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KOSOVO BETWEEN CONFLICT AND DIALOGUE
(Ethnic Conflict and the Crisis of Identity: The Case of Serb - Albanian Relations)

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Introduction

Subject of the study

This study deals with the social dimensions, basic causes and behaviour of major participants during and in the aftermath of the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo.

The role of the NGOs, especially the attempts of the Forum for Ethnic relations (FER), at contributing to the peaceful solution of the problem, based on a special status for Kosovo as an interim solution, is also analysed.

The study also addresses the peace-building process, measures for establishing and maintaining the peace, and the building of democratic institutions of self-government both in Kosovo and in the region of the South Balkans.

The following participants in the conflict will be examined:

Internal participants:
- The political actors, especially the governments of Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Slobodan Milosevic, and his specific role, taking into consideration the fact that his personal power in the FRY was outside any public or parliamentary control;
- Political leaderships of Serbian and Kosovar Albanian national movements;
- Intellectuals;
- The military: The Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the police, paramilitary formations (Serbian parapolice and Albanian: Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, and National Movement of Kosovo, LKCK);
- Foreign participants:
  - Governments of Macedonia, Albania, Russia, United States and other NATO member states;
  - NATO military commander and political leadership;
  - International organisations (UN, OSCE, European Union).

The involvement of certain international NGOs will also be considered, especially the role of the Project on Ethnic relations (PER), a leading US-based organisation that has extensively co-operated with FER.

The opening hypothesis is the following:
- In the case of Kosovo and the Serb-Albanian conflict we are dealing with a conflict in a non-democratic state. In a state of this kind violence associated with secessionist and separatist movements tend to be high. The institutionalised protection of civil liberties and respect for human rights is not dealt with and does not permit communities to transform their demands into democratic, electoral power. The government is not able to rule in a democratic way and to manage its ethnic opposition at the same time. Also, there is no widespread popular legitimacy for resolving the conflicts peacefully through democratic institutions.

The new nationalist elites and their "negative policies", such as internal colonialism, ethnocide and genocide, play a special role in the conflict.

International intervention in the conflict is officially motivated by the concern to uphold the principles of minority and human rights, but primary to preserve international peace and stability. This resulted in a clash of opinions between Russia and China on the one side, and the United States and its NATO ally, on the other. Likewise, the EU itself displayed internal differences of interests and approaches to the Kosovo crisis and the Balkan (and European) integration. Indeed, during the Kosovo crisis two important questions are raised: the role of the UN in restoring and maintaining the peace and the expanding of NATO into a Pan-European security system.

The local parties in the conflict viewed the international community’s response to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo crisis differently.

The Serbian side took a stand against the interests of NATO countries, while the Albanian side opted for an alliance with NATO. A main challenge for the international community is to put this experience behind and establish a set of the new relations, acting as a “Third party” - a mediator in the conflict.
A new epoch began in the Balkans and Yugoslavia in 1989 when the SFRY was transformed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the republics were given more autonomy. However, the Kosovo question reappeared demanding another solution. On 20 March 1990, the Federal Assembly of the FRY passed a Basic Law on Kosovo, a law that was to make Kosovo autonomous. It was a law that rendered Kosovo an autonomous region with a wide range of powers, which seemed to satisfy all the demands of the Kosovo Albanians as well as the Serbian government. The Kosovo Albanians welcomed the law as a step forward toward self-determination. However, the Serbian federal government, led by Slobodan Milošević, saw the law as a threat to its sovereignty and promptly rejected it. The law was never implemented.

Kosovo became a focus of international attention when ethnic Albanians began to protest against Serbian rule. The protests led to a series of events that culminated in the Kosovo War of 1998-1999. After the war, Kosovo was administered by the UN until it became an independent state in 2008.

The Kosovo War was fought between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian armed forces. The KLA was largely composed of ethnic Albanians and was supported by the United States and other Western countries. The Serbian government was backed by Serbia itself and Russia. The war resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people and the loss of many lives.

The conflict in Kosovo continues to be a source of tension between Serbia and Kosovo. The international community has recognized Kosovo as an independent state, but Serbia remains opposed to this recognition. The status of Kosovo is still a matter of debate and negotiation.
The history of Serb - Albanian relations in the former Yugoslavia went through a number of stages (see Chronology in the APPENDIX I):

- First stage, 1918 - 1941/45: A period of shifting domination, occasional violence and armed conflicts. At first, Albanians were under Serbian domination. Later, from 1941 - 1945, in Greater Albania, created in co-operation with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, Serbs were persecuted in Kosovo.

- Second stage, 1945 - 1966: A period of oscillations from occasional violence (Albanian rebellions and their suppression by the military and police) to solution of disputes by political means. In this period, massive and numerous administrative limitations of Albanians rights have occurred, as well as occasional violence.

- Third stage, 1966 - 1981: A period in which the rights of Albanians are recognised and guaranteed at a very wide range, while the autonomy of Kosovo within the federal structure of Yugoslavia strengthens. This upholds the emancipation and self-assertion of the Albanian community, but also gives rise to an Albanian nationalist movement, supported by the local communist elite.

- Fourth stage, 1981 - present: A period of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, strengthening of both Serbian and Albanian ethno-nationalistic movements and political and armed conflicts of Serbs and Albanians. This period could be divided into four sub-stages.

  - The first began in 1981 and lasted until 1986: at that time, the Albanians, primarily combining mass political demonstrations with the use of state institutions (mostly of the local branch of the Yugoslav Communist Party), demanded their own state - a "Kosovo - Republic".

  - The second that started in 1986 was characterized by a conflict over the constitutional status of Kosovo and the Albanian community.

  - The third sub-stage, 1989 - 1998, was marked by open political conflicts. In fact, invoking the "ethnic principle" the Serbian authorities tried to constitute Serbia as an ethnic state and protect all Serbs on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. However, in their approach to the Kosovo issue, the priority was given to the "historical right" and to the "principle of statehood". The Albanian leaders, on the other hand, tried to build institutions of a "parallel state" - self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo.

  - Finally, the fourth sub-stage was marked by an open armed conflict 1998 - 1999.

- The fifth stage begins in July 1999, with the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and is characterised by international military (KFOR) and civil (UNMIK) presence in Kosovo. This period should develop along the lines of restoring and maintaining the peace, confidence building and establishing a common system of decision-making for Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo.

### War over Kosovo

- **The Bloody Feast of Ethnic Nationalism**

Milosevic's regime tried to establish direct jurisdiction over Kosovo by restricting the rights of Albanians through a methodically pursued campaign for their marginalization, as well as discrimination and provision of social, economic and political "motives" for moving them out of Kosovo. On the other hand, Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), by building institutions of the Albanian "parallel state", made an effort to achieve
independence for the Republic of Kosovo. These two political participants established and maintained a status quo from 1990 until 1995. The result is a complete division within Kosovo's society: a vast majority of the population lives in strict separation.

After the Dayton1), at the end of 1995, two parallel processes begin:

- Official public discussion on Kosovo status emerges. The talks about status started independently of, or rather against the will of government and political leaderships, by the domestic and foreign NGO's, including the FER. The government, political leaders and parties (Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS and LDK), both hard-liners and moderate ones joined the discussion later on.

- Radicalization of the Albanian movement and political life in Kosovo, which took the courses of the intensification of the Albanian political conflicts. In 1996, among the Albanians, especially the younger ones, there was a growing tendency to reject the peaceful policy of Ibrahim Rugova. At that time, strengthening of an anti-Serbian attitude culminating in a series of "test attacks" by LKCK and KLA, which began on April 22nd, 1996 and turned into armed resistance in 1998 and 1999.

The beginning of the year 1997 was ominous. In March, protests in Albania grew into a chaotic rebellion against the government of President Sali Berisha. The events in Albania had two consequences for Kosovo: 1. an increasing insecurity and nervousness among Kosovar Albanian political leaders, along with the strengthening of radicalisation and reinforcement of military activities of the KLA2), which used training camps in northern Albania. The targets of their attacks were the Serbian police and state officials as well as Albanians who...
were perceived to be the "collaborators" or "the people of the Serbian regime".

