CHAPTER VIII: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY: THE CASE OF SERB - ALBANIAN RELATIONS

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Introduction

Subject of the study

These study deals with the social dimensions, basic causes and behaviour of major participants during and in the aftermath of the Serb - Albanian conflict in Kosovo.

The role of the NGOs, especially the attempts of the Forum for Ethnic relations (FER) at contributing to the peaceful solution of the problem based on a special status for Kosovo as an interim solution, is also analysed.

The study also addresses the peace-building process, measures for establishing and maintaining the peace and the building of democratic institutions of self-government both in Kosovo and the region of the South Balkans.

The following participants in the conflict will be examined:

Internal participants:

- The political actors, especially the governments of Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Slobodan Milosevic, and his specific role, taking into consideration the fact that his personal power in the FRY was outside any public or parliamentary control;
- Political leaderships of Serbian and Kosovar Albanian national movements;
- Intellectuals;
- The military: The Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the police, paramilitary formations (Serbian parapolice and Albanian: Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA and National Movement of Kosovo, LKCK);

Foreign participants:

- Governments of Macedonia, Albania, Russia, United States and other NATO member – states;
- NATO military commander and political leadership;
- International organisations (UN, OSCE, and European Union, EU).

The involvement of certain international NGOs will also be considered, especially the Project on Ethnic relations (PER) leading US – based organisation that has extensively co-operated with FER.

The opening hypothesis

The opening hypothesis of the study is the following:

- In the case of Kosovo and of the Serb-Albanian conflict we are dealing with a conflict in a non-democratic state. In a state of this kind violence associated with secessionist and separatist movements tend to be high. The institutionalised protection of civil liberties and respect for human rights is not dealt with and does not permit communities to translate their demands into democratic, electoral power. The government is not able to rule in a democratic way and to manage its ethnic opposition at the same time. Also, there is no widespread popular legitimacy for resolving the conflicts peacefully through democratic institutions.

The new nationalist elites and their “negative policies”, such as internal colonialism, ethnocide and genocide, play a special role in the conflict.
International intervention in the conflict is officially motivated by the concern to uphold the principles of minority and human rights, but primary to preserve international peace and stability. This resulted in a clash of opinions between Russia and China on the one hand, and the United States and its NATO ally, on the other. Likewise, the EU itself displayed internal differences of interests and approaches to the Kosovo crisis and the Balkan (and European) integration.

Two questions are particular disputable: the role of the UN in restoring and maintaining the peace and the expanding of NATO into a Pan-European security system.

Parties in the conflict viewed the international community's response to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo crisis differently.

The Serbian side took a stand against the interests of NATO countries, while the Albanian side opted for an alliance with NATO. A main challenge for the international community is to put this experience behind itself and establish a set of the new relations, acting as a “Third party” - a mediator in the conflict.

**Method**

Data and process analysis have been used in the preparation of the study including, in particular, sociological methods, such as surveys, interviews, etc. and historiography, demographic and statistical researches methods.

The method of an “action research” has also been applied.
**Origin, Causes and Consequences of the Serb-Albanian Conflict**

*The Origin of the Serb-Albanian Conflict*

Serb-Albanian relations are marked by confrontations, which reveal numerous characteristics of ethnic conflict. The conflict itself is over the status of Albanians and control over the territory of Kosovo. It is a conflict between the Serbian majority opting for self-isolation and the Albanian minority opting for separation. At the same time, both sides choose irredentism.

The order in Kosovo was not based on the rule of law, but on the balance of fear: either fear of the revenge (“vendetta”), which is especially widespread within the Albanian community, or fear of state sanctions. Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo are established according to the domination model. Both communities seek to institutionalise their domination.

*The significance of Kosovo for the Serb-Albanian relations and regional stability*

Kosovo is situated in the south of Serbia and FRY. It is the geostrategic centre of the Balkans, known for its permeability, road junctions and geostrategic operational courses.

Kosovo covers the territory of 10,908 sq. km and is populated with approximately two million people, ethnic Albanians account 1.600.000.

FRY and Serbia, Kosovo is a ground where peoples and communities meet, co-operate and clash with their different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. (See Tables. 1, 2, 3, and 4.) Accounting for 82% of Kosovo population, ethnic Albanians are the prevailing ethnic community. However, in the context of Serbia (17%) or FRY (16,5%) ethnic Albanian’s are a significant minority. This clearly indicates the relativity of the majority-minority concept in the case of Serb – Albanian Relations. The process of ethnic
homogenisation is characteristic of Kosovo and it is also well evident on the territorial level, as a concentration of the ethnic minorities, especially in the bordering areas.

Kosovo is an area of extreme emigration, with the establishment of Milosevic’s rule over Kosovo (in 1990), coercion and political insecurity grew among the Albanians, which intensified their emigration to other countries.


The Constitution of 1974, linked Kosovo with the federal state directly referring to it as a “constitutive element”. After coming to power in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic changed the constitution in 1990 and limited the autonomy of Kosovo, which has become a territorial autonomy only.

Kosovo experienced a fast-growing modernisation of economy and society. But it still remained the least developed area in the former Yugoslavia. Despite a great number of changes and modernisation, the Kosovar Albanian society remains mostly rural. There has been a real exodus of population from villages into towns, from agriculture into industry. The towns, with their growth, could not absorb the increase in population and were especially unable to influence the change of the ingrained habits and life styles. The colonial model bears upon the development of the economic structure of Kosovo. Kosovo is on the "outskirts" of economy development and Albanians are a peripheral social group.
The history of Serb - Albanian relations in the former Yugoslavia went through a number of stages (see Chronology in the APPENDIX I):

- First stage, 1918 - 1941/45: A period of shifting domination, occasional violence and armed conflicts. At first, Albanians were under Serbian domination. Later, from 1941 - 1945, in Greater Albania, created in co-operation with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, Serbs were persecuted in Kosovo.

- Second stage, 1945 - 1966: A period of oscillations from occasional violence (Albanian rebellions and their suppression by the military and police) to solution of disputes by political means. In this period, massive and numerous administrative limitations of Albanians rights have occurred, as well as occasional violence.

- Third stage, 1966 - 1981: A period in which the rights of Albanians are recognised and guaranteed at a very wide range, while the autonomy of Kosovo within the federal structure of Yugoslavia strengthens. This upholds the emancipation and self-assertion of the Albanian community, but also gives rise to an Albanian nationalist movement, supported by the local communist elite.

- Fourth stage, 1981 – present: A period of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, strengthening of both Serbian and Albanian ethnonationalistic movements and political and armed conflicts of Serbs and Albanians. This period could be divided into four sub-stages.

The first began in 1981 and lasted until 1986: at that time, the Albanians, primarily combining mass political demonstrations with the use of state institutions (mostly of the local branch of the Yugoslav Communist Party), demanded their own state - a “Kosovo - Republic”.
The second that started in 1986 was characterized by a conflict over the constitutional status of Kosovo and the Albanian community.

The third sub-stage, 1989 - 1998, was marked by open political conflicts. In fact, invoking the “ethnic principle” the Serbian authorities tried to constitute Serbia as an ethnic state and protect all Serbs on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. However, in their approach to the Kosovo issue, the priority was given to the “historical right” and to the “principle of statehood”. The Albanian leaders, on the other hand, tried to build institutions of a “parallel state” - self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo.

Finally, the fourth sub-stage was marked by an open armed conflict 1998 - 1999.

- The fifth stage begins in July 1999, with the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and is characterised by international military (KFOR) and civil (UNMIK) presence in Kosovo. This period should develop along the lines of restoring and maintaining the peace, confidence building and establishing a common system of decision-making for Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo.

**War over Kosovo - The Bloody Feast of Ethnic Nationalism**

Milosevic's regime tried to establish direct jurisdiction over Kosovo by restricting the rights of Albanians through a methodically pursued campaign for their marginalization, as well as discrimination and provision of social, economic and political “motives” for moving them out of Kosovo. On the other hand, Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), by building institutions of the Albanian “parallel state”, made an effort to achieve independence for the Republic of Kosovo. These two political participants established and maintained a status quo from 1990 until 1995. The result is a complete division within Kosovo’s society: a vast majority of the population lives in strict separation.

After Dayton\(^1\), at the end of 1995, two parallel processes begin:
- Official public discussion on Kosovo status emerges. They was deep-frozen and the talks about that issues started independently of, or rather against the will of government and political leadingships, by the domestic and foreign NGO’s, including the FER. The government, political leaders and parties (Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS and LDK), both hard-liners and moderate ones joined the discussion later on.

- And, radicalization of the Albanian movement and political life in Kosovo, which took the courses of the intensification of the Albanian political conflicts. In 1996, among the Albanians, especially the younger ones, there was a growing tendency to reject the peaceful policy of Ibrahim Rugova. At that time, strengthening of an anti-Serbian attitude culminating in a series of “test attacks” by LKCK and KLA, which began on April 22nd, 1996 and turned into armed resistance in 1998 and 1999.

The beginning of the year 1997 was ominous. In March, protests in Albania grew into a chaotic rebellion against the government of President Sali Berisha. The events in Albania had two consequences for Kosovo: first, in an increasing insecurity and nervousness among Kosovar Albanian political leaders, along with the strengthening of radicalisation and reinforcement of military activities of the KLA, which used training camps in northern Albania. The targets of their attacks were the Serbian police and state officials as well as Albanians who were perceived to be “collaborators” or “the people of the Serbian regime”.

During 1998, the influence of the KLA, which supported the radicalisation of the political fitting including armed resistance to Serbia and which influence among Albanians kept growing. Indeed, the KLA became the “movement worth joining”. The result was a change in the balance of political power: the influence of Rugova and the LDK, which weakened. For the Serbian side and the international community, the KLA became a political factor, which should be included in any negotiating process.
In January 1999, the self-organisation of local Serbs into “village guards” began, and the first militant actions took place in Kosovo (blocking of roads around Pristina, on January 7, 1999. At that time, Milosevic decided to defeat the KLA with massive military and police action. Milosevic's conviction (shared by most political parties and the Serbian public) that the problem can be solved by the use of force, was one reason why Serbia and the FR Y were pushed into an armed conflict with the strongest powers of the world (NATO alliance).

In taking up arms, Serbs and Albanians believed they took their destiny into their hands. For the first time, survival on the territory of Kosovo became a personal problem for both Serbs and Albanians, which has to be resolved by force. Serbs who supported Milosevic for 11 years, believing that he would “finally solve the Kosovo problem”, did not find the way to give up. A wide circle of local Serbs is taking part in these actions, mostly through police forces. Local Serbs, who took part in ethnic cleansing, were in total conflict with their Albanian neighbours. Also, many Albanians tried to find an answer to the dilemma: Now or never! The KLA was ordering: Freedom cannot be gained without blood!

*Causes and factors that have led into armed conflict*

The war in Kosovo, which began on February 28th, 1998, is yet another in the line of armed conflicts waged on the soil of the former Yugoslavia over the past decade. These wars were part of the process of the former Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the inception of new states.

The key factors that conflicts in Kosovo escalated into bloody war are:

- Inability of the political elite to undertake the modernisation of the society and democratise the government. Ethnic nationalism appeared to be the means of survival for this elite.
- Orientation of the new nationalist elite towards non-democratic means and policy, violence included ethnocide, genocide and war;
- A sense of insecurity among Kosovo’s citizens, which developed into a psychosis of being endangered³, maintained by the government, political leaders and parties, as well as media under their control, all for the purpose of tipping the balance in favour of one of the competing elites;
- Different shapes of repression of Albanians and violation of their rights⁴;
- Failure to resolve deep crisis of national identity with ethnonationalism. That applies to both Serb⁵ and Albanian ⁶ communities.

