriotism or divided national attachment have disappeared, while one broad dimension of ethnocentric/nationalist orientation remained.

The advantage of this kind of analysis seems obvious in comparison to the simple use of ‘civic’ vs. ‘ethnic’ nationalism. It enables fine grade analysis, allows the contextualisation of changes in nationalist attitudes, and more accurate description of individual or group positions concerning the nationalist ideology.

**Final Discussion and conclusions**

Primary task of the paper was to illustrate the empirical and theoretical inadequacy of the use of the distinction ‘civic vs. ethnic’ nationalism. The first part of the analysis showed that nationalist movements, traditions, ideologies are in fact not internally homogeneous. To label nationalism in the Western countries simply as ‘civic’ means a gross oversimplification and basically the distortion of the reality. That part of the analysis could be basically seen as a footnote to Brubaker's sixth point in his *Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism* (1997).
The second part of the analysis addressed the problem of the dimensionality of nationalist attitudes. The reviewed previous studies and comparison of the attitudinal structure among Hungarian and Yugoslavian respondents evidenced the multidimensionality of national attitudes. It was found that number and content of dimensions varies in two countries. While in the Yugoslavian sample it could be acceptable to compare *individuals* according to ethnic-civic dimension of nationalism (note: individuals within the group, not yet the group with another external group), in the Hungarian sample it is not the case. Relative independence of the three described dimensions implies that an individual’s nationalist attitudes should be described referring to her position on the all three dimensions simultaneously.

Brubaker’s (1996) concepts of external homeland, nationalising states and mobilising minorities could be used as macro level concepts helpful for understanding the differences in attitudinal structure of Yugoslavian and Hungarian respondents, and in this way illustrate the analytical usefulness of the more diversified and empirically based approach to nationalist ideologies. For example, Hungary being already a nationalised state, without particularly acute ethnic cleavages, leaves the ‘psychological space’ for relatively independent variations of various aspects of nationalist ideology. On the other hand, ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia put ethnic Hungarians (relative majority in the sample) in position of the mobilising minority. Nationalising of the Serbian political space also increased the salience of ethnicity for Serbs in the sample. Consequently, the whole sample, regardless of the ethnic background was in the situation of intensive ethnification of the both public and private sphere (cf. Brubaker, 1996).

In such socio-political context, cleavages along ethnic lines leave narrow space for the influence of other factors onto attitudinal structure. To put it simply, one is in the ‘yes-no’ position regarding nationalism: either accepts ethno-nationalist ideology in a ‘package’ consisting of both romantic and ethnocentric elements, or rejects it altogether. As a result, previously independent attitudes converged towards the single dimension. Comparison of the attitudinal structure between Serbs and Ethnic Hungarians within the Yugoslavian sample (results not presented in the paper), shows their considerable similarity. It seems that ethnic tension in a society makes structural aspects of minority and majority attitudes more similar.5

These processes could be related to what Brubaker calls "eventful" character of nationalism (Brubaker, 1996), referring to the sudden increase in the salience of nationality or ethnicity. However, to explain this phenomena, particularly why and how social processes influence individual reactions, also psychological considerations are needed. One way of connecting social and psychological processes could be derived from findings of Dijker et al. (1996). They argue that those “aspects of intergroup relations that potentially can arouse emotions ... are likely to become central and motivationally relevant elements” (p. 313). In other words, ethnic conflicts provoke intensive emotional reactions, leading to intensive ‘ethnification’ and polarisation of previously more heterogeneous national attitudes.

In order to examine these speculations about the relationship between socio-political processes and the structure of nationalist attitudes it would be interesting to perform similar analysis after the political change in Serbia. Post-Milošević period should be characterized by increasing diversification of national attitudes.

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5On the other side, ethnic groups were quantitatively located on the opposite extremes of the single nationalist attitude dimension. The groups have the following means on the first principal component of the nationalism scale: -.52 (Serbs), -.33 (Montenegrin), -.04 (Bunjevac), .02 (Magyars), .19 (declared Yugoslavs), and .26 (Croats). ANOVA analysis showed significant differences between groups (p<.001). Negative sign indicates greater agreement with ethno-nationalist attitudes.
Referring back to Kohn’s and Greenfeld’s ‘psychological’ hypotheses about the inferiority complex as being the basis of ethnic, i.e., Eastern nationalism, it seems that this hypothesis is not without foundation. However, the inferiority complex perhaps plays similar role both in Eastern and in Western nationalism, and it could be related to individual differences in ethno-nationalist attitudes, but hardly as a basis for group comparisons. In any way the hypothesis is open to empirical testing, at least concerning contemporary nationalisms. Otherwise, ascription of inferiority feelings to a group could be interpreted as an expression of a belief in the superiority of another group, i.e., of ethnocentrism and prejudices.

The argument presented in the paper has two aspects: positive and negative. It was shown that it is not inappropriate to conceptualise nationalism as internally homogeneous movement or ideology and that nationalisms should not be compared only along a single dimension as in cases of contrasting ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms. This view of nationalism resemble the cognitive processes involved in stereotyping, and deserves critical examination. Cross-cultural comparison of nationalist attitudes (and nationalisms) should therefore be sometimes done along more than one dimension. But, even if multidimensionality is taken into account, internal heterogeneity of nationalist attitudes and movements, i.e., existence of significant inter-individual differences, should not be overlooked.

Concerning the positive aspect of the argument, it was attempted to show the analytical usefulness of a more diversified view of nationalism, based on sets of empirically rooted and theoretically meaningful concepts. Particular advantage of this approach could be the possibility to connect socio-psychological and sociological theories and micro and macro processes in a meaningful way.

References