During 1998, the influence of the KLA, which supported the radicalisation of the political fitting including armed resistance to Serbia and whose influence among Albanians kept growing. Indeed, the KLA became the "movement worth joining". The result was a change in the balance of political power: the influence of Rugova and the LDK started to become weak. For the Serbian side and the international community, the KLA became a political factor, which should be included in any negotiating process.

In January 1999, the self-organisation of local Serbs into "village guards" began, and the first militant actions took place in Kosovo (blocking of roads around Pristina, on January 7, 1999). At that time, Milosevic decided to defeat the KLA with massive military and police action. Milosevic's conviction (shared by most political parties and the Serbian public) that the problem can be solved by the use of force, was one reason why Serbia and the FRY were pushed into an armed conflict with the NATO alliance, the strongest powers of the world.

In taking up arms, Serbs and Albanians believed that they took their destiny into their hands. For the first time, survival on the territory of Kosovo became a personal problem for both Serbs and Albanians, which has to be resolved by force. Serbs who supported Milosevic for 11 years, believing that he would "finally solve the Kosovo problem", did not find the way to give up. A wide circle of local Serbs is taking part in these actions, mostly through police forces. Local Serbs, who took part in ethnic cleansing, were in total conflict with their Albanian neighbours. Also, many Albanians tried to find an answer to the dilemma: Now or never! The KLA gave orders: Freedom cannot be gained without blood!
Causes and factors that have led into armed conflict

The war in Kosovo, which began on February 28th, 1998, is yet another in the line of armed conflicts waged on the soil of the former Yugoslavia over the past decade. These wars were part of the process of the former Yugoslavia's disintegration and the inception of new states.

The key factors that conflicts in Kosovo escalated into bloody war are:
- Inability of the political elite to undertake the modernisation of the society and democratise the government. Ethnic nationalism appeared to be the means of survival for this elite.
- Orientation of the new nationalist elite towards non-democratic means and policy, violence included ethnocide, genocide and war;
- A sense of insecurity among Kosovo's citizens, which developed into a psychosis of being endangered, maintained by the government, political leaders and parties, as well as media under their control, all for the purpose of tipping the balance in favour of one of the competing elites;
- Different shapes of repression of Albanians and violation of their rights;
- Failure to resolve deep crisis of national identity with ethn nationalism. That applies to both Serb and Albanian communities.

The aftermath of the war in Kosovo

The mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo took place twice: in spring 1998 and spring 1999. UNHCR announced, on May 25th, that 957,913 refugees left Kosovo since the beginning of armed conflict in March 1998. Reasons for such a mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo are the following:
- ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo, organised by the Serbian civil authorities, police and paramilitary forces;
- fleeing from Kosovo during the NATO bombardment;
- Kosovo Albanians found themselves under coercion of the KLA. Indeed, the KLA made an effort to legitimise NATO air strikes and "secure" the arrival of NATO troops in Kosovo.
During April 1999 that was also the way of moving a part of KLA fighters along with the refugees into Albania or Macedonia, in order to avoid their destruction by VJ and police forces of the regime.

The end of Milosevic’s Dictatorship over Kosovo and Serbia: New Reality and Challenges

Milosevic’s control over Kosovo came to an end in June 1999 with the arrival of UNMIK, headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. A new reality was established in Kosovo. Such a situation has been created on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

The situation in Kosovo today is even more difficult than ever. The war of 1998-1999 aggravated unresolved problems from the past, and added the status of Kosovo as a new problem, including:

- Killings, dislodging and war devastation;
- Military and civilian presence of the international community, including NATO, the UN and the OSCE, insufficiently prepared or willing to preserve the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo as the fundamental value of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244;
- Administrative9) and security vacuum10), or rather Kosovo as an example of bad management of conflicts.
- Economy is not functioning11) and UNMIK is incapable to establish social security.
- Public sector in Kosovo is worse a year after the war ended than it was before. The Albanians now think that freedom has come and that the West will provide jobs for Kosovar people and will pay them. However, the international community has neither intention nor funds to do that in Kosovo (Mailiqi. 2000: 26).
- Albanian society at present is suffering from a trauma. Half of the population is displaced. For example, there are about 300,000 people in Pristina who fled their villages. They come from a traditional society where everybody knows everybody else and where a moral code prohibits a person to do anything that might disgrace the family in front of one’s neighbours. Since the society in Pristina makes them feel anonymous, they become completely unrestrained, as there is no authority to respect. The “Father of the Family” used to have everything in his hands but now he is a refugee or lives in wretched conditions and is not able to provide for the existence of his dependants. This causes traumas for hundreds of the young people. Teenagers are without any family control, and the school has broken down (Mailiqi.2000: 27);
- Lack of legality, increased insecurity and instability of Kosovo. Crime and politically motivated murders, kidnap-
pings and thefts; unauthorised possessions of arms, etc. are numerous\textsuperscript{12}). Kosovo Serbs and members of other non-Albanian communities live in an atmosphere of fear in isolated and insecure enclaves, under the repression and intolerance. In fact, in late 1999, anarchy and lawlessness ruled Kosovo\textsuperscript{eventhough UNMIK and OSCE managed the situation in Kosovo}. Such a situation caused a balance of impotence of all the actors in the Kosovo crisis. The position of Serbs was particularly weakened, demonstrated by the fact that with the arrival of KFOR and establishment of the interim civil administration they began to seek refuge\textsuperscript{13}).

- Opening up of the Albanian issue both as a regional issue and the one of possible unification of all Albanian territories. The transfer of ethnic, and political and territorial tensions outside Kosovo is a matter of particular concern. In southern Serbia (Presevo Valley) provocative activities of Albanian extremists and their so-called avenging actions continue. Negative effects of such actions are also evident in neighboring Macedonia.

- The authorities and opposition in Serbia are embroiled in internal political conflicts and insufficiently engaged in the solution of the Kosovo issue (Statement. 2000)

In October 2000, the fall of Milosevic’s dictatorship created a "new reality". The new established government in Belgrade officially expresses willingness to cooperate with the international community, while the UNMIK - after the replacement of top officials, i. e. departure of Bernard Kouchner - shows greater readiness for contacts and cooperation with the Serbian side. However, the new situation is teeming with challenges and the possible response of the actors concerned is yet unknown.
The process of searching for a solution: The Case of Forum for Ethnic Relations

It was not until 1998 that, through the mediation of the international community, comparatively uninterrupted political talks began some even ending in negotiations. However, in the course of 2000 or rather during the first year of the international civil and military presence in Kosovo, these talks Belgrade and Kosova's Albanians totally sliced. They only met at PER's regional meetings within the PER series on ‘Albanians and Their Neighbors’.

One of the features of many efforts made by international governmental organizations and NGOs is that they, in the beginning of their search for the solutions to the Serb-Albanian conflict, paid very little attention to the activities of local NGOs. Not before the NATO bombing, in the second half of 1999, the international community was developed an interest in NGOs activities. The most probably, international community become aware of the fact that the NGOs were an active factor of the public life in Serbia and that, in the situation of a dictatorship, NGOs tended to be more efficient and less politically corrupt than political parties. However, even then the NGO's efforts at establishing a Serb-Albanian dialogue did not receive any considerable support. As opposed to the general trend, some NGOs are very active in their search for the solution to the Serb-Albanian conflict, above all, the human rights NGOs. For instance, the Helsinki Citizens' Parliament in the first half of the 1990s, as well as the Helsinki Committees for Human Rights in Serbia and the Helsinki Committees for Human Rights in Kosovo, the Humanitarian Law Center, Women in Black and the Belgrade Circle throughout the period. One of these organizations that were very active in seeking to the solution of the conflict was Forum for Ethnic Relations (FER).