The aftermath of the war in Kosovo

The mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo took place twice: in spring 1998 and spring 1999. UNHCR announced, on May 25th, that 957,913 refugees left Kosovo since the beginning of armed conflict in March 1998. Reasons for such a mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo are the following:

- first, ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo, organised by the Serbian civil authorities, police and paramilitary forces;
- second, fleeing from Kosovo during the NATO bombardment;
- Third, Kosovo Albanians found themselves under coercion of the KLA. Indeed, the KLA made an effort to legitimise NATO air strikes and “secure” the arrival of NATO troops in Kosovo. During April 1999 that was also the way of moving a part of KLA fighters along with the refugees into Albania or Macedonia, in order to avoid their destruction by VJ and police forces of the regime.

The end of Milosevic’s Dictatorship over Kosovo and Serbia: New Reality and Challenges

Milosevic’s control over Kosovo came to an end in June 1999 with the arrival of UNMIK, headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. A new reality
was established in Kosovo. Such a situation has been created on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

The situation in Kosovo today is even more difficult than ever. The war of 1998 - 1999 aggravated unresolved problems from the past, and added the status of Kosovo as a new problem, including:

- Killings, dislodging and war devastation;
- The military\(^7\) and civilian presence of the international community\(^8\), including NATO, the UN and the OSCE, insufficiently prepared or willing to preserve the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo as the fundamental value of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244;
- Administrative\(^9\) and security vacuum\(^10\), or rather Kosovo as an example of bad management of conflicts.
- Economy is not functioning\(^{11}\) and UNMIK is incapable to establish social security.
- The public sector in Kosovo is worse off a year after the war than it was before. The Albanians now think that freedom has come and that the West will provide jobs for Kosovar people and will pay them. However, the international community has neither intention nor funds to do that in Kosovo (Mailiqi, 2000: 26).
- The Albanian society at present is suffering from a trauma. Half of the population is displaced. For example, there are about 300,000 people in Pristina who fled their villages. They come from a traditional society where everybody knows everybody else and where a moral code prohibits a person to do anything that might disgrace the family in front of one's neighbours. Since the society in Pristina makes them feel anonymous, they become completely unrestrained, as there is no authority to respect. The “Father of the Family” used to have everything in his hands but now he is a refugee or lives in wretched conditions and is not able to provide for the existence of his dependants. This causes traumas for hundreds of the young people. Teenagers are without any family control, and the school has broken down (Mailiqi, 2000: 27);
- Lack of legality, increased insecurity and instability of Kosovo. Crime and politically motivated murders, kidnappings and thefts; unauthorised possessions of arms, etc. are
nume12). Kosovo Serbs and members of other non-Albanian communities live in an atmosphere of fear in isolated and insecure enclaves. Repression and mass intolerance are today characteristic of the Albanian side. In fact, in late 1999, anarchy and lawlessness ruled Kosovo. In the second half of 2000, even that UNMIK or OSCE managed the situation in Kosovo, was not establish rule of love and peace. Such a situation caused a balance of impotence of all the actors in the Kosovo crisis. The position of Serbs was particularly weakened, demonstrated by the fact that with the arrival of KFOR and establishment of the interim civil administration they began to seek refuge13).

- Opening up of the Albanian issue both as a regional issue and the one of possible unification of all Albanian territories. The transfer of ethnic, and political and territorial tensions outside Kosovo is a matter of particular concern. In southern Serbia (Presevo Valley) provocative activities of Albanian extremists and their so-called avenging actions continue. Negative effects of such actions are also evident in neighboring Macedonia.
- The authorities and opposition in Serbia are embroiled in internal political conflicts and insufficiently engaged in the solution of the Kosovo issue (Statement. 2000)

In October 2000, the fall of Milosevic’s dictatorship created a “new reality”. The new established government in Belgrade officially expresses willingness to cooperate with the international community, while the UNMIK - after the replacement of top officials, i. e. departure of Bernard Kouchner - shows greater readiness for contacts and cooperation with the Serbian side. However, the new situation is teeming with challenges and the possible response of the actors concerned is yet unknown.
The process of searching for a solution: The Case of Forum for Ethnic Relations

It was not until 1998 that, through the mediation of the international community, comparatively uninterrupted political talks began some even ending in negotiations. However, in the course of 2000 or rather during the first year of the international civil and military presence in Kosovo, these talks Belgrade and Kosovar Albanians totally sliced. They only meet at PER’s regional meetings within the PER series on Albanians and Their Neighbors.

One of the features of many efforts made by international governmental organizations and NGOs is that they, in the beginning of their search for the solutions to the Serb – Albanian conflict, paid very little attention to the activities of local NGOs. Not before the NATO bombing, in the second half of 1999, the international community was developed an interest in NGOs activities. The most probably, international community become aware of the fact that the NGOs were an active factor of the public life in Serbia and that, in the situation of a dictatorship, NGOs tended to be more efficient and less politically corrupt than political parties. However, even then the NGO’s efforts at establishing a Serb – Albanian dialogue did not receive any considerable support. As opposed to the general trend, some NGOs are very active in their search for the solution to the Serb – Albanian conflict, above all, the human rights NGOs. For instance, the Helsinki Citizens’ Parliament in the first half of the 1990s, as well as the Helsinki Committees for Human Rights in Serbia and the Helsinki Committees for Human Rights in Kosovo, the Humanitarian Law Center, Women in Black and the Belgrade Circle throughout the period. One of these NGOs is FER.

A particular characteristic of the FER is that it is the only NGO with the prime objective of searching for a solution to the problem of the status of Kosovo and the Serb – Albanian conflict. This was in fact possible since the founders of the FER are prominent intellectuals, some of them even influential political personalities in the Serbian and Albanian communities.14)
Analyzing FER actions one might discern the following phases:
- First, the period from 1990 to 1995,
- Second, post-Dayton period, 1995 – 1997,
- Third, the second half of 1997 – 1999,
- Fourth, post-war period: June 1999 – October 2000,
- Finally, post-Milosevic period, since October 2000.

**Period 1990 – 1995**

The general characteristic of this period is a low level of the Serb – Albanian dialogue. In fact, talks of prominent representatives of the Serb and Albanian communities occur rarely. However, the FER’s activity in the period is very rich in this field.

FER’s activity was based on individual projects within the framework of general objectives, and the following assumptions:

- Direct Serb – Albanian talks are possible, and participation of national or foreign NGOs can be valuable in any mediation process.
- Talks should be held with representatives of the civil society, intellectuals and other important segments of the elites but not with political leaders.
- The question of the Serb – Albanian relations is the question of interethnic relations, and above all the question of the protection and respect for minority rights;
- Solution of the question of violation of human and minority rights of Albanians and of the status of Kosovo is possible within the concept of democratization of Serbia, and with the prospect of joining a united Europe.

In this period, basic FER activities in the sphere of the Serb - Albanian dialogue were:

- First, numerous meetings, joint public round tables, articles in the newspapers, the subject of which were protests against the violation of human and minority rights of the
Albanians, particularly prohibiting their access to schools, universities, scientific and cultural institutions and the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo to the Albanians.

- Second, many and varied activities were carried out within the project *Soros Network for a Serb – Albanian Dialogue*;
- Third, activities carried out in cooperation with PER.

In the *Network*, which was supported in 1993 – 1994 by the Soros Foundation from Yugoslavia and Albania, FER was one of principal initiators and the “executive agency”. While a number of meetings were held within the *Network*, the Albanians were, in reality, increasingly self-organizing themselves through “parallel institutions”, and the Serbs in Kosovo and the Serbia lived next to the Albanians in their “parallel world” firmly leaning on Milosevic’s regime. There was no cooperation in public life, culture, education or politics. In Serbia and FRY, the authorities and media created an atmosphere of disapproval of such activities. Simply, such activities were regarded as “traitorous”. The government persistently tried to exclude any public talk about Kosovo, even more so setting forth views other than the official ones. Actors outside Serbia and Kosovo were not allowed to take part in talks about Kosovo. Indeed, a strong campaign was pursued against the “internationalization of the Kosovo issue”. That is why the first talks were held in Budapest, Hungary, in spring 1993, and in Ohrid, Macedonia, in autumn 1993. Notable intellectuals from Serbia, Kosovo and Albania took part in the talks. After that, work on the preparation and publication of a collection of papers on *Conflict or Dialogue*, in the Albanian, Serbian and English languages, was organized.

The intention of FER’s involvement inn the *Network* was:

- To restore or establish for the first time the severed ties among intellectuals and politicians of the Serbian and Albanian communities, through meetings, exchange of views and work on a joint project (collection of papers) of independent minded intellectuals. Accordingly, opening up new channels of cooperation would have to encourage also other actors of the society, above all doctors, attorneys and business people, to cooperate;
To elucidate from within the most topical problems and ways for overcoming the existing tendencies and conflicts (Licht. 1994:9)

Lessons learned from this work are the following:

- First, there are considerable differences in appraising the reality, especially political consequences of the suspension of Kosovo’s autonomy, and the ways out of the crisis of political relations. Both sides having agreed on the existence of the violation of rights of Albanians (Ahmeti, 1994: 108 – 114; Vasilijevic, 1994: 107). An intellectual from Serbia (Vasilijevic) pointed out that the problem will be solved by democratization of Serbia, while an Albanian (Ahmeti) views it as a systematic policy of apartheid relying on a deep-rooted rejection of Albanians in culture, everyday life, and not only in politics.

- Second, certain facts, even where statistical data are concerned, are viewed and interpreted differently. This particularly relates to the number of Albanians in Kosovo and migration of Serbs and Albanians (Bogosavljevic, 1994: 17 – 29. Islami, 1994: 30 – 53). Further, in relation to the factors of disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the place of Kosovo in the process, Albanian intellectuals from Kosovo (Zajmi, 1994: 189 – 201) hold the view that Kosovo has the same position as Slovenia, Croatia had. Also, they pointed out that Albanians have the right to self-determination and secession from Serbia and the building of the Republic of Kosovo (Agani, 1994: 205 – 225). Kullashi, 1994: 177 – 188). An author from Serbia is of the opinion that the strength of the Albania request lies in an response to the identity crisis and that the request of the Albanians could be justified by the right to self-organization and self-administration, within the transitory period and “special status” in FRY. It could be accompanied with the opening up of borders and intensive regional cooperation (Janjic, 1994: 117 – 176).

- Third, there is a high degree that the questions of Kosovo and Serb – Albanian relations are linked with a deep crisis of the national and state identity (Bobi, 1994; Janjic, 1994; Maliqi, 1994). That the Kosovo problem should be solved by peaceful, non-violent actions of Albanians and negotiation, under the condition of the putting an end to the repression of Milosevic’s regime was pointed out by the some people (Agani, 1994; Janjic, 1994; Kovacevic, 1994). Also, there is a high degree of the strong regional
dimension of the Albanian and Kosovo question (Ismajli, 1994; Milo, 1994; Petkovic, 1994; Puto, 1994), especially at the level of the security (Ocokoljic, 1994) and economic regional integration (Minic, 1994).