A particular characteristic of the FER is that it is the only NGO whose prime objective was searching of solution to the problem of the status of Kosovo as well as to the Serb-Albanian conflict. Due to the fact that the founders of the FER are prominent intellectuals, some of them even influential political personalities in the Serbian and Albanian communities, activity on seeking of the solution for the status was in fact possible.14)

Analyzing FER's actions one might discern the following phases:

- The period from 1990 to 1995,
- The post-Dayton period, 1995 - 1997,
- The second half of 1997 - 1999,
- The post-war period: June 1999 - October 2000,
- The post-Milosevic period, since October 2000.

Period 1990 - 1995

General characteristic of this period is a low level of the Serb-Albanian dialogue. In fact, talks of prominent representatives of the Serb and Albanian communities occur rarely. However, the FER's activity in the period is very rich in this field.

FER's activity was based on individual projects within the framework of general objectives, and the following assumptions:

- Direct Serb-Albanian talks are possible, and participation of national or foreign NGOs can be valuable in any mediation process.
- Talks should be held with representatives of the civil society, intellectuals and other important segments of the elites but not with political leaders.
- The question of the Serb-Albanian relations is the question of interethnic relations, and above all the question of the protection and respect for minority rights;
- Solution of the question of violation of human and minority rights of Albanians and of the status of Kosovo is possible within the concept of democratization of Serbia, and with the prospect of joining a united Europe.

In this period, basic FER activities in the sphere of the Serb-Albanian dialogue were:

- Numerous meetings, joint public round tables, articles in the newspapers, the subject of which were protests against the violation of human and minority rights of the Albanians, particularly prohibiting their access to schools, universities, scientific and cultural institutions and the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo to the Albanians.
- Many and varied activities were carried out within the project Soros Network for a Serb-Albanian Dialogue;
- Third, activities carried out in cooperation with PER.

In the Network, which was supported in 1993 - 1994 by the Soros Foundation from Yugoslavia and Albania, FER was one of principal initiators and the 'executive agency'. While a number of meetings were held within the Network, the Albanians were, in reality, increasingly self-organizing themselves through 'parallel institutions'. At the same time, the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia were living next to the Albanians in their "parallel world" firmly leaning on Milosevic's regime. Indeed, there was no interaction in public life, culture, education or politics between the two communities.

In Serbia and FRY, the authorities and media created an atmosphere of disapproval of such activities. Simply, such activities were regarded as "traitorous". The government persistently tried to exclude any public talk about Kosovo, even more so setting forth views other than the official ones. Actors outside Serbia and Kosovo were not allowed to take
part in talks about Kosovo. Indeed, a strong campaign was pursued against the "internationalization of the Kosovo issue". That is why the first talks were held in Budapest, Hungary, in spring 1993, and in Ohrid, Macedonia, in autumn 1993. Notable intellectuals from Serbia, Kosovo and Albania took part in the talks. After that, work on the preparation and publication of a collection of papers on Conflict or Dialogue, in the Albanian, Serbian and English languages, was organized.

The intention of FER's involvement in the Network was:

- To restore or establish for the first time the severed ties among intellectuals and politicians of the Serbian and Albanian communities, through meetings, exchange of views and work on a joint project (collection of papers) of independent minded intellectuals. Accordingly, opening up new channels of cooperation would have to encourage also other actors of the society, above all doctors, attorneys and business people, to cooperate;

- To elucidate from within the most topical problems and ways for overcoming the existing tendencies and conflicts (Licht, 1994:9)

Lessons learned from this work are the following:

- There are considerable differences in appraising the reality, especially political consequences of the suspension of Kosovo's autonomy, and the ways out of the crisis of political relations. Both sides having agreed on the existence of the violation of rights of Albanians (Ahmeti, 1994: 108 - 114; Vasiljevic, 1994: 107). An intellectual from Serbia (Vasiljevic) pointed out that the problem will be solved by democratization of Serbia, while an Albanian (Ahmeti) views it as a systematic policy of apartheid relying on a deep-rooted rejection of Albanians in culture, everyday life, and not only in politics.

- Certain facts, even where statistical data are concerned, are viewed and interpreted differently. This particularly relates to the number of Albanians in Kosovo and migration of Serbs and Albanians (Bogosavljevic, 1994: 17 - 29; Islami, 1994: 30 - 43). Further, in relation to the factors of disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the place of Kosovo in the process, Albanian intellectuals from Kosovo (Zajmi, 1994: 189 - 201) hold the view that Kosovo has the same position as Slovenia, and Croatia. Also, they pointed out that Albanians have the right to self-determination and secession from Serbia and the creation of the Republic of Kosovo (Agani, 1994: 205 - 225; Kullashi, 1994: 177 - 188).

An author from Serbia is of the opinion that the strength of the Albania request lies in an response to the identity crisis and that the request of the Albanians could be justified by the right to self-organization and self-administration, within the transitory period and "special status" in FRY. It could be accompanied with the opening up of borders and intensive regional cooperation (Janjic, 1994: 117 - 176).

- There is a high degree that the questions of Kosovo and Serb-Albanian relations are linked with a deep crisis of the national and state identity (Bobi, 1994; Janjic, 1994; Maliqi, 1994). That the Kosovo problem should be solved by
peaceful, non-violent actions of Albanians and negotiation, under the condition of the putting an end to the repression of Milosevic’s regime was pointed out by the some people (Agani, 1994; Janjic, 1994; Kovacevic, 1994).

Also, there is a high degree of the strong regional dimension of the Albanian and Kosovo question (Ismajli, 1994; Milo, 1994; Petkovic, 1994; Puto, 1994), especially at the level of the security (Ocokoljic, 1994) and economic and regional integration (Minic, 1994).

Organizing and holding of these meetings, and publishing of the collection The Conflict or Dialogue, and later (within the framework of a similar project carried out in cooperation with the University of Nijmegen for the Netherlands) The Confrontation or Co-existence, was by itself a good sign. At that same time we have noted that:

- The activities were "sporadic" and "non-cumulative" (Popov, 1994);
- In a situation where differing and often mutually confronted views existed, good will for understanding is not sufficient. However, Network gathered together individuals of unequal influence. While on the Albanian side people of influence in the Albanian community in Kosovo and Albania were participating, on the Serb side, from Serbia, participants were moderate and well-intentioned people, representatives of the so-called civic option who were marginalized in Serbia and without any effect on the government. For instance, while Agani was the second man of LDK, there were no party leaders on the Serb side.
- The advocates of extreme views on both sides were totally excluded.
- These activities aroused minor attention on the part of international governmental organizations, NGOs and diplomats acting in Serbia and Kosovo. Even in the program policy of the major sponsor Soros Foundation, these activities were not highly rated.
- Both the public and the Network lacked a clear understanding of possible solutions. However, a number of elements pointing to the possibility of solving the status of Kosovo issue transpired. Those were concepts of the Kosovo Republic as an independent state (the majority of Albanian advocates), autonomy within Serbia (the majority of Serb and foreign participants) and an interim solution in the form of a "special status" (Janjic, 1994: 167:176);
- Maybe the biggest problem is the lack of instruments for implantation of the ideas that came about in the Network activities as well as the absence of an alternative view of the instruments to deal with the issue (Sorensen, 1999: 33).
The cooperation within the Network provided an opportunity to FER to re-examine some of its objectives. For instance:

- Direct Serb-Albanian talks were possible but they could not yield any serious results. Internal division of each of the communities, intransigence of the official Belgrade, mutual confrontation of ethno nationalist views and mutual mistrust required the involvement of a third party, above all CSCE/OSCE or/and UN (Janjic, 1994: 173). However, the potential Third Party did not show any serious interest in the projects like the Network.

- Talks with representatives of the civil society proved to be useful but they were only within the reach of a narrow segment of the national and foreign public. It was particularly unfavorable that the cooperation was pursued in Serbia only with "civic" intellectuals but not with other significant segments of the elites, especially that there was no cooperation with political leaders.

- It is desirable to have talks in the very centers of the political power of the Albanians and Srebian government, in Pristina and Belgrade. However, in such a case there was neither room for free talks or for influence on the domestic and foreign public. In fact, dictatorial regimes, like Milosevic’s, were very efficient in making such activities impossible in the country such events were also very vulnerable, in fact powerless, if they took place outside the country.

- Consideration of the Serb-Albanian relations only within the framework of the protection of human and minority rights proved to be insufficient. The belief that the solution of the status of Albanians and Kosovo is possible within the concept of the democratization of Serbia and FRY proved also to be questionable, due to small chances of this happening before the radicalization of both, Serb and Albanian movements.

The cooperation with PER began on the initiative of PER which, in September 1993, at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, organized a roundtable on Interethnic relations in Serbia/Yugoslavia: Alternatives for the Future. That was a meeting of intellectuals, politicians and journalists from different parts of the former Yugoslavia, including an Albanian from Kosovo, experts on the region from the U.S.A. and other countries. The meeting focused on interethnical relations in Serbia and FRY and on the position of the Serbs in the neighboring successor states.

The basic premise of the meeting was that peace will not come to the Balkans as long as the Serbian "national question" remains unsolved; that is, until Serbs are at peace with their non-Serbian fellow citizens of Serbia-FRY, and with their neighbors in the formerly Yugoslav republics. Participants at the September meeting form the nucleus of an informal Serbian - American Consultative Group, which will continue to act on an ad hoc basis to facilitate the efforts in Serbia aimed at the peaceful resolution of the Serbian national question.

In the course of March 1994, a PER founded fact-finding mission visited Serbia, Kosovo and Croatia. The general purpose of the mission was to contact the "moderates" in Serbia, to take note of their views on the situation within Serbia and the Serbs outside Serbia and to consider how moderate forces from different ethnic communities can be assisted or helped to assist each other (Project on Ethnic Relations. 1994:1).

Separate talks with Albanian leaders, representatives of the governments of Serbia and the FRY, as well as the repre-
sentatives of SPS, demonstrated radically different understanding of the situation on the part of the two sides. From the point of view of the Albanians, they are living in a brutal police state. From the point of view of the both, Serbian and the Federal governments and SPS, the Albanians have every opportunity to participate in political, cultural and social life in Serbia, but refuse to do so because they only want to secede from Serbia. The Albanians point to a well-documented discrimination, harassment and other forms of hostile activities directed against them.

While Albanians created a system of parallel schools, hospitals and other institutions in Kosovo, boycotting official institutions and elections, representatives of the governments on their part saw little reason to negotiate with the Albanians. Some opposition leaders said that a non-nationalistic party in Serbia couldn't survive. Yet other leaders of major opposition parties did express willingness to enter into discussions with the Albanians, although they admitted that they could not at this time ensure practical results of any agreements. For their part, the Albanians were skeptical of the utility of discussions, but did not rule them out (Project on Ethnic Relations, 1994:7).

Experiences acquired in the first stages of cooperation with the PER confirm the following:
- The existence of a paradox that will later transform the crisis into war: the authorities in Serbia, unable to change the situation to their benefit, strove to maintain the status quo. This was, however, accepted by the leader of the Albanians Dr Ibrahim Rugova and LDK, with the intention to monopolize the institutions of the "parallel system";
- There were a lot of "moderates" in Serbia who believed in a democratic, peaceful solution of the Serbian national issue, including Serb-Albanian conflict, but they had no power to implement any agreement;
- It transpired that there would not be a clear and simple solution and that various measure had to be taken. That meant that, in addition to trying to include the authorities and SPS into talks with Albanians, it was necessary to uphold efforts of those who were seriously committed to the democratization of political life in Serbia. As a form of such a support, it was proposed to organize in Belgrade a conference on democratization and interethnic relations, scheduled for 1995, with participation of well-known experts in these fields, and a number of public figures of international renown. It was further proposed to support professional political training, such as the development of a data base with the help of neutral experts, that would facilitate a rational discussion of the problem of Kosovo (Project on Ethnic Relations, 1994: 9, 11).

Based on the experience from work within the Network and the cooperation with PER, the following has been learned:
- It is necessary for FER to continue its research, academic and expert search for an efficient solution, re-examining both the limits of the regime in Serbia and the very framework of Serbia and FRY;
- It is needed to increase attention paid to the political leadership, including the SPS. This orientation was the basic reason for a later interruption of cooperation with the Soros Fund in the field of the Serb-Albanian dialogue15).
- Communications with the public of Serbia and with the representatives of the international community should be intensified. It had aimed to making them more receptive to capabilities of the civil society and NGOs in the Serb-Albanian relations and to the ideas which do not coming from those in power.
- Usefulness of cooperation with influential foreign NGOs. That was a decisive factor in favor of the continuation of FER's cooperation with PER.
- Creation of favorable logistic conditions in the FER itself for a more systematic work. An attempt was made in this respect with the Soros Fund through a project of the Center for Ethnic Relations and Protection of Minorities, but the Fund's support was missing. However, the support was provided by SIDA creating thereby possibilities for the continuation of FER's activities in this field.

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15 The Serb-Albanian Round Table: Robert Hayden, Hidayet Hyseni, F. Agani, Mark Krasniqi and Vuk Draskovic, Carnegie Corporation of New York. New York, April 7-9, 1997
In this period, more specifically late in 1995, leaderships of opposition parties, the ruling SPS and the Albanian leaders accepted the method of dialogue and negotiation, and a discussion began within the Yugoslav public on the possibilities for a Serb-Albanian dialogue. As opposed to increasingly grave situation in Kosovo, the province however seemed to be closer to peace than to war. Nonetheless, this possibility was soon put off due to passive and occasionally arrogant behavior of government and the ruling SPS which interpreted the Dayton agreement as a chance to solve the question of Kosovo by themselves and in their own way.

PER gave its considerable contribution to this, promoting a dialogue of the leading political persons of different ethnic groups in the FRY. For that, cooperation with the PER for FER as the local partner was important parts of FER's activities. This was done through a series of informal talks, especially with representatives of communities in conflict, with a view to preparing their meetings and dialogues.

In summer, on 23-24 June 1995, FER in the cooperation with PER organized the conference on Democratization and Inter-ethnic Relations in Yugoslavia, which was held in Belgrade. A number of outstanding representatives of the Albanian leadership, opposition parties and the ruling SPS took part in the conference. On that occasion, the SPS suggested and the Albanians accepted an offer to hold a meeting on possibilities to resolve the Serb-Albanian relations and on the status of Kosovo.

It is important to note that the political situation in the former Yugoslavia changed dramatically in the months immediately following the conference. In July, Serbian forces took over two Muslim "safe areas" in eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica and Zepa, while in early August Croatia took the Serb-populated region of Krajina. In both cases, the resident populations were expelled, the Muslims from the Bosnian enclaves and almost all Serbs from Krajina, further undermining the position of 'moderates' in all formerly Yugoslav republics. Thus, some positions taken by participants in June may have been rendered obsolete by the events of July and August.

This period is characterized by the following:
- First, the problem of the Serb - Albanian relations was still viewed by the majority of actors in Serbia/FRY and the international community as an issue of minority protection, and measures like the abrogation of discrimination laws were proposed. For instance, it was proposed to repeal the Serbian law on limiting the trade in real estate which, for example, required authorization from the Ministry of Finance in all transactions related to sales/purchases of apartments and land if one of the parties was not of Serb ethnic origin. However, it was noted that this problem could not be solved only through instruments of minority protection. The Serbian public was for the first time informed that as regards Kosovo one of the central questions was the following: is the FRY a framework allowing the solution of the conflict between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo or not? In answers to this questions, opposing positions were expressed: Albanian leaders denied that possibility while the Serbian ones claimed it appropriate framework, although admitted that its democratization was needed;
- Second, both the Serbs and Albanians expressed their agreement that it was an imperative that the authorities of Serbia and Albanians should initiate direct talks without any
pre-conditions, and on all topics. This was also expressed in public at the June Conference. Subsequently, based on the initiative, the New York Round Table of Representatives of Political Parties: Towards Peaceful Accommodation in Kosovo, was organized by PER, in New York City, April 7-9, 1997.