Holding of these meetings and the publication of the collection *Conflict or Dialogue*, and later (within the framework of a similar project carried out in cooperation with the University of Nijmegen for the Netherlands) of *Confrontation or Co-existence*, was by itself a good sign. At that same time we have noted that:

- The activities were “sporadic” and “non-cumulative” (Popov, 1994);
- In a situation where differing and often mutually confronted views existed, good will for understanding is not sufficient. However, *Network* gathered together individuals of unequal influence. While on the Albanian side people of influence in the Albanian community in Kosovo and Albania were participating, on the Serb side, from Serbia, participants were moderate and well-intentioned people, representatives of the so-called civic option who were marginalized in Serbia and without any effect on the government. For instance, while Agani was the second man of LDK, there were no party leaders on the Serb side.
- The advocates of extreme views on both sides were totally excluded.
- These activities aroused minor attention on the part of international governmental organizations, NGOs and diplomats acting in Serbia and Kosovo. Even in the program policy of the major sponsor Soros Foundation, these activities were not highly rated.
- Both the public and the *Network* lacked a clear understanding of possible solutions. However, a number of elements pointing to the possibility of solving the status of Kosho issue transpired. Those were concepts of the Kosovo Republic as an independent state (the majority of Albanian advocates), autonomy within Serbia (the majority of Serb and foreign participants) and an interim solution in the form of a “special status” (Janjic, 1994: 167:176);
- Maybe the biggest problem is the lack of instruments for implantation of the ideas that came about in the *Network* activities as well as the absence of an alternative view of the instruments to deal with the issue (Sorensen, 1999: 33).
The cooperation within the *Network* provided an opportunity to FER to re-examine some of its objectives. For instance:

- First, direct Serb–Albanian talks were possible but they could not yield any serious results. Internal division of each of the communities, intransigence of the official Belgrade, mutual confrontation of ethnonationalist views and mutual mistrust required the involvement of a third party, above all CSCE/OSCE or/and UN (Janjic, 1994: 173). However, the potential Third Party did not show any serious interest in the projects like the *Network*.
- Second, talks with representatives of the civil society proved to be useful but they were only within the reach of a narrow segment of the national and foreign public. It was particularly unfavorable that the cooperation was pursued in Serbia only with “civic” intellectuals but not with other significant segments of the elites, especially that there was no cooperation with political leaders.
- Third, it is desirable to have talks in the very centers of the political power of the Albanians and Srebian government, in Pristina and Belgrade. However, in such a case there was neither room for free talks or for influence on the domestic and foreign public. In fact, dictatorial regimes, like Milosevic’s, were very efficient in making such activities impossible in the country such events were also very vulnerable, in fact powerless, if they took place outside the country.
- Fourth, consideration of the Serb–Albanian relations only within the framework of the protection of human and minority rights proved to be insufficient. The belief that the solution of the status of Albanians and Kosovo is possible within the concept of the democratization of Serbia and FRY proved also to be questionable, due to small chances of this happening before the radicalization of both, Serb and Albanian movements.

The cooperation with PER began on the initiative of PER which, in September 1993, at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, organized a roundtable on *Interethnic relations in Serbia/Yugoslavia: Alternatives for the Future*. That was a meeting of intellectuals, politicians and journalists from different parts of the former Yugoslavia, including an
Albanian from Kosovo, experts on the region from the U.S.A. and other countries. The meeting focused on interethnic relations in Serbia and FRY and on the position of the Serbs in the neighboring successor states.

The basic premise of the meeting was that peace will not come to the Balkans as long as the Serbian “national question” remains unsolved; that is, until Serbs are at peace with their non-Serbian fellow citizens of Serbia - FRY, and with their neighbors in the formerly Yugoslav republics. Participants at the September meeting form the nucleus of an informal Serbian – American Consultative Group, which will continue to act on an ad hoc basis to facilitate the efforts in Serbia aimed at the peaceful resolution of the Serbian national question.

In the course of March 1994, a PER founded fact-finding mission visited Serbia, Kosovo and Croatia. The general purpose of the mission was to contact the “moderates” in Serbia, to take note of their views on the situation within Serbia and the Serbs outside Serbia and to consider how moderate forces from different ethnic communities can be assisted or helped to assist each other (Project on Ethnic Relations. 1994:1).

Separate talks with Albanian leaders, representatives of the governments of Serbia and the FRY, as well as the representatives of SPS, demonstrated radically different understanding of the situation on the part of the two sides. From the point of view of the Albanians, they are living in a brutal police state. From the point of view of the both, Serbian and the Federal governments and SPS, the Albanians have every opportunity to participate in political, cultural and social life in Serbia, but refuse to do so because they only want to secede from Serbia. The Albanians point to a well-documented discrimination, harassment and other forms of hostile activities directed against them.

While Albanians created a system of parallel schools, hospitals and other institutions in Kosovo, boycotting official institutions and elections, representatives of the governments on their part saw little reason to negotiate with the Albanians. Some opposition leaders
said that a non-nationalistic party in Serbia couldn’t survive. Yet other leaders of major opposition parties did express willingness to enter into discussions with the Albanians, although they admitted that they could not at this time ensure practical results of any agreements. For their part, the Albanians were skeptical of the utility of discussions, but did not rule them out (Project on Ethnic Relations. 1994:7).

Experiences acquired in the first stages of cooperation with the PER confirm the following:

- First, the existence of a paradox that will later transform the crisis into war: the authorities in Serbia, unable to change the situation to their benefit, strove to maintain the status quo. This was, however, accepted by the leader of the Albanians Dr Ibrahim Rugova and LDK, with the intention to monopolize the institutions of the “parallel system”;
- Second, there were a lot of “moderates” in Serbia who believed in a democratic, peaceful solution of the Serbian national issue, including Serb - Albanian conflict, but they had no power to implement any agreement;
- Third, it transpired that there would not be a clear and simple solution and that various measure had to be taken. That meant that, in addition to trying to include the authorities and SPS into talks with Albanians, it was necessary to uphold efforts of those who were seriously committed to the democratization of political life in Serbia. As a form of such a support, it was proposed to organize in Belgrade a conference on democratization and interethnic relations, scheduled for 1995, with participation of well-known experts in these fields, and a number of public figures of international renown. It was further proposed to support professional political training, such as the development of a data base with the help of neutral experts, that would facilitate a rational discussion of the problem of Kosovo (Project on Ethnic Relations, 1994: 9, 11).

Based on the experience from work within the Network and the cooperation with PER, the following has been learned:
- It is necessary for FER to continue its research, academic and expert search for an efficient solution, re-examining both the limits of the regime in Serbia and the very framework of Serbia and FRY;
- It is needed to increase attention paid to the political leadership, including the SPS. This orientation was the basic reason for a later interruption of cooperation with the Soros Fund in the field of the Serb – Albanian dialogue\(^5\).
- Communications with the public of Serbia and with the representatives of the international community should be intensified. It had aimed to making them more receptive to capabilities of the civil society and NGOs in the Serb – Albanian relations and to the ideas which do not coming from those in power.
- Usefulness of cooperation with influential foreign NGOs. That was a decisive factor in favor of the continuation of FER’s cooperation with PER.
- Creation of favorable logistic conditions in the FER itself for a more systematic work. An attempt was made in this respect with the Soros Fund through a project of the Center for Ethnic Relations and Protection of Minorities, but the Fund's support was missing. However, the support was provided by SIDA creating thereby possibilities for the continuation of FER’s activities in this field.


In this period, more specifically late in 1995, leaderships of opposition parties, the ruling SPS and the Albanian leaders accepted the method of dialogue and negotiation, and a discussion began within the Yugoslav public on the possibilities for a Serb – Albanian dialogue. As opposed to increasingly grave situation in Kosovo, the province, however, seemed to be closer to peace than to war? Nonetheless, this possibility was soon put off due to passive and occasionally arrogant behavior of government and the ruling SPS which interpreted the Dayton agreement as a chance to solve the question of Kosovo by themselves and in their own way.
PER gave its considerable contribution to this, promoting a dialogue of the leading political persons of different ethnic groups in the FRY. For that, cooperation with the PER for FER as the local partner was important parts of FER's activities. This was done through a series of informal talks, especially with representatives of communities in conflict, with a view to preparing their meetings and dialogues.

In summer, on 23 – 24 June 1995, FER in the cooperation with PER organized the conference on *Democratization and Inter–ethnic Relations in Yugoslavia*\(^{(16)}\), which was held in Belgrade. A number of outstanding representatives of the Albanian leadership, opposition parties and the ruling SPS took part in the conference. On that occasion, the SPS suggested and the Albanians accepted an offer to hold a meeting on possibilities to resolve the Serb – Albanian relations and on the status of Kosovo.

It is important to note that the political situation in the former Yugoslavia changed dramatically in the months immediately following the conference. In July, Serbian forces took over two Muslim “safe areas” in eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica and Zepa, while in early August Croatia took the Serb–populated region of Krajina. In both cases, the resident populations were expelled, the Muslims from the Bosnian enclaves and almost all Serbs from Krajina, further undermining the position of “moderates” in all formerly Yugoslav republics. Thus, some positions taken by participants in June may have been rendered obsolete by the events of July and August.

This period is characterized by the following:

- First, the problem of the Serb – Albanian relations was still viewed by the majority of actors in Serbia/FRY and the international community as an issue of minority protection, and measures like the abrogation of discrimination laws were proposed. For instance, it was proposed to repeal the Serbian law on limiting the trade in real estate which, for example, required authorization from the Ministry of Finance in all transactions related to sales/purchases of apartments and land if one of the parties was not of Serb ethnic origin. However, it was noted that this problem could not be solved only through instruments of
minority protection. The Serbian public was for the first time informed that as regards Kosovo one of the central questions was the following: Is the FRY a framework allowing for the solution of the conflict between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo at all or not? In answers to this questions, opposing positions were expressed: Albanian leaders denied that possibility while the Serbian ones claimed it appropriate framework, although admitted that its democratization was needed;

- Second, both the Serbs and Albanians expressed their agreement that it was an imperative that the authorities of Serbia and Albanians should initiate direct talks without any pre-conditions, and on all topics. This was also expressed in public\textsuperscript{17,21} at the June Conference. Subsequently, based on the initiative, \textit{the New York Round Table of Representatives of Political Parties: Towards Peaceful Accommodation in Kosovo}, was organized by PER, in New York City, April 7 – 9, 1997.

In the second half of June, within the framework of FER’s project “The Anatomy of the Kosovo Crisis and Perspectives for the Development of Serbian – Albanian Relations in Kosovo, Serbia and the Region.” A \textit{Public Opinion Survey} was carried out. It was made in cooperation with the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology in Pristina. This was the first and only one survey in seven years made in cooperation of Serbian and Albanian scientists on a sample including both Serbs and Albanians. On the basis of the survey a preliminary report was presented at two press conferences in Pristina and Belgrade to inform the public about the findings of the survey\textsuperscript{18}.

Findings of the survey confirmed that, as far as Serbs and Albanians are concerned, they lived in two parallel worlds that meet only in case of a conflict. Above all, permanent contacts (other than the neighborly conflicts) between Serbs and Albanians are extremely rare. These are two totally separate ethnic communities. For instance, among the Serbian respondents, there was none whose mother or father was Albanian, and only 4 percent were married to someone who did not belong to his/her ethnic group. There are only 4 percent mixed marriages among the Serbs, and 5.3 percent among the Albanians. The characteristic of the position of Albanians is that they totally deny legitimacy of the political system and the FRY itself. This is only intensified by not going to the polls
organized by Serbia or Yugoslavia. Positions of Serbs and Albanians are also opposite as regards the way out of the crisis and the model to solve the status of Kosovo. For example, 98 percent of Albanians and only 2 percent of Serbs give preference to the “independence of Kosovo”. On the other hand, 73 percent of Serbs gives preference to “annulling any autonomy”, while only 2 percent of Albanians opt for this alternative.