In the second half of June, within the framework of FER’s project "The Anatomy of the Kosovo Crisis and Perspectives for the Development of Serbian - Albanian Relations in Kosovo, Serbia and the Region." A Public Opinion Survey was carried out. It was made in cooperation with the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology in Pristina. This was the first and only one survey in seven years made in cooperation of Serbian and Albanian scientists on a sample including both Serbs and Albanians. On the basis of the survey a preliminary report was presented at two press conferences in Pristina and Belgrade to inform the public about the findings of the survey.

Findings of the survey confirmed that, as far as Serbs and Albanians are concerned, they lived in two parallel worlds that meet only in case of a conflict. Above all, permanent contacts (other than the neighborly conflicts) between Serbs and Albanians are extremely rare. These are two totally separate ethnic communities. For instance, among the Serbian respondents, there was none whose mother or father was Albanian, and only 4 percent were married to someone who did not belong to his/her ethnic group. There are only 4 percent mixed marriages among the Serbs, and 5.3 percent among the Albanians. The characteristic of the position of Albanians is that they totally deny legitimacy of the political system and the FRY itself. This is only intensified by not going to the polls organized by Serbia or Yugoslavia. Positions of Serbs and Albanians are also opposite as regards the way out of the crisis and the model to solve the status of Kosovo. For example, 98 percent of Albanians and only 2 percent of Serbs give preference to the “independence of Kosovo”. On the other hand, 73 percent of Serbs gives preference to “annulling any autonomy”, while only 2 percent of Albanians opt for this alternative.

In 1996, FER established a Serb-Albanian Workshop as the first form of institutional cooperation between Kosovar Albanian scientists and scientists from other parts of FRY. In 1996, FER established a Serb-Albanian Workshop as the first form of institutional cooperation between Kosovar Albanian scientists and scientists from other parts of FRY.

Under the leading of the PER, FER was actively engaged in mediation between the political leaders of leading parliamentary parties in Serbia and the Albanian leadership. The result was the New York Round Table the adoption of the following documents: "Jointly Agreed Positions" (PER. 1977) and
"Concluding Statement", which represent a contribution to the relaxation of the atmosphere and easier beginning of the Serb-Albanian dialogue (See Appendix II).

The New York's debate demonstrated:
- That they did not have a clear idea of a possible "final" solution of the Kosovo status.
- Inability of conflicting parties to attain their objectives created conditions that directed both parties to a dialogue (Sorensen, 1999: 33).

Having realized that both the problem of Kosovo and the Kosova's Albanian issue are a regional matter, FER has begun to intensify its cooperation with leaders from Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania since 1997.

In this period, the beginning of the armed conflicts on the ground, pushed dialogue on the status of Kosovo and Serb-Albanian relations into the background (Janjic. 1997:5).

Reacting to the approaching war in Kosovo, FER decided on a vigorous campaign (numerous statements for media, FER communications, appearance of FER's collaborators in many local TV and radio station broadcasts, etc.) in which the basic messages were:
- Calling to account for the escalation of conflicts, above all the political elite of Serbia;
- Insisting on a peaceful agreed solution of the status of Kosovo, on the basis of an intermediate solution.
- Promotion of a model of the special status, including the international military and civilian presence.

Within the sphere of this campaign, Dusan Janjic, FER Coordinator, addressed to Slobodan Milosevic, President of the FRY, attaches a special place to “The Open Letter”22.

On the basis of lessons learnt in the preceding periods, FER concentrated its activities on the search for an interim solution. FER's experts were engaged in the elaboration of a “special status” model. FER also made every effort to ensure support of the Serbian democratic opposition parties. Thus, a solution has been found in the way that FER drew up Framework for a Peaceful and Democratic Solution of the Question of the Status of Kosovo-Metohija and the
Albanian Community and its Integration into Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. The leadership of Social Democracy Party approved Framework on 26 June 1998. In circumstances of violent armed conflicts in Kosovo at that time, this document was the only consequent program document with a clear-cut solution.

The Framework was presented to the public at the time of armed conflicts in Kosovo, on 26 June 1998, when Milosevic's regime and the majority of opposition parties rejected the international mediation. That is why the following messages of the document are particularly encouraging:

- Appeal to the government to stop repression against Albanians and to reduce the number of police and military units concentrated in Kosovo; call for an amnesty of Albanians who were involved in armed conflicts; cooperation with the Hague Tribunal in trials for war crimes committed in Kosovo;
- Call for an unconditional dialogue in which all solutions are open.
- Standing for the autonomy of the Albanian community in Kosovo, and the autonomy of Kosovo (Social Democracy, 1998: 2 - 6)

In this period, an International Academic Round Table was held on 26 July 1998 in Montenegro to discuss the results of the studies "Anatomy of the Kosovo Crisis" and "Research on Public Opinion in Kosovo". Eminent experts on the Balkans and Serbian-Albanian relations, representatives of the Montenegrin government and parliamentary parties of the ruling "For a Better Life" coalition, NGOs and Albanian politicians took part in the round table.

The aims of the round table were:
- To get an insight into the main features and trends of everyday life in Kosovo and political relations between Serbs and Albanians;
- To ascertain the possibilities and proposals for political solutions to the crisis and the question of Kosovo's future status;
- To support democratic initiatives and advocates of dialogue.

Since the end of February 1998, the situation in Kosovo can be described as a civil war between the revolting Albanians and the Serbian and Yugoslav security forces. Participants of the round table stressed that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) would remain even after the end of fighting. It should, therefore, be included in negotiations and in the future security arrangements in Kosovo so that it would not become a base for the development of terrorism in Kosovo and elsewhere. Proposals for the solution of the Kosovo crisis were discussed at
the political and the psychological levels:
- It was stated that the feeling of having no solutions was a danger in itself. People seek solutions only when they believe that they exist, but the most influential leaders are not articulating new solutions. They are incapable of developing positive concepts, and it is almost inconceivable that people will spontaneously move in a direction different from the one of conflict. However, since the level of interpersonal violence has remained relatively low and political views are changeable, there is a chance of dividing the problem into concrete issues, which can be resolved one at a time. The signing by Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan Milosevic of the agreement on the return of Albanian pupils and students to state schools shows that this approach is possible.

- With respect to political solutions, participants discussed the possibility of temporary solutions or a so-called "special status" for Kosovo. According to this model, Kosovo would be a third federal unit but not quite a republic. The questions of the status of Kosovo and the status of the Albanian community would be discussed separately but as interrelated subjects. Local self-government would be strengthened and the minorities would participate in government at the local, provincial, republican and federal levels. Application of this model would lead after a period of three to five years to the federalization of Serbia and confederalization of FRY, creating wide possibilities to manage the problem within the broader context of Southeast European cooperation. Since FRY does not today have any reliable internal institutional framework or mechanism for managing conflicts, political negotiations, reaching agreements, stopping war, establishing peace and introducing special status, international mediation and support for the negotiating process are essential. This would lead in the first place to a solution of the Kosovo question and later to the stabilization and harmonization of relations throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Southeast Europe.

NATO strikes and the State of War implemented by Serbian and Yugoslav authorities prohibited the work of NGOs, including the FER. However, a solution was found in the association into a broader network of NGOs of Serbia with the Independent Trade Union "Nezavisnost", the Yugoslav Action Group. Within this group, FER was in charge of the Kosovo issues, particularly active in issuing a series of appeals, a "Letter to Albanian Friends" being of special significance (See Appendix III). Though there was not a direct answer to the Letter from the Albanian side, its effect on maintaining communication with the Albanian NGOs was considerable. A "Comunication on the occasion of the murder of Fehmi Agani" (See Appendix IV) received a very favorable reaction both among Albanians and abroad.

The Communication was a condemnation of Milosevic's government whose target was an Albanian intellectual. That was confirmed in January 1999 when Enver Maloku, chief of the LDK Kosovo Information Center, was killed and in May, during NATO attack and war in Kosovo, Fehmi Agani, a leading Albanian negotiator in Rambouillet, was also killed. It is widely agreed that the Serbian police murdered him. Moreover, Agani was vice-president of Rugova's LDK and one of the founders of FER, active participant in many FER activities related to the question of the Serbian - Albanian relations in Kosovo, and one of the most active negotiators on the Albanian side.