In 1996, FER established a Serb-Albanian Workshop as the first form of institutional cooperation between Kosovar Albanian scientists and scientists from other parts of FRY\(^{19}\).

Under the leading of the PER, FER was actively engaged in mediation between the political leaders of leading parliamentary parties in Serbia\(^{20}\) and the Albanian leadership. The result was the New York Round Table the adoption of the following documents: ” Jointly Agreed Positions” (PER. 1977) and ”Concluding Statement”, which represent a contribution to the relaxation of the atmosphere and easier beginning of the Serb-Albanian dialogue (See Appendix II).

The New York’s debate demonstrated:

- That did not have a clear idea of a possible solution, especially of a transitory solution of the Kosovo’s status, which the meeting reached accord;
- Inability of conflicting parties to attain their objectives created conditions that directed both parties to a dialogue (Sorensen, 1999: 33).

Having realized that both the problem of Kosovo and the Kosovar Albanian issue are a regional matter, FER has begun to intensify its cooperation with leaders from Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania\(^{21}\) since 1997.

*The second half of 1997 – 1999*
In this period, the beginning of the armed conflicts on the ground, pushed dialogue on the status of Kosovo and Serb – Albanian relations into the background (Janjic. 1997:5).

Reacting to the approaching war in Kosovo, FER decided on a vigorous campaign (numerous statements for media, FER communications, appearance of FER’s collaborators in many local TV and radio station broadcasts, etc.) in which the basic messages were:

- Calling to account for the escalation of conflicts, above all the political elite of Serbia;
- Insisting on a peaceful agreed solution of the status of Kosovo, on the basis of an intermediate solution.
- Promotion of a model of the special status, including the international military and civilian presence.

Within the sphere of this campaign, Dusan Janjic, FER Coordinator, addressed to Slobodan Milosevic, President of FRY, attaches a special place to ”The Open Letter”.

On the basis of lessons learnt in the preceding periods, FER concentrated its activities on the search for an interim solution. FER’s experts were engaged in the elaboration of a “special status” model. FER also made every effort to ensure support of the Serbian democratic opposition parties. Thus, a solution has been found in the way that FER drew up Framework for a Peaceful and Democratic Solution of the Question of the Status of Kosovo – Metohija and the Albanian Community and its Integration into Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. The leadership of Social Democracy Party approved Framework on 26 June 1998. In circumstances of violent armed conflicts in Kosovo at that time, this document was the only consequent program document with a clear-cut solution.

The Framework was presented to the public at the time of armed conflicts in Kosovo, on 26 June 1998, when Milosevic’s regime and the majority of opposition parties rejected the international mediation. That is why the following messages of the document are particularly encouraging:
- Appeal to the government to stop repression against Albanians and to reduce the number of police and military units concentrated in Kosovo; call for an amnesty of Albanians who were involved in armed conflicts; cooperation with the Hague Tribunal in trials for war crimes committed in Kosovo;
- Call for an unconditional dialogue in which all solutions are open.
- Standing for the autonomy of the Albanian community in Kosovo, and the autonomy of Kosovo (Social Democracy, 1998: 2 – 6)

In this period, an International Academic Round Table was held on 26 July 1998 in Montenegro to discuss the results of the studies “Anatomy of the Kosovo Crisis” and “Research on Public Opinion in Kosovo”\(^\text{23}\). Eminent experts on the Balkans and Serbian-Albanian relations, representatives of the Montenegrin government and parliamentary parties of the ruling “For a Better Life” coalition, NGOs and Albanian politicians took part in the round table.

The aims of the round table were:

- To get an insight into the main features and trends of everyday life in Kosovo and political relations between Serbs and Albanians;
- To ascertain the possibilities and proposals for political solutions to the crisis and the question of Kosovo’s future status;
- To support democratic initiatives and advocates of dialogue.

Since the end of February 1998, the situation in Kosovo can be described as one of civil war between the revolting Albanians and the Serbian and Yugoslav security forces. Participants of the round table stressed that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) would remain even after the end of fighting. It should, therefore, be included in negotiations and in the future security arrangements in Kosovo so that it would not become a base for the development of terrorism in Kosovo and elsewhere.
Proposals for the solution of the Kosovo crisis were discussed at the political and the psychological levels:

- First, It was stated that the feeling of having no solutions was a danger in itself. People seek solutions only when they believe that they exist, but the most influential leaders are not articulating new solutions. They are incapable of developing positive concepts, and it is almost inconceivable that people will spontaneously move in a direction different from the one of conflict. However, since the level of interpersonal violence has remained relatively low and political views are changeable, there is a chance of dividing the problem into concrete issues, which can be resolved one at a time. The signing by Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan Milosevic of the agreement on the return of Albanian pupils and students to state schools shows that this approach is possible.

- Second, With respect to political solutions, participants discussed the possibility of temporary solutions or a so-called “special status” for Kosovo. According to this model, Kosovo would be a third federal unit but not quite a republic. The questions of the status of Kosovo and the status of the Albanian community would be discussed separately but as interrelated subjects. Local self-government would be strengthened and the minorities would participate in government at the local, provincial, republican and federal levels. Application of this model would lead after a period of three to five years to the federalization of Serbia and confederalization of FRY, creating wide possibilities to manage the problem within the broader context of Southeast European cooperation. Since FRY does not today have any reliable internal institutional framework or mechanism for managing conflicts, political negotiations, reaching agreements, stopping war, establishing peace and introducing special status, international mediation and support for the negotiating process are essential. This would lead in the first place to a solution of the Kosovo question and later to the stabilization and harmonization of relations throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Southeast Europe.
NATO strikes and the State of War implemented by Serbian and Yugoslav authorities prohibited the work of NGOs, including the FER. However, a solution was found in the association into a broader network of NGOs of Serbia with the Independent Trade Union “Nezavisnost”, the Yugoslav Action Group. Within this group, FER was in charge of the Kosovo issues, particularly active in issuing a series of appeals, a “Letter to Albanian Friends” being of special significance (See Appendix III). Though there was not a direct answer to the Letter from the Albanian side, its effect on maintaining communication with the Albanian NGOs was considerable. A”Communication on the occasion of the murder of Fehmi Agani” (See Appendix IV) received a very favorable reaction both among Albanians and abroad.

*The Communication* was a condemnation of Milosevic’s government whose target was an Albanian intellectual. That was confirmed in January 1999 when Enver Maloku, chief of the LDK Kosovo Information Center, was killed and in May, during NATO attack and war in Kosovo, Fehmi Agani, a leading Albanian negotiator in Rambouillet, was also killed. It is widely agreed that the Serbian police murdered him. Moreover, Agani was vice-president of Rugova’s LDK and one of the founders of FER, active participant in many FER activities related to the question of the Serbian – Albanian relations in Kosovo, and one of the most active negotiators on the Albanian side.

This period taught us the following fundamental lessons:

- First, impotence of peace initiatives when they are faced with resoluteness of political leaderships of conflicting communities to resolve their disagreements by the arms;
- Second, that peace initiatives were not unavailing and that they represented investment in the future.

*Post-war period: June 1999 – October 2000*

It became evident in this period that the end of Milosevic’s dictatorship was nearing, but also that the democratic opposition was incapable of reaching an accord on alternative
policy. The FER decision to focus expert work on the elaboration of a strategy of constitutional, legislative and institutional changes for post-Milosevic era proved to be the right one. The outcome of expert work that began late in 1998, without interruption even during NATO attacks, and supported by Know How Foundation and Westminster Foundation for Democracy, were three documents: “Principles for a constitutional declaration”, “Theses for the constitutional minority act of Serbia” and “Statement on Kosovo”.

The FER developed a text explaining the model of the special status and drafted appropriate instruments for its implementation (Statement as a draft of a political agreement between the authorities and the Albanian political leadership, appropriate international agreements etc).

FER’s Statement on Kosovo was issued in Belgrade, 17 May 2000. This document is a sort of a summary of the FER’s knowledge about the Kosovo solution. Also, It is a summary of the FER's proposals for the solution of the issues of Kosovo status.

Basic elements of the proposed model are the following:

- A Peace Conference on Kosovo, which would strengthen the awareness, both among the conflicting parties and the international community, that the war ended and would confirm it by reaching a peace treaty. The peace treaty would determine a basis for the solution of status issues of Kosovo and the framework of the temporary situation, i. e. the institutions of the division of power and the role of the international community in Kosovo. The first step in the peace process is the recognition of political existence of the Albanian community in the territory of Kosovo. A peace treaty is the safest way of achieving security and safety in Kosovo and Southeast Europe.

Official representation has to be supported by including domestically non-governmental organizations in activities of the preparation of the Peace Conference on Kosovo and, at a later stage, in a pre-negotiating phase of the peace process. FER urges the establishment
of an international expert team of governmental and non-governmental organizations working under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The task of the team would be to offer solutions to be considered in the course of the negotiating process and the Peace Conference.

- Looking for a resolution of the Kosovo status is an illusion for the time being. We again stress the necessity of establishing a special status. Basic elements of a special status include the participation of the international community, the UN and OSCE in the exercise of authority and provision of peace and security. It include and the mediation in finding a more lasting solution for the Kosovo status; a high degree of autonomy of a Republic of Kosovo (RK) and that, step by step, autonomy of national communities within the RK would be achieved. The time limit, up to ten years, and after that a referendum to solve the remaining outstanding questions of the Kosovo status and territorial and political arrangement for Kosovo and Serbia are include in the "special status" model.

- By peaceful and democratic means, including manifold referendums, a strong and efficient local self-government and appropriate administrative and territorial organization of the RK would be established. Regionalization, which, to the largest possible extent respects economic, demographic, cultural, historical and ethnic features, would also make possible full protection of the rights of national communities, including self-government for Serbs. Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro have to be included directly (bilaterally and multilaterally) in the peace process. The first objective of including these countries is to establish common instruments of regional security and join the NATO - Partnership for Peace.

- It is evident that Serbia will not be able to integrate Kosovo politically, economically and socially as long as it does not build itself as a democratic and efficient state.

Expectations that Montenegro would give up reforms and democratization that have already started for the sake of the preservation of perspectives absent and unstable
community such as FRY is unreal. In fact, the process of acquiring political and state independence of Montenegro and Kosovo will continue. This does not, however, put an end to possibilities for economic, traffic and information cooperation, maintenance of cultural, scientific and similar ties. On this basis, after a period of the special status of Kosovo, could be possible to establish a *Union of Independent Republics of Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo*, as a state and political framework of cooperation.

- The territorial and national issues in *Southeastern Europe* are closely interrelated, each having its regional repercussions. In the past months, the Albanian issue has been raised to the regional level, while the Serb-Albanian relations in Southeast Europe have become a strategic one. For that reason, Albanians and Serbs respectively have to be assured of a free inter-Albanian and inter-Serbian cooperation and integration respectively, and all the states with guarantees of territorial integrity;

- Taking into account the interest of development and democratization of Serbia and of the stability of Southeastern Europe, it is an imperative to have a democratic Serbia involved into regional and European integration processes. The first steps along these lines are lifting of the so-called external wall of sanctions of the EU and UN against FRY and Serbia and access of Serbia and Montenegro to the Stability Pact.

a) *Strategically, long-term development interests* of the countries of the Region are that Southeast Europe:

- Gets rid of domination of any expansionist authority and big national ambitions;
- Eliminates destabilizing political and ethnic problems and conflicts exhausting human and material resources of the Region;
- Makes easier, through the implementation of concrete projects within the Stability Pact and SECI, interregional integration and joining the EU.

b) *Short-term and medium-term interests* of regional cooperation, proposed by the FER *Statement* are the following:
- stabilizing the political solution of Kosovo status and preventing the Kosovo crisis from spilling over into the entire sub-region, through new war conflicts or, above all, through increased demands for all-Albanian state unification;

- improvement in the status of minorities and protection of their rights, and development of cultural, information and economic cooperation within ethnicities separated by state boarders but also among different ethnicities of this sub-region;

- promotion of common standards of citizenship, protection of minorities;

- Control of migratory movements, illicit work (for instance, by introducing border controls but at the same time more easier movement subject to labor based residence permits) and refugee status (a regime of temporary humanitarian refugees, sharing costs for the needs of refugees, prevention of causes for new refugees, encouragement of refugee returns and making the integration easier); suppression of terrorism and organized crimes, etc.

- The following measures should be taken with a view to establishing mutual confidence:

- The authorities, especially the parliaments and governments of the Republic of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia have to admit and accept their share of responsibility for war and situation in Kosovo, and suspend all laws and decrees that limited rights and freedoms of members of the Albanian community;

- A mixed Humanitarian Commission, including also representatives of the International Red Cross and the UNHCR, that would establish assistance to and care of victims of conflicts and their families. Particular attention should be paid to creation of conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons.

- To set up a Bureau for struggle against organized crime and terrorism within which authorities of the Republic of Serbia, FRY, RK, KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE and relevant international organizations would cooperate;
- Setting free political prisoners (around 2,000 Albanians in prisons in Serbia and several hundred kidnapped Serbs and members of other non-Albanian communities who are in Albanian “prisons” in Kosovo);
- Full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal for war crimes committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia.
- The international encouragement, support and assistance to overcome present misunderstandings, problems and conflicts necessitate to include KFOR and UNMIK in securing a total end of violence and beginning of a dialogue; full membership of Serbia and Montenegro in OSCE, relevant European and regional institutions, and in the UN.

A particularly important development of this period for FER is that the problem of Serbian–Albanian relations and the status of Kosovo has also to be viewed in its regional dimension. That means that the crisis affects the neighboring countries in which Albanians live (Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo), and that its solution is likely to lie in stronger regional integration.

*Post – Milosevic Period, since October 2000*

Having Slobodan Milosevic removed from power, a new political reality has come in which an important factor is pro-democratic government and its readiness to cooperate with the international community. This creates new opportunities for the resumption of the Serb – Albanian dialogue.

FER does its best to be an active promoter of the resumption of the dialogue and negotiation about the future of Kosovo. It manages to do it thanks, inter alia, to the fact that in the course of the decade of its action relating to the Serb – Albanian issue it has acquired trust of the conflicting parties as a reliable mediator. In fact, FER acts along two lines:
- First, on reopening the dialogue between political leaders of the Albanian and Serb communities, and among people in power in FRY, Serbia and local authorities of Kosovo;
- Second, at the regional level, cooperating with PER, it takes part in active exchanges of views with the most prominent leaders of the Balkans (PER roundtables of cabinet level officials and party presidents from the Balkan countries held in Budapest, 7 – 8 April 2000 and in Athens, 1 – 2 December 2000). The basic objective is to strengthen regional connections reducing the conflicting character of Serb – Albanian relations. Likewise, the idea is to strengthen the influence of FER in the public of Serbia as a result of which the chances for success of campaigns it leads will increase. For instance, one of the campaigns in which FER is active is the campaign for amnesty of Albanian prisoners in prisons in Serbia.28)

Having reviewed the FER activities relating to the question of the Serb – Albanian conflicts and the status of Kosovo, one might draw the following conclusions:

- NGOs are an important factor in maintaining communications among people, in the promotion of reaching an accord peacefully, etc.
- No matter how much NGOs are influential, it is political leaders, especially those in power and media controlled by them, whose influence is decisive.

**Summary**

Generally speaking, one might say that activities of the FER were focused on the following:

- Research aimed at establishing the basic ideas, concepts and actors of the existing situation as well as ideas, actors and factors of changes and dialogue;
- Making the dialogue easier by organizing a series of important meetings between both political and intellectual leaders of the Serbian and Albanian communities, maintaining
regular contacts with influential persons in both communities and promoting meetings of outstanding persons from different ethnic communities.

However, these efforts were not given support of any significance either by political parties and the media in Serbia and Kosovo or national or foreign donors and diplomatic representatives in Belgrade (Sorensen, 1999:31). This only confirmed the then attitude of political actors in the country and international community towards Kosovo. That attitude may be described as pushing the problems aside.

Broaching, from its very inception in early 1990s, the problems of the status of Kosovo and Serb – Albanian relations, the objectives of FER have been:

- First, in a situation of interrupted communications on the political, cultural, scientific and all other levels of public life, it is necessary to restore confidence in the possibility negotiation as the means of reaching a compromise to support a peaceful solution;
- Second, to establish contacts between the actors, including political leaderships such as Serbian and Yugoslav governments and Albanian party leaders though all other, particularly political channels of communication were severed;
- Third, by supporting implementation of individual projects, to contribute to a step by step creation of a political climate necessary for a dialogue, and suppress the speech of hatred, intolerance and violence.

Basic target groups of these actions were politicians and influential intellectuals, in view of their decisive influence on the Albanian and Serbian communities and, consequently, on the conflict itself.

The guiding principles of FER in trying to find the solutions for the Kosovo issue through the Serb – Albanian dialogue, were as follows:
- First, the necessity to keep alive in public the topics of the Serb–Albanian relations and of Kosovo by provoking "positive events" i.e. organizing debates of the prominent and influential representatives of the elites of both communities;
- Second, the relaxation of the political atmosphere and clashing of intransigent positions, creating the climate of mutual trust, clarification of the nature of the Serb–Albanian conflicts and of standpoints of the most influential actors of the dialogue;
- Third, maintaining communications between the leaderships of the communities in conflict, even in the worst moments of the crisis, such as war.
- Fourth, insistence on unconditional talks, respect for justified requests of each of the parties, and responsibility of participants in the dialogue for the observance of the agreed procedure;
- Fifth, the possibility to adjust the ideas, concepts and methods to the changing reality and improved knowledge of the Serb–Albanian relations and the status of Kosovo.
The Peace and Democracy Building Process

Analyzing the Serb – Albanian conflict, in the period 1990 -1999, some lessons could be learned:

- First, the difficulty of conducting a dialogue in a non-democratic society where the prevailing force for mobilizing the people is ethnonationalism. In fact, in societies lacking democratic institutions, procedures and culture, with elites averse to negotiation, ethnic misunderstandings and conflicts easily turn into open political and even violent conflicts. However, even attempts at initiating a dialogue, talks or negotiations, are of importance. That is how a necessary political climate is created for a dialogue.

- Second, underdevelopment of the political culture for a dialogue and non-existence of an independent and democratic public opinion that is sensitive to problems of human rights violation and discrimination of the Other;

- Third, a main preoccupation of the most influential segments of political and intellectual elites on both sides was to maintain a status quo awaiting a more favorable climate to promote their own positions. Admittedly, there were sporadic contacts (in 1991, 1995 and 1996) between the leading party of Kosovo Albanians, the LDK and the authorities in Serbia and the FRY, especially on the issues of the education.

- Fourth, undeveloped civil society and the lack of sufficient interest in establishing mutual contacts and dialogue, manifested by most civil society institutions (trade unions, churches and Egos), both on the Albanian and Serb sides;

- Fifth, the unwillingness of domestic and foreign donors to provide more substantial support to the political dialogue efforts;

- Sixth, non-existence an institutionalized channel for exchange knowledge and experiences about the procedures that might contribute to preventing a conflict from growing into an armed clash. In this context, the weakness of the international community to oppose dictatorial authorities, like Milosevic or the tenaciousness of extremist groups and movements are particularly evident.
- Seventh, the absence of a well-conceived, well-planned and well-conducted dialogue not only between the authorities and the Albanian political leadership but also among the civil society actors, including NGOs.

In Kosovo, upon the restoration of peace, and with the arrival of KFOR and establishment of UNMIK, two priority objectives have been set:

- First, stabilization of peace;
- Second, peace building, which is in fact a process of democratic institutions and procedures building in Kosovo.

The attainment of these two objectives is not possible overnight. In addition, they would have to be accomplished in a situation where Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are, more than ever in their history, far from one another imbued with mutual hatred and conviction that they cannot live “under the same roof” (Milosevic, 1999:8). In this war as in other cases it has been confirmed that intolerance and rejection of diversity is a major cause of war. In its extreme form it leads to ethnic cleansing and genocide (Annan. 2001). To the contrary, the dialogue seeks to promote the understanding that the diversity of cultures can be a source of betterment and growth (Annan. 2001). For that reason, the work to promote tolerance is fundamental to both conflict prevention and peace building.

In order to achieve the desired objectives, one should take into account, among numerous ones, the following recommendations resulting from the preceding analysis and experiences in other cases of fractured societies:

- First, talks that might lead to negotiation have been conducted so far. To reach negotiations, it is necessary to achieve both in Serbia and FRY, and in the Albanian and international communities a consensus and on that basis a strategy for the solution of the Kosovo problem. The mediation role of the international community is also necessary. UNMIK should be developed more in a sense of communication than, as it used to be during the time of Kouchner’s leadership, as an arbiter. However, more than that, it is
necessary that conflicting parties make some unilateral moves for the sake of regaining confidence. Among these measures, on the part of the authorities of Serbia and FRY, it is the amnesty and return of several hundred Albanians to their homes. Here comes also the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and individualization of guilt and responsibility for civilians having been the target of attacks. Protection of civilians and giving force to the international law has to be at the very top of the internal and international agendas. At that, it is an aggravating factor that Milosevic and organizers of his war machinery were not tried for war crimes. That might be, however, one of the strong measures in favor of the return of confidence;

- Second, the peace-building process necessitates fundamental constitutional and legislative reforms, building of democratic institutions and procedures. This process is linked with the one of establishing new relations between Montenegro and Serbia, and with the solution of the Kosovo issue. In Kosovo, a singular legal, administrative and political milieu has begun to be established which will differ from the one in the Republic of Serbia. That is why, late in 2000, Kosovo looked to many people like the Balkan Taiwan – an independent state recognized by no one (Judah, 2000);

- Third, the work of UNMIK to date should be reappraise with a view to finding possibilities of using the work on constitutional and legislative reforms for harmonization of the legislation of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia with the European legislation;

- Fourth, restoration and expansion of the civil society can play a significant role in the recovery and development of Kosovo and, consequently, the international community should support those activities. In that respect, UNHCR has a particularly important role in the development of cooperation with the Kosovo civil society, including national NGOs.

- Fifth, needs of the Region, especially needs of Albania and Macedonia, must not be disregarded in haste to restore Kosovo. The Stability Pact is one of the key elements of the building of regional cooperation in political, economic and security spheres. No less important is the involvement of all the countries of Southeast Europe in NATO. This includes Partnership for Peace, the alliance of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and, for the countries that fulfill conditions, membership in the Alliance. This becomes possible with the introduction of the Action plan for membership, at the Washington summit in April
1999. At that moment, NATO manifested clearly its intention to expand additionally the zone of stability and security in Europe through the admission of other European democracies which are able to contribute to common security (Judah, 2000).

In search for pragmatic solutions, it is an imperative to find answers to the following question:

- First, on the future status of Kosovo;30)
- Second, on the status of Kosovo surroundings, i. e. “FRY” where three different political and economic systems will be (Surroi, 1998:5).