This period taught us the following fundamental lessons:
- Impotence of peace initiatives when they are faced with resoluteness of political leaderships of conflicting communities to resolve their disagreements by the arms;
- That peace initiatives were not unavailing and that they represented investment in the future.

Post-war period:
June 1999 - October 2000

It became evident in this period that the end of Milosevic's dictatorship was nearing, but also that the democratic opposition was incapable of reaching an accord on alternative policy. The FER decision to focus expert work on the elaboration of a strategy of constitutional, legislative and institutional changes for post-Milosevic era proved to be the right one. The outcome of expert work that began late in 1998, without interruption even during NATO attacks, and supported by the Know How Foundation and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, were three documents: 'Principles for a constitutional declaration', "Theses for the constitutional minority act of Serbia" and 'Statement on Kosovo'.

The FER developed a text explaining the model of the special status and drafted appropriate instruments for its implementation (Statement as a draft of a political agreement between the authorities and the Albanian political leadership, appropriate international agreements etc. FER's Statement on Kosovo was issued in Belgrade, 17 May 2000. This document is a sort of a summary of the FER's knowledge about the Kosovo solution. Also, it is a summary of the FER's proposals for the solution of the issues of Kosovo status.

Basic elements of the proposed model are the following:
- A Peace Conference on Kosovo, which would strengthen the awareness, both among the conflicting parties and the international community, that the war ended and would confirm it by reaching a peace treaty. The peace treaty would determine a basis for the solution of status issues of Kosovo and the framework of the temporary situation, i. e. the institutions of the division of power and the role of the international community in Kosovo. The first step in the peace process is the recognition of political existence of the Albanian community in the territory of Kosovo. A peace treaty is the safest way of achieving security and safety in
Kosovo and Southeast Europe.

Official representation has to be supported by including domestically non-governmental organizations in activities of the preparation of the Peace Conference on Kosovo and, at a later stage, in a pre-negotiating phase of the peace process. FER urges the establishment of an international expert team of governmental and non-governmental organizations working under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The task of the team would be to offer solutions to be considered in the course of the negotiating process and the Peace Conference.

- Looking for a resolution of the Kosovo status is an illusion for the time being. We again stress the necessity of establishing a special status. Basic elements of a special status include the participation of the international community, the UN and OSCE in the exercise of authority and provision of peace and security. It includes and the mediation in finding a more lasting solution for the Kosovo status; a high degree of autonomy of a Republic of Kosovo (RK) and that, step by step, autonomy of national communities within the RK would be achieved. The time limit, up to ten years, and after that a referendum to solve the remaining outstanding questions of the Kosovo status and territorial and political arrangement for Kosovo and Serbia are included in the "special status" model.

- By peaceful and democratic means, including manifold referendums, a strong and efficient local self-government and appropriate administrative and territorial organization of the RK would be established. Regionalization, which, to the largest possible extent respects economic, demographic, cultural, historical and ethnic features, would also make possible full protection of the rights of national communities, including self-government for Serbs. Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro have to be included directly (bilaterally and multilaterally) in the peace process. The first objective of including these countries is to establish common instruments of regional security and join the NATO - Partnership for Peace.

- It is evident that Serbia will not be able to integrate Kosovo politically, economically and socially as long as it does not build itself as a democratic and efficient state.

Expectations that Montenegro would give up reforms and democratization that have already started for the sake of the preservation of perspectives absent and unstable community such as FRY is unreal. In fact, the process of acquiring political and state independence of Montenegro and Kosovo will continue. This does not, however, put an end to possibilities for economic, traffic and information cooperation, maintenance
of cultural, scientific and similar ties. On this basis, after a period of the special status of Kosovo, could be possible to establish a Union of Independent Republics of Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, as a state and political framework of cooperation.

- The territorial and national issues in Southeastern Europe are closely interrelated, each having its regional repercussions. In the past months, the Albanian issue has been raised to the regional level, while the Serb-Albanian relations in Southeast Europe have become a strategic one. For that reason, Albanians and Serbs respectively have to be assured of a free inter-Albanian and inter-Serbian cooperation and integration respectively, and all the states with guarantees of territorial integrity;

- Taking into account the interest of development and democratization of Serbia and of the stability of Southeastern Europe, it is an imperative to have a democratic Serbia involved into regional and European integration processes. The first steps along these lines are lifting of the so-called external wall of sanctions of the EU and UN against FRY and Serbia and access of Serbia and Montenegro to the Stability Pact.

Strategically, long-term development interests of the countries of the Region are that Southeast Europe:

- Liberates itself from domination of any expansionist authority and big national ambitions;
- Eliminates destabilizing political and ethnic problems and conflicts exhausting human and material resources of the Region;
- Makes easier, through the implementation of concrete projects within the Stability Pact and SECI, interregional integration and joining the EU.

Short-term and medium-term interests of regional cooperation, proposed by the FER Statement are the following:

- Stabilizing the political solution of Kosovo status and preventing the Kosovo crisis from spilling over into the entire

Round Table on the Role of Albanians in the Euro-Integration of the Western Balkans - Mission Possible, under the auspices of the Aspen Institute - Berlin, Ohrid, Macedonia, September 16 - 17, 2000.

sub-region, through new war conflicts or, above all, through increased demands for all-Albanian state unification;

- Improvement in the status of minorities and protection of their rights, and development of cultural, information and economic cooperation within ethnicities separated by state boarders but also among different ethnicities of this sub-region;
- Promotion of common standards of citizenship, protection of minorities;
- Control of migratory movements, illicit work (for instance, by introducing border controls but at the same time more easier movement subject to labor based residence permits) and refugee status (a regime of temporary humanitarian refugees, sharing costs for the needs of refugees, prevention of causes for new refugees, encouragement of refugee returns and making the integration easier); suppression of terrorism and organized crimes, etc.
- The following measures should be taken with a view to establishing mutual confidence:
  - The authorities, especially the parliaments and governments of the Republic of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia have to admit and accept their share of responsibility for war and situation in Kosovo, and suspend all laws and decrees that limited rights and freedoms of members of the Albanian community;
  - A mixed Humanitarian Commission, including also representatives of the International Red Cross and the UNHCR, that would establish assistance to and care of victims of conflicts and their families. Particular attention should be paid to creation of conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons.
  - To set up a Bureau for struggle against organized crime and terrorism within which authorities of the Republic of Serbia, FRY, RK, KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE and relevant international organizations would cooperate;
  - Setting free political prisoners (around 2,000 Albanians were prisoners in Serbia and several hundred kidnapped Serbs and members of other non-Albanian communities who are in Albanian “prisons” in Kosovo);
  - Full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal for war crimes
committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

- The international encouragement, support and assistance to overcome present misunderstandings, problems and conflicts necessitate to include KFOR and UNMIK in securing a total end of violence and beginning of a dialogue; full membership of Serbia and Montenegro in OSCE, relevant European and regional institutions, and in the UN.

A particularly important development of this period for FER is that the problem of Serbian-Albanian relations and the status of Kosovo has also to be viewed in its regional dimension. That means that the crisis affects the neighboring countries in which Albanians live (Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo), and that its solution is likely to lie in stronger regional integration.

**Post - Milosevic Period, since October 2000**

Having Slobodan Milosevic removed from power, a new political reality has come in which an important factor is pro-democratic government and its readiness to cooperate with the international community. This creates new opportunities for the resumption of the Serb-Albanian dialogue.