Standpoints of leaders of both communities on these issues are diametrically opposite. Thus, President of FRY Vojislav Kostunica, in his inaugural address in October 2000, hinted that he would try to reinstate Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo. In the same month, in the week of triumph in local elections, Ibrahim Rugova called upon the world to recognize the independence of Kosovo. On their part, diplomats of the Foreign Office, the U.S. State Department and Quai d’Orsay are considering old plans for a confederation of the tree republics - Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, or variations of the sort.

Actually, nobody has a solution acceptable to all the parties. In view of this fact, the only possibility seems to be finding an interim solution. For that reason, the presentation of the FER’s model of a “special status”, which is basically a compromise, continues to be topical in all likelihood. As it is almost impossible to reach a compromise in direct negotiations of the conflicting parties, it is necessary to organize an international conference on Kosovo. The purpose of the Conference would be to formulate a general political framework for a temporary solution and to begin the process of stabilization of the region.
**APPENDICES:**

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<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>MONTENEGRO</th>
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<td>25,854</td>
<td>343,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>237,358</td>
<td>89,932</td>
<td>327,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>137,265</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>327,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>109,214</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>115,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>67,234</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>67,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>47,577</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>48,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>42,386</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>42,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>25,214</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>25,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>18,339</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>18,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlachs</td>
<td>17,557</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>17,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>11,501</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>11,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>8,340</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>8,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional affiliation</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>4,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>44,881</td>
<td>13,425</td>
<td>58,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>16,661</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>16,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>61,278</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>61,278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: KOSOVO – SERBS AND ALBANIANS LIVING UN WAR ZONES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total in Serbia**</th>
<th>% of Serbs</th>
<th>Total in Kosovo**</th>
<th>% of Serbs</th>
<th>% of Albanians</th>
<th>Total in Kosovo**</th>
<th>% of Albanians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>6,258</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>6,979</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>65.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7,642</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8,447</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9,313</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991*</td>
<td>9,779</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Due to Albanian “boycott” of the 1991 census, the figures are result of the estimation of
the Yugoslav Federal Statistics Bureau

** In thousands.
Table 3: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF KOSOVO, 1948-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>727,820</td>
<td>808,141</td>
<td>963,988</td>
<td>1,243,693</td>
<td>1,584,440</td>
<td>1,956,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>28,050</td>
<td>31,343</td>
<td>37,558</td>
<td>31,555</td>
<td>27,028</td>
<td>20,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>171,911</td>
<td>189,869</td>
<td>227,016</td>
<td>228,264</td>
<td>209,497</td>
<td>194,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>498,242</td>
<td>524,559</td>
<td>646,605</td>
<td>916,168</td>
<td>1,226,736</td>
<td>1,596,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>11,230</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>34,126</td>
<td>45,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>34,583</td>
<td>25,764</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>12,513</td>
<td>10,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,206</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>2,676</td>
<td>3,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,393</td>
<td>9,434</td>
<td>10,098</td>
<td>11,997</td>
<td>11,929</td>
<td>17,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION IN KOSOVO IN %, 1948-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Final results of the census for 1991 – official estimate.
NOTE: Data given for nationalities accounting for more than 0.5 percent of the total population at least (except Yugoslavs).
Appendix I: *CHRONOLOGY OF SERB - ALBANIAN CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASES AND LEVELS</th>
<th>TIME PERIODS</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>1918-1941/45</td>
<td>Mutual violence and domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>1945-1966</td>
<td>Armed violence and administrative limitation of ethnic Albanian community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>1968-1981</td>
<td>Strengthening of Kosovo autonomy, national affirmation of ethnic Albanian community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>1981-1999</td>
<td>Conflicts concerning Kosovo status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Level</td>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>Strengthening of ethnic Albanian national movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Level</td>
<td>1986-1989</td>
<td>Political disputes on the status of Kosovo and ethnic Albanian community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Level</td>
<td>1989-1997</td>
<td>Suspension of autonomy and establishment of parallel Serbian and ethnic Albanian communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Level</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>Armed conflict (war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>1999-</td>
<td>Deployment of the international (UN) civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and military missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II:  *THE New York’S JOINTLY AGREED POSITIONS*

“Kosovo constitutes a serious problem that requires an urgent solution. Without international encouragement and assistance the current lack of confidence between the parties cannot be overcome or a lasting settlement reached.

The problem can only be resolved by mutual accord reached through dialogue that is entered into with no preconditions or prejudgment of possible outcomes.

The agreement must be based on the principles of democratization, mutual respect between the sides, respect for human rights, both individual and collective, and promotion of regional stability through respect for Helsinki principles concerning borders. An interim solution requires both democratic Kosovo and democratic Serbia”.
Appendix III: NGO’S STATEMENTS

“The Appeal by the Yugoslav Action Group of Yugoslav NGOs and Trade Union Confederation ‘Nezavisnost’”, Belgrade, April 6, 1999, was said:

...” Faced with the tragic situation we have found ourselves in, and in the name of human ideas and values, as well as in accordance with all our past activities, we are demanding:
- Immediate discontinuance of the bombing campaign and all armed movements;
- Resumption of the peace process with international mediation at the regional -Balkan and European levels, as well as within the framework of the United Nations;
- Sharing of responsibility between the European Union and Russia and their contribution to the peaceful solution of the crisis;
- The end of ethnic cleansing process and immediate return of all refugees;
- Support to the citizens of Montenegro to preserve peace and stability, solve serious consequences of the refugee catastrophe and resume democratic processes that were under way;
- That the Serbian and international media inform the public in a professional manner rather than encouraging media war, inciting interethnic hatred, creating irrational public opinion and glorifying force as the ultimate accomplishment of the human mind.
We cannot meet these demands by ourselves...”

FER’s Appeal for Humanitarian and Health Aid to the Population of Kosovo”, Belgrade, June 2, 1999, pointed out:

“The population of Kosovo, especially hundreds of thousands of Albanians who remained in Kosovo in these difficult times, are experiencing the worst living conditions as a result of war operations.
We appeal to the authorities, the Red Cross of Serbia and Yugoslavia and other specialized local and international humanitarian and health organizations and NGOs to undertake all means at their disposal to:

- Prevent discrimination in the distribution of humanitarian aid and providing of health service.
- Enable access of local and international humanitarian NGOs to the entire territory of Kosovo in order to deliver food and other humanitarian aid and make possible the return of displaced persons;
- Organize and support the return of international NGOs and humanitarian organizations as well as to improve conditions for the return and registration of new international and local NGOs and humanitarian organizations;
- Support broad local and international action of solidarity, humanitarian aid, especially health care (medical examination, vaccination and treatment) of the imperiled population of Kosovo in order to prevent deaths and disease spreading on a massive scale.”

In “A letter to Albanian friends”, April 26, 1999, was said:

“Dear friends,

We are writing to you in these hard times of our joint suffering, murders and persecution of people. Columns of Albanians, among them being many of you and your other compatriots, had to leave their homes.

These days, murders and persecutions, ruined and burnt homes, destroyed bridges, roads and industrial facilities make a somber and painful picture of Kosovo and Serbia as if presaging that the future life were not possible. We, however, do believe that it is necessary and possible.
A better future of citizens of Kosovo and Serbia, the Serbs and Albanians, as fellow citizens of one and the same state or as closest neighbors will not come either by itself or overnight. But, to that end we can and have to act together. We know that it will be difficult, and sometimes even painful. The example of the German – French post-war conciliation and cooperation can be both an example and incentive to us.

For the sake of a future joint life, the pain of crime has to be talked about so that it might be, with a pardon, remembered. This personal and collective tragedy, both yours, and ours result from long standing erroneous policies of the most radical among us, and of the international community. Continuation of such policies leads to an abyss both Serbs and Albanians. Likewise, the way of a collective guilt is the way of frustration, continuation of hatreds and revenges without an end. That is why that way has to be given up. Our first step away from hatred, ethnic conflicts and bloody revenges is public pronouncement of the feeling of shame, humiliation and deep apology for all the victims and sufferings inflicted on you and your compatriots in ethnic hatred and war madness perpetrated in these days on behalf of our, Serbian people…

…Ethnic cleansing, the NATO bombing and armed clashes has to stop. There should not be any new victims. All those who were expelled have to return safely to their homes and to live in a way becoming free and proud people.

We are confident that both Serbs and Albanians will gather strength and courage to set on the way of peace, democracy, respect of human rights, mutual conciliation and appreciation. The dialogue, political negotiation and peace process have no alternatives. That is for all of us the only way out of war conflicts. That is the safest way of ensuring the return of the expelled to their homes, recovery of normal life and work, and of finding a solution to the status of Kosovo issue”…
Appendix IV: THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNICATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE MURDER OF FEHMI AGANI

“Murders of people, columns of refugees, devastated and burnt homes represent a painful picture of Yugoslavia and Kosovo at the very end of the 20th century. A victim of ethnic hatred is also Fehmi Agani, one of the leading moderate Albanian intellectuals and politicians, an advocate of and participant in all major attempts at establishing a Serb–Albanian dialogue, patient and persistent negotiator, and one of the founders of the Forum for Ethnic Relations.

Murderers of Fehmi Agani might have wished to frighten all those people who are in favor of a dialogue, of the Serb–Albanian conciliation, to send a message: We cannot live together! It is clear that such an act encourages the most radical ones to follow the way that leads both Serbs and Albanians to an abyss. However, the dialogue, political negotiation and peace process have no alternatives. That is the only way out of the Kosovo problem.

Serbs and Albanians are, in these bloody war days, inevitably faced with a new choice. A direct threat to life experienced today by citizens of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro diminishes their old fears of uncertainty of political changes. Serbs and Albanians have to pluck up courage and strength to make it up and organize their joint life. In that case, peaceful efforts of professor Agani would not have been futile.

On my own behalf, I express the feeling of shame to all victims of ethnic hatred and war madness, and particularly on account of evils that are being committed these days on behalf of my, Serbian people. It is up to the consciousness and responsibility of the others to judge their responsibility for what they did and are doing to the Serbs.

Dusan Janjic, FER Coordinator, Belgrade, 8 May 1999.”
Appendix V: GLOSSARY

**Albanian:** In the Serbian language and in the cultural context, there are two terms for a member of the Albanian community: "Šiptar" - derived from the Albanian word "Shqiptar", which indicates their ethnic and tribal origin; and "Albanac" ("Albanian"), which indicates their relation to the nation and state of Albania. The term "Albanac" became frequent in Kosovo as of 1968. Today, the latter term is in prevailing use and expresses connection with Albania proper as well as with the national status.

**DC –** Democratic Center is an organization from Belgrade with two identities: the first one is the face of a NGO later called Democratic Center Fund later called Center for Democracy, and the second one, since 1995, and the essential one, of a political party called Democratic Center organized by a faction of the Democratic Party (DS) and headed by the first president of the Democratic Party Dragoljub Micunovic who left DS after having been deposed as the president of DS.

**DOS:** Democratic Opposition of Serbia: The coalition of 18 parties, established for the purpose of local and federal elections in September 2000 which it has won and its presidential candidate Dr Vojislav Kostunica defeated Milosevic and became the President of FRY. DOS has also become, since the republican elections in September 2000, the ruling coalition in Serbia.

**Ethnonationalism:** a sub-type of a general process of identity forming. In terms of ethnic nationalism, membership in a nation is designated within the category "jus sanguineous". Ethnic-national country is supposed to be based on one ethnic group or nationality, with domination of ethnic loyalty.

**Ethnic mobilisation:** a process in which members of an ethnic community, in correlation with the other ones, develop a higher degree of group consciousness, when cultural and other unification criteria (along with religion) are used in order to establish distinct borders vis-à-vis others. Ideological core of ethnic mobilisation is ethnic centralism,
setting one's own ethnic community to the level where it is considered to be the highest and one and only value, whilst underestimating, even not recognising, other communities.

**Ethnicity:** Awareness of one's national, ethnic identity as one of alternative forms of social organisation and class identity.

**EU:** European Union

**FER:** Forum for Ethnic Relations. It is a NGO, which was founded in 1989 as a network of 110 social scientists from former Yugoslavia, Europe and USA, specialising in the fields of national questions, ethnic relations and minority protection. It has completed a series of projects on ethnic and national issues.

**Former Yugoslavia:** State and social community that existed since 1918 until the civil war and international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states on January 15th, 1992.

**JAC:** Joint Advisory Council for Legislative Matters, established by UNMIK.

**JUL:** Jugoslovenska levica (JUL) – The Yugoslav Left, the political procommunist coalition led by Dr Mirjana Markovic, Slobodan Milosevic’s wife.

**KFOR:** Kosovo Force

**KLA:** Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, UCK (al) - Kosovo Liberation Army

**Kosovo:** This term for the Province is one of the most illustrative examples of general ethnification of public and political life and language. "The Old Serbia" is one of the terms in use as well. That is how Serbian politics and historiography named the region in the beginning of 20th century, emphasising that the "core of the Serbian State and culture" was there. The term is of the Turkish-Albanian origin, with the meaning of Kosovo
county, which, before the Balkan war in 1912, contained territories of Sandzak, High Polilimije, Kosovo and Metohija, Northern Macedonia up to the city of Veles and Eastern Macedonia up to the river of Bregalnica. The term was connected to the concept of "Greater Albania"; today, it is a synonym for the Albanian point of view concerning the Province. The term "Kosovo and Metohija" is much longer in use in terms of the constitution and linguistics. In the first post-war (World War II) constitutions the term "Kosovo and Metohija" was used. However, it was later dropped and reinstated in 1990 by the constitutions of Serbia and FRY. The term "Kosovo and Metohija" is considered to be a synonym for the Serbian point of view concerning the Province. In this study the term "Kosovo" is used since it is usually used in present-day literature and in general public.

**LDK**: Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo), an Albanian political party led by Dr Ibrahim Rugova.

**LKCK**: Levizija Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves – National movement for liberation of Kosovo

**NATO**: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

**PER**: Project on Ethnic Relations is an U.S. based independent American – European NGO with headquarters in Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.

**OSCE**: Organisation for Security and Cupertino in Europe

**SPS**: Socijalisticka partija Srbije - The Socialist Party of Serbia. It was the ruling party in Serbia and FRY, led by Slobodan Milosevic, until the end of 2000.

**UN**: United Nations

**UNDP**: United Nations Development Program
**UNHCR**: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNMIK**: United Nations Mission in Kosovo

**VJ**: Vojska Jugoslavije - Yugoslav Army.
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Maliqi, Skeljzen. (2000) “Kosovo čeka status Republike Srpske” (Kosovo is waiting for the status as the one of the Republika Srpska), Interview, Danas, Belgrade, January 22 – 23. PP, 26, 27.


Misovic Milos (1999) “The seeds of hatred have been sown long ago”, Danas, Belgrade 1 June.


1) The Dayton agreement was understood differently by the parties in the conflict. For the Serbs, it meant an end to a conflict and fixing of what the Bosnian Serbs achieved through war - Republic Srpska. The most important lesson the Albanians learned was that the Dayton agreement valued the armed struggle of Bosnian Serbs by recognizing the Republic Srpska in Bosnia, and that the international community understands only the language of armed conflict, unlike the language of non-violence.

2) KLA was formed from “Marxist-Leninist” resistance groups that were active in 1980s. However, in the period of 1996-1998, these groups were “refreshed” by young Albanians, unhappy with the situation in Kosovo and with Rugova’s “Gandhi-like” policy. From the end of 1997 until the end of February 1998, KLA was rapidly arming itself and openly calling for armed struggle for the independence of Kosovo. Volunteers, arms and money came especially from Albanian communities in Europe, especially Germany and Switzerland.

3) The “psychosis of being jeopardized” implies adoption and consolidation of the system of prejudices, beliefs and emotions, which form a certain matrix for interpreting reality as a total endangerment of national identity. That is best shown through the increased fear of demographic “wipe out”, which stokes up xenophobia and closing into oneself. All of this goes together with numerous quasi-scientific interpretations of demographic explosion of Albanians as their “infernal plan” to cause the explosion of birth rate by “artificial means”, all by the rules of nazi German geopolitical theory of Lebensraum.

4) For example: A series of discriminating laws and official documents that put the Albanians in Kosovo in the legal status of “citizens with limited rights”; “compulsive measures” in the economy and mass dismissals of workers; closing the schools, dismissing teachers and organizing enrollment into schools in the Albanian language, suspension of financing for the schools which “do not adhere to the unified education program for Serbia” etc. The consequence is that approximately 250.000 students were unable to continue their education. In 1991, only 28.8% of students were allowed to
enroll into secondary schools. Numerous elementary and secondary schools were closed and segregation on the national basis was introduced.

5) Predominant model of national self-identification of Serbs belongs to the group of pre-political and pre-determined national identity. Ethnic background (birth or blood) and history are decisive “elements” of a people’s national self-identification.

6) The prevailing model of identification for the Albanians is the one in which they observe themselves through negative characteristics of Serbs. According to this notion, the picture of present-day situation according to the Albanians looks like this: the Serbs homogenize against the Albanians and the whole world in order to decrease the negative consequences of their policy in Kosovo. On the other hand, Albanians homogenize spontaneously, in order to defend their national entity from the anti-Albanian regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Essentially, Albanian national movement found the source of its identity in the resistance to Milosevic’s regime. Accordingly, Albanians are the “dominant ethnic group”, not a minority, because they number 2 million people. Albanians are “the only nation in Europe divided by international borders”. Self-determination and independence of the Albanian nation are justified because it has never been recognized as equal to others in the Slavic environment, and because continuing of its life out of its own legal system leads to new conflicts.

7) Responsibilities of the military mission (the so-called security presence) are multiple and far-reaching. Those are:

- prevention of the renewal of hostilities;
- securing retreat from Kosovo and prevention of possible attempts at return of the Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces into the area;
- demilitarisation (disarmament) of the Albanian rebel forces (KLA) and other Albanian armed groups;
- ensuring safe conditions both for the return of refugees and displaced persons to Kosovo and for activities of the civilian mission, establishment of the interim administration, and delivery of humanitarian assistance;

- Taking care of the order and security in Kosovo until the responsibility in the sphere is taken over by the UN civilian mission and carrying out of the necessary border control. Basically, the full responsibility for the safety - police affairs is in the hands of the international community, including that section of the peace process.

8) The civilian mission’s presence include:

- seeing to the process of the establishment of “the substantial autonomy and self-government”;

- performing basic administrative functions where and when needed; organisation and control of interim institutions of democratic and autonomous self-government until the final solution, including the holding of elections;

- support to the political process that should lead to a solution of the political status of Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet agreements; supervision at the final stage of the transfer of power from interim institutions to those established on the basis of a final political solution; support to the recovery of economy, especially of the key infrastructure;

- Securing civil order and legality, including the deployment of the international police personnel and establishment of the local police forces; taking care of the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

9) The underlying reasons are the following: unclear framework of the UNMIK actions; lack of co-operation of the Kosovar Albanian leaders with UNMIK going so far as to have in existence a parallel Albanian government and militia. Only in late 1999, the Albanian shadow governments acting in Kosovo, though having not been recognised by the UN, were dissolved. The leader of one of the “provisional governments” was Hashim Thaci, the former KLA political leader, and of the other Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the LDK; continuation of an erroneous policy of Belgrade instigating Serbs not to take part in
the work of the interim joint bodies of the executive authority, administration and judiciary.

In December 2000, UNMIK revoked all executive, legislative and judiciary structures that existed before the war. A joint administrative structure was set up. That was done by an agreement on the division of the provisional administration in Kosovo signed by the Albanian leaders Hasim Thaci from the Democratic Party of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova from the Democratic League of Kosovo, Rexhep Qosaj from the United Democratic Movement, on the one hand, and Bernard Kouchner on behalf of UNMIK, on the other hand. Kouchner appointed Thaci, Rugova and Qosja as members of the Provisional Administrative Council. Radmila Trajkovic joined them later on behalf of the Serbian National Council as an observer.

10) The existence of a security vacuum is also illustrated by the fact that neither for full 90 days since the arrival of KFOR neither the control of borders with Albania was established nor the Kosovo police forces were formed. That directly affected the strengthening of the decision of the non-Albanian population that had fled not to return to Kosovo.

11) The price of the Kosovo conflict was high for all the parties concerned. Only the war cost FRY around 60 billion US dollars. The war in Kosovo additionally contributed to the population of FRY becoming the most destitute in Europe, even more than the Albanians were. The gross domestic product per capita amounted to $75 per month and $900 per year respectively in 1999, as stated by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) (Danas. April 23, 1999). The percentage of the Serbs living below the poverty level increased from 14 to 44 percent in only a year (1999/2000). The domestic gross product per inhabitant fell by 46 percent in 1999 over 1998, while industrial production fell by 44 percent. The foreign trade has been halved. It will take 15 years to bring the industrial production back to the level of 1998, provided the production increases at the rate of 4 percent per year and foreign investments begin flowing into the country (Vijesti. July 11, 2000).
The economy of Kosovo was in a bad condition even before the NATO bombing for which the responsibility lays with the government of Serbia which managed it poorly and which controlled major economic capacities. Economy before the conflict was mostly agriculture-oriented and, as such, it continues to provide for the majority of the population. The major industry was the iron and steel one and manufacturing enterprises associated with it. Agricultural production and food processing are also of importance. The leading exports were energy, ores and agricultural products. Aid from relatives from abroad and foreign aid were significant sources of national income. Grey economy was substantial. The population had low standards of living. Armed conflicts caused mass destruction of property, including economic enterprises. Unemployment among the Albanians is estimated to be between 40 and 75 percent. It is considerably higher than among the Serbs and Roma. Unstable environment does not provide an incentive to investors.

12) Political violence and political murders took lives of about 10,000 Albanians in the first 6 months of 1999. Since the retreat of the VJ in June, there were 20 to 30 murders on an average per week, in early June and in July, and by mid-November 1999, 379 persons were killed, out of which 135 Serbs and 145 Albanians. Many of those killings were ethnically motivated. However, there were a lot of crimes that were not ethnically motivated (U.S. Department of State.2000).

13) The July 1999, report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan states that the first wave of Serbian refugees set out for fear of future behavior of Albanians, while the second wave of refugees was caused by a large number of incidents – kidnappings, murders, setting Serbian property on fire, plunders, perpetrated by Kosovo Albanians (Danas, July 15, 1999).

14) For instance, those are: Sima Cirkovic, Vojin Dimitrijevic, Dusan Janjic, Sonja Licht, Konstantin Obradovic, Najdan Pasic, Ljubisa Rajic, Miroslav Simic, Vojislav Stanovcic, Vladan Vasiljevic, Tibor Varady, Janos Vekas, Laszlo Vegel, from Vojvodina and
Serbia propre and Fehmi Agani, Becaj Behljul, Musliu Fahri, Shkelzen Maliqi, Gazmend Pula, Asllan Pushka, Veton Surroi, from Kosovo.