FER does its best to be an active promoter of the resumption of the dialogue and negotiation about the future of Kosovo. It manages to do it thanks, inter alia, to the fact that in the course of the decade of its action relating to the Serb-Albanian issue it has acquired trust of the conflicting parties as a reliable mediator. In fact, FER acts along two lines:

- First, on reopening the dialogue between political leaders of the Albanian and Serb communities, and among people in power in FRY, Serbia and local authorities of Kosovo;
- Second, at the regional level, cooperating with PER, it takes part in active exchanges of views with the most prominent leaders of the Balkans (PER roundtables of cabinet level officials and party presidents from the Balkan countries held in Budapest, 7 - 8 April 2000 and in Athens, 1 - 2 December 2000). The basic objective is to strengthen regional connections reducing the conflicting character of Serb - Albanian relations. Likewise, the idea is to strengthen the influence of FER in the public of Serbia as a result of which the chances for success of campaigns it leads will increase. For instance, one of the campaigns in which FER is active is the campaign for amnesty of Albanian prisoners in prisons in Serbia.28)

Having reviewed the FER activities relating to the question of the Serb - Albanian conflicts and the status of Kosovo, one might draw the following conclusions:

- NGOs are an important factor in maintaining communications among people, in the promotion of reaching an accord peacefully, etc.
- No matter how much NGOs are influential, it is political leaders, especially those in power and media controlled by them, whose influence is decisive.
Are the Peace and Democracy the way out?

Analyzing the Serb-Albanian conflict, in the period 1990-1999, some lessons could be learned: first, the difficulty of conducting a dialogue in a non-democratic society where the prevailing force for mobilizing the people is ethnonationalism. In fact, in societies lacking democratic institutions, procedures and culture, with elites averse to negotiation, ethnic misunderstandings and conflicts easily turn into open political and even violent conflicts. However, even attempts at initiating a dialogue, talks or negotiations, are of importance. That is how a necessary political climate is created for a dialogue.

- Second, underdevelopment of the political culture for a dialogue and non-existence of an independent and democratic public opinion that is sensitive to problems of human rights violation and discrimination of the "Other";
- Third, a main preoccupation of the most influential segments of political and intellectual elites on both sides was to maintain a status quo awaiting a more favorable climate to promote their own positions. Admittedly, there were sporadic contacts (in 1991, 1995 and 1996) between the leading party of Kosovo Albanians, the LDK and the authorities in Serbia and the FR Yugoslavia, especially on the issues of the education;
- Fourth, undeveloped civil society and the lack of sufficient interest in establishing mutual contacts and dialogue, manifested by most civil society institutions (trade unions, churches and Egos), both on the Albanian and Serb sides;
- Fifth, the unwillingness of domestic and foreign donors to provide more substantial support to the political dialogue efforts;
- Sixth, non-existence of an institutionalized channel for exchange knowledge and experiences about the procedures that might contribute to preventing a conflict from growing into an armed clash. In this context, the weakness of the international community to oppose authoritarian authorities, like Milosevic or the tenaciousness of extremist groups and movements are particularly evident.
- Seventh, the absence of a well-conceived, well-planned and well-conducted dialogue not only between the authorities and the Albanian political leadership but also among the civil society actors, including NGOs.

In Kosovo, upon the restoration of peace, and with the arrival of KFOR and establishment of UNMIK, two priority objectives have been set:
- First, stabilization of peace;
- Peace building, which is in fact a process of democratic institutions and procedures building in Kosovo.

The attainment of these two objectives is not possible overnight. In addition, they would have to be accomplished in a situation where Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are, more than ever in their history, far from one another imbued with mutual hatred and conviction that they cannot live "under the same roof" (Milosevic, 1999:8). In this war as in other cases it has been confirmed that intolerance and rejection of diversity is a major cause of war. In its extreme form it leads to ethnic cleansing and genocide (Annan, 2001). To the contrary, the dialogue seeks to promote the understanding that the diversity of cultures can be a source of betterment and growth (Annan, 2001). For that reason, the work to promote tolerance is fundamental to both conflict prevention and peace building.

In order to achieve the desired objectives, one should take into account, among numerous ones, the following recommendations resulting from the preceding analysis and experiences in other cases of fractured societies:

First talks that might lead to negotiation have been conducted so far. To reach negotiations, it is necessary to achieve both in Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, and in the Albanian and international communities a consensus and on that basis a strategy for the solution of the Kosovo problem. The mediation role of the international community is also necessary. UNMIK should be developed more in a sense of communication than, as it used to be during the time of Kouchner's leadership, as an arbiter. However, more than that, it is necessary that conflicting parties make some unilateral moves for the sake of regaining confidence. Among these measures, on the part of the authorities of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, it is the amnesty and return of several hundred Albanians to their homes. Here comes also the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and individualization of guilt and responsibility for civilians having been the target of attacks. Protection of civilians and giving force to the international law has to be at the very top of the internal and international agendas. At that, it is an aggravating factor that Milosevic and organizers of his war machinery were not tried for war crimes. That might be, however, one of the strong measures in favor of the return of confidence.

Second, the peace-building process necessitates fundamental constitutional and legislative reforms, building of democratic institutions and procedures. This process is linked with the one of establishing new relations between Montenegro and Serbia, and with the solution of the Kosovo issue. In Kosovo, a singular legal, administrative and political milieu has begun to be established which will differ from the one in the Republic of Serbia. That is why, late in 2000, Kosovo looked to many people like the Balkan Taiwan - an independent state recognized by no one (Judah, 2000); Third, the work of UNMIK to date should be reappraised with a view to finding possibilities of using the work on constitutional and legislative reforms for harmonization of the legislation of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia with the European legislation;

Fourth, restoration and expansion of the civil society can play a significant role in the recovery and development of Kosovo and, consequently, the international community should support those activities. In that respect, UNHCR has a particularly important role in the development of cooperation with the Kosovo civil society, including national NGOs.

Fifth, needs of the Region, especially needs of Albania and Macedonia, must not be disregarded in haste to restore
Kosovo. The Stability Pact is one of the key elements of the building of regional cooperation in political, economic and security spheres. No less important is the involvement of all the countries of Southeast Europe in NATO. This includes Partnership for Peace, the alliance of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and, for the countries that fulfill conditions, membership in the Alliance. This becomes possible with the introduction of the Action plan for membership, at the Washington summit in April 1999. At that moment, NATO manifested clearly its intention to expand additionally the zone of stability and security in Europe through the admission of other European democracies, which are able to contribute to common security (Judah, 2000).

In search for pragmatic solutions, it is an imperative to find answers to the following question:

First, on the future status of Kosovo;

Second, on the status of Kosovo surroundings, i.e. "FRY" where three different political and economic systems will be (Surroi, 1998:5).

Standpoints of leaders of both communities on these issues are diametrically opposite. Thus, President of FRY Vojislav Kostunica, in his inaugural address in October 2000, hinted that he would try to reinstate Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo. In the same month, in the week of triumph in local elections, Ibrahim Rugova called upon the world to recognize the independence of Kosovo. On their part, diplomats of the Foreign Office, the U.S. State Department and Quai d'Orsay are considering old plans for a confederation of the three republics - Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, or variations of the sort.

Actually, nobody has a solution acceptable to all the parties. In view of this fact, the only possibility seems to be finding an interim solution. For that reason, the presentation of the FER's model of a "special status", which is basically a compromise, continues to be topical in all likelihood. As it is almost impossible to reach a compromise in direct negotiations of the conflicting parties, it is necessary to organize an international conference on Kosovo. The purpose of the Conference would be to formulate a general political framework for a temporary solution and to begin the process of stabilization of the region.

Kosovo and Its Neighbours: Circle of Instability

The Unstable situation in Kosovo both disables the reconstruction of civil society, and deters regional democratisation and peace building efforts. It also influences the destabilization of neighbouring countries. The situation emphasizes the need for approaching the Kosovo issue as a regional question. Actually, a circle was created: Albania (a weak state) - Kosovo (a destructive substance society without its state identity) - South of Serbia (a crucial point in the constitutionally unformed Serbia) - Montenegro (state entity with divided national identity) Macedonia (a country before the temptation of getting the "Lebanon" characteristics). The seriousness of the situation is that the majority of the Kosovo Albanians wants to establish their own independent state.