15) Admittedly, the Soros Fund continued its activities in this field within the Foundation network. Adhering to the concept of affecting the non-nationalist segment of the public. What was done through the media project “Radio B 92” is of special relevance. The Fund stuck to the principle of non-cooperation with political parties until 1996 and then it embarked on cooperation with “pro-civic” opposition parties, and since the NATO attack “democratic nationalism” prevailed in the policy of the local Fund and, hence, a more direct cooperation with political parties of such an orientation. That was an additional sign that the “civil option”, as a political orientation, vanished from the political scene of Serbia.

16) PER was the organizer and its local co-partner FER which was in charge of communicating with representatives of the opposition and ethnic minorities, Democratic Center Found’s (DC) leader Dragoljub Micunovic was in contact with SPS in order to ensure participation of SPS in the debate, and the Soros Fund Yugoslavia being the co-sponsor.

17) Vice-president of the ruling SPS Goran Percevic showed readiness and willingness to talk with Albanian leaders. In the course of discussion, with mediation of Dr Allen Kassoff, PER’s President, an accord was reached on direct talks to be organized in the following year in New York.

It was planned that The Survey will be used in 1998 in a series of round tables, i.e. training programs for journalists, young political leaders of both communities, and people who deal with the Kosovo problems within the federal and republican administrations. But, the activities have been postponed for spring 1998 due to lack of sufficient funding.

19) In 1996, Gjergj Rrapi and Antun Berishaj from Pristina, Dusan Janjic, from Belgrade and Laszlo Vegel, from Novi Sad, headed the Serb-Albanian Workshop.

In 1997, it included the activities on the promotion of the book “Kosovo-Kosova, Confirmation or Coexistence”, ed. by Ger Dujizings, Dusan Janjic and Shkelzen Maliqi (February 28, 1997 in Belgrade and March 1, in Pristina).

20) In the process of the preparation, FER cooperated with PER and was in contact with SPS representatives which, above all included SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic. Dacic, in consultation with Slobodan Milosevic, set only one precondition: that their participation in the Serb – Albanian talk in New York would not be used by State Department to weaken Milosevic’s position in the country. Since immediately before the meeting Madeleine Albright received representatives of the opposition (Vesna Pesic, Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Djindjic) associated in the coalition “Zajedno” (“Together”) that, supported by mass protests, fought out the recognition of its victory in large cities in local elections held late in 1996, and who also were participants in the Serb – Albanian talks, SPS decided not to send any of its representatives. An extensive propaganda and media campaign was conducted in the country condemning participants in the talks as being “traitors of the Serbian national interests”. Basically, it was a clear sign that Milosevic worried, more than about anything, including the solution of the Kosovo issue, about his survival in power.

21) Thus, for instance, FER’s fact-finding mission visited Kosovo, January 25-27, and met vice-presidents of the LDK, Fehmi Agani, Hidayet Hyseni, Mahmut Bakali and president of the Parliamentary Party Adem Demaci and took part in the proceedings of the All-
Serbian Convention organized by the Serbian Resistance Movement and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Raska-Prizren Eparchy).

During visits to Macedonia in February and October, Dusan Janjic met the Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, President of the Macedonian Parliament Tito Petkovski, Minister of justice Djordje Spasov, Minister of the Interior Tomislav Cokreviski, President of Albanian Party for the Democratic Prosperity Abdurahiman Haliti, President of the Liberal Democratic Party Stojan Andov, and discussed ethnic relations in Macedonia, especially the Macedonian - Albanian relations.

During a visit to Tirana, Albania, Dusan Janjic discussed the prospects for the resolution of the Serb-Albanian conflict with Paskal Milo, current Foreign Minister of Albania, who collaborated on the project of the Soros Network for Serb - Albanian Dialogue, i.e. the Collection of Papers ”Conflict or Dialogue”.

22) *The Letter*, inter alia, says:

“Mr. Milosevic,

I am calling upon you to stop. It is time for personal, civic and political courage and decisiveness. Only political talks and respect for principles of democracy and the rule of law must stop the conflagration of war in Kosovo. It is possible to pass from the phase of armed conflicts into the one of political agreements. Under the constitution, as the President of Yugoslavia, and as one of the most influential persons and leaders of the ruling parties, you are personally called upon and responsible for the preservation of Yugoslavia. Human casualties and destruction undermine the foundations of Yugoslavia and of keeping Kosovo within the confines of Serbia”…(Janjic, 1998).


This material provided the basis for discussions, following which it will have to be revised and published as a book. As neither the USIS nor the Open Society Fund provided financial support to FER, they were published as late as in 2001, in the journal *Nova srpska politicka misao* (New Serbian Political Thought).

Discussions covered three themes: Kosovo yesterday, today and tomorrow; national segregation as a dominant feature of everyday life in Kosovo; and possibilities and proposals for the solution of the Kosovo crisis.

24) Work on these documents, numerous public meetings with minority Leaders in Serbia, with representatives of Albanians and participation in consultations with leaders of the Balkans Region, were “irritant” to the authorities, and especially so the visit to Belgrade, as a guest of FER, of former President of Bulgaria Zhelin Zhelev, and publication in the daily *Danas* of the “Statement on Kosovo”.

Retaliating against such activities of FER, Milosevic’s police closed down FER office and exerted pressures on the Coordinator, Dusan Janjic, in May 2000. That was the reason why FER operations were dislocated, from July to October, to Montenegro and Croatia. FER associates also took refuge outside Serbia. Otherwise, this repression was a part of a broader repression campaign of Milosevic’s regime against those who did not share his political views, such as individuals, independent media, journalists, opposition leaders and a numbers of NGOs.

25) A *special status* is an interim solution making Kosovo a self-governing territory under the international civil administration and protection, providing simultaneously
convincing security, political, administrative, economic and cultural guarantees to Albanians, Serbs and other national communities and to Kosovo as a whole.

26) *Autonomy of the Republic of Kosovo* should include: exercise of the legislative powers through a two-chamber parliament of RK to be constituted on the basis of free and fair elections organized and controlled by UNMIK and OSCE. During the transitory period, a close cooperation and exchange of views would take place between parliaments of the Republic of Serbia and the RK, and the UNMIK. OSCE may take part in this process; independent executive bodies, including RK police; autonomous and independent judiciary in matters within the competence of RK; the right to develop agriculture, planning and carrying out veterinary and other controls of production and inventories; the right to plan and control the exploitation of ores, water and other natural resources of Kosovo; the right to strategic planning of transportation; establishment, development and control of health services; urban planning and development of cities, villages and other settlements; planning, control and promotion of the human environment protection; establishment of institutions and development of the culture of social welfare; promotion, marketing, research and development of tourist trade; the right to collect appropriate taxes and contributions to the budget of RK; the right to pursue direct cooperation with international organizations with a view to protecting and promoting the autonomy of RK, collective and individual freedoms and rights.

27) Institutions of *self-organization and self-administration of national communities,* including the Serb community, would be instituted on the basis of democratic elections within each of the communities. In these elections, conducted under the control of OSCE, representatives of national communities in common bodies of the legislative, executive, administrative and judicial authorities of RK as well as in self-governing bodies of national communities would be elected.
The autonomy of national communities includes: the right to self-organization and self-administration; the right to official use of mother tongue; the right to use the national flag and other symbols; the right of dual citizenship of RK and the Republic of Serbia or of the appropriate state union - for all citizens of RK who wish so; system of education, culture, information and sports, taking account of values and needs of the national community concerned; proportionate representation on the command staff and in professional military and police units, and in other public services; the right to collect a self-contribution for the purpose of self-financing along with the right to financial aid from the RK budget; the right to international cooperation within the sphere of competence of self-government.

In fact, FER began this campaign in cooperation with the Yugoslav Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights in August 1999, and in 2000 FER’s experts were included in an informal team that prepared a model law on amnesty, supported in December 2000 by the President of FRY Vojislav Kostunica, which was taken by the federal government as a basis for its work. However, the federal government informed the public in January 2001 that there would not be a general pardon to those that committed acts of “terrorism”. This meant that Albanians who were taken into custody during the war in Kosovo as “terrorists” would not be amnestied and released. That motivated a public reaction on the part of the FER Coordinator Dusan Janjic. This reaction has been exceptionally well received in a part of the Serbian public, among Albanians in Kosovo and within UNMIK.

The open letter addressed to the federal minister of justice Momcilo Grubac says inter alia:

…” You are saying: “The amnesty does not cover those who were charged and convicted for terrorism” (Vecernje Novosti of 12 January 2001). Further: “The criminal act of terrorism could not be covered by the Amnesty Act though major pressures were exerted to do it…”
…I must admit that I consider even now that there are reasons that the Federal Assembly should take into consideration and pardon Albanian prisoners. Those are:

- instituting of the rule of law and full respect and protection of human rights have to apply to the entire territory of the FRY, including Kosovo, and to all citizens without regard to their national affiliation and, consequently, to members of the Albanian community;
- the exercise of legal powers of the federal authorities in Kosovo would be so verified, which is at the moment de facto under the civil administration of UNMIK, and under the military control of KFOR;
- that would create a legal and especially a moral obligation of all the agents in Kosovo, and of the bodies of UNMIK and KFOR in particular, to cooperate with bodies of the FRY in finding and releasing Serbs who were kidnapped or arrested by Albanian paramilitary and parapolice formations;
- The position of FRY bodies would be strengthened in the inevitable but hard process of negotiations on the status of Kosovo and administration of it. That would also attest to the seriousness of the invitation to talk extended publicly by the President of FRY and individual federal ministers to Albanian leaders…

You are saying that there is a considerable number of cases “where proceedings or legal actions were not correctly conducted. Many cases qualified as terrorism do not fall under it” (Danas, 12 January 2001). That is encouraging because it indicates that your Ministry had an insight into concrete court procedures. However, the part in your statement that follows is surprising as you say that it was a mistake “which resulted from political views prevailing at that time.”

I would like you to correct me if I am wrong but it seems to me that the policy of violation of human rights of all, and Albanians in particular, was pursued for years in Kosovo, that measures of repression and discrimination against Albanians were practiced, including the measures of expulsion for the purpose of ethnic cleansing. Also, it seems to
me that there was war in Kosovo. Therefore, one cannot speak about mistakes, as it was the policy, which constituted the very gist of Milosevic’s dictatorship. Naturally, that does not free from liability those Albanians who persecuted Serbs and others from Kosovo after the arrival of KFOR. However, as far as I know, such people were neither arrested nor are in prisons of Serbia.

Taking into account that the story about “mistakes” reminds me of unhappy games of transferring individual responsibility to the collectivity, to “all of us”, I kindly ask you and your government to note that I – citizen Dusan Janjic exclude myself from that game.

29) In that context, it is extremely important to complete the process of disarmament of citizens, suppression of organized crime, specifically the trafficking in women, arms, drugs, cars, etc. Among the measures to be taken with a view to achieving the mentioned objective are the following: to increase the strength and improve the training of the police forces which should also incorporate members of local communities; establishment of independent judiciary and prosecution; education in non-violence, etc.

22) The status of Kosovo issue should be solved with the least possible delay as the continuation of the present state of affairs has extraordinary negative effects: criminalization of the Region and institution of a strong “parallel” Albanian state (Krastev, 2000:9).

30) The status of Kosovo issue should be solved with the least possible delay as the continuation of the present state of affairs has extraordinary negative effects: criminalization of the Region and institution of a strong “parallel” Albanian state (Krastev, 2000:9).