Certain uncertainty of the FRY future

The question on Kosovo status is still open. In tackling the question, the new Belgrade Government has undertaken the following steps: establishment of a relationship with UNMIK; establishment of Coordinating Centre for Kosovo and Metohija appointed by the Government of Serbia and FRY. It is led by Nebojsa Covic and composed of DOS, SPS - and the local Serbs population including people coming from the old structures, particularly those from northern Kosovo; cooperation with the OSCE and UNMIK upon registration of the displaced persons from Kosovo and organization of the November elections. It is emphasized, in addition, both in Belgrade and in many governments of the EU Member States, that total independence of Montenegro would affect the future of Kosovo. As a result, both Kosovo and Montenegro have become in a way hostages of the resolution of the dilemma concerning the future of the FRY (Judah, 2000).

The present stage in relations between Montenegro and Serbia can be described as a stage of the beginning of talks,
thanks to the international pressure manifested also by the involvement of the EU representatives, and even Solana himself, in these talks. The conclusion that can be drawn therefrom is that the international community is of the opinion that the question of the FRY survival and of future relations between Montenegro and Serbia is an important international security and legal issue:

As a security question, it is of significance for regional security. Besides, apprehensions of the international community are connected, above all, with fear that crisis management in Kosovo would be made more difficult if not impossible should the FRY disappear because the question would be again reverted to the question of relations between Serbs and Albanians, i.e., Serbia and Kosovo. Also, there is fear present that fragmentation of the FRY would stir up further disintegration of B&H, that is making Republika Srpska independent and its association with Serbia. From this point of view, the question of the status of Kosovo can be, after the November elections and participation of Serbs in them, postponed for some time, at least for a year to three years;

The international legal issue is the one of the holder of international legal status. Many in Belgrade define this issue as the one of succession to the SFRY. However, the EU is also faced with the problem of the existence of the Badinter’s commission view concerning both Montenegro and Serbia. According to it, Montenegro may, if the majority of its citizens come out for it in a referendum, declare its independence, which would be recognized by the EU and the international community.

Additional problem lies in the fact that both Montenegro and Serbia declared themselves, when the FRY was constituted, for direct successors of the SFRY, which was also in the interest of many in the international community. The option of full independence of Montenegro or of a union of two independent and internationally recognized states increases doubts of the many about those with which one should negotiate on international arrangements or which will be responsible for compensation of war damages to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

The conclusion follows that the international community, especially the EU, is trying to buy time until appropriate mechanisms are secured for diminishing risks of possible instability, and even conflicts within Montenegro or between Serbia and Montenegro. That is why it is to be expected that the EU will exert strong pressure on both parties to reach an agreement. In order to achieve this, combined measures are going to be applied, both a stick for conditioning financial and other assistance and carrot by offering conclusion of the agreement on association with the EU.

From this perspective, reactivation of the request to constitute Sandjak as a single entity - a republic within the FRY or, in case of Montenegro and Serbia split up, as cross-border region, deserves special attention. These requests might engender a hot spot. Namely, developments in Sandjak and
the fact that all factions of Bosniak politicians from Serbia agree in their intention to exert influence on persons belonging to the Bosniak minority in Montenegro to detach themselves from DPS and the government of Milo Djukanovic, can destabilize the situation in Montenegro considerably and aggravate solution of the question of new relations between Montenegro and Serbia. Two risks of this happening are particularly prominent:

First, weakening of political support to the present government in Montenegro and threatening to mar the image of government of Montenegro as multi ethnically orientated;

Second, exacerbation of tensions between the Bosniaks and Albanians in Montenegro (e.g. at Rozaje bordering Kosovo) because Albanians might feel threatened by possible 'hitching' to Sandjak and Serbia.

In continuation of the institutional building process in Montenegro, priority will be accorded to prevention of these possible conflicts and a more resolute continuation of legislative and economic reforms. That will strengthen internal stability of Montenegro and secure a stable, majority support to state independence. What will the relationship be between Montenegro and Serbia and whether the FRY will survive, does not depend only on the fate of reforms in Montenegro but also on developments in Serbia itself.

In the public of Serbia and in the international community, worries become increasingly pronounced that divisions within DOS are leading to paralysis of the decision-making process and to creation of room for political instability of Serbia. Conflicts about redistribution of the existing social, economic and political power, in the absence of a democratic institutional framework, represent one of basic risks for internal stability of Serbia. Hence, a prevailing position in the international community that everything should be done that neither of governments (Serbia or the FRY) caves in before the spring 2002, and it would be desirable to have new elections only late in 2002. All this indicates that the process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia cannot be checked by possibly forcing Montenegro to remain, for a shorter or longer term, in the FRY and in association with Serbia but rather by preventing the break-up of Serbia along the ethno-territorial lines, i.e. by building a new institutional structure in Serbia. At the same time, Montenegro and Serbia will have, in defining their future relations, to take into account to the largest possible extent interests of the international community and
to reach a solution through a process of negotiations. This further means that the most probable outcome of the agreement will be the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Anyhow, there are neither social nor political presuppositions and even no interest for strengthening the federation because that would aggravate already difficult problem of Kosovo.

Similarly, total independence of Montenegro that would come into effect by summer 2002 cannot enlist support of the majority in the EU. In addition, the Union of Montenegro and Serbia would enable strengthening of links between these two states and encourage even broader regional integrations. That could mean establishment of free customs and passport zone, etc.

**Challenges of Ethnic Clashes in the South of Serbia and Kosovo status**

Presevo valley zone, composed of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja municipalities, is important to Serbia for its major railroad and other road networks that connect Middle Europe with the Mediterranean. In this zone lives about 70,000 Albanians. For the Albanians that is "Eastern Kosovo". On the other side, in the 1992 referendum, the Albanians from these municipalities declared for "peaceful attachment" to their Kosovo compatriots.

According to its dimensions, the Presevo valley problem is small, but it is at the same time dangerous for its link with Kosovo and Macedonia and therefore must be resolved. The Presevo valley turned out as one of the "pockets" which was left in the ethnic re-composition of former Yugoslavia. Observed from this point, the Presevo valley serves as an opposite thesis for northern part of Kosovo, which are under control of the Serbs. Weakness of the idea to give the Presevo valley in exchange for the northern part of Kosovo is based on the fact that Serbia gets in that way an important (northern) part of Kosovo, but on the other hand, it becomes practically cut off from Macedonia.

The Kumanovo agreement established the 'land security zone' on the side of the Serbian border towards Kosovo. It is a five kilometre wide zone, which forbids the presence of the VJ, while the MUP members are only allowed to carry "less than 12 mm calibre" weapons. In March 2000, it was publicly stated that KFOR does not have control over the land security zone. Such a statement enabled the establishment of the OVPMB base numbering 100 to 200 people in Dobrosin village and its continual mobilization of more people. At the beginning of the year 2000, NATO had no intention to inter-
vene or involve itself if riots ensued. A few months after the low intensity war was finished it was clear that Mitrovica which is marked by KFOR as "zone M" and Presevo valley, marked as "zone B" are area targeted by armed extremists, which present a direct challenge to KFOR responsibility and security.

In February 2001, by the gradual downsizing of the GSC, NATO was attempting to exert pressure on the armed Albanians in Presevo valley and stop their attacks, while Belgrade was required to cooperate with KFOR. The Coordinating Body of Federal and Republic Government for Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja (well known as 'Covic's team' - Nebojsa Covic is a vice-president of the Government of Serbia), on 6th of February 2001 adopted the information on security situation in Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja municipalities with a draft on crises resolving (the so-called "Covic plan"). This plan presents the following values: a peaceful approach to resolving the regional crises including a proposed Albanian contribution to the following: a need for security forces for the protection of citizens, prevention of the expansion of terrorism; anti-terrorist activities; establishing a multi-ethnic society.

The "Albanian platform" exposed by Riza Halimi, a manager for the Party of Democratic Activities (PDD), which takes part in political life of Serbia, requests the following: The disputes can and must be resolved in a political way
through negotiations; The PMBLA representatives should take part in the Albanian negotiating team; the negotiations should take place in another country with a direct international intervention factor (the USA, UN); all military activities to be stopped from both sides; the implementation of the agreement to be guaranteed by an international institution with credibility - NATO, UN; legal status of the Albanians in Presevo valley should not be under the existing constitutional-legal and institutional frameworks of Serbia; the aims of the negotiations should be the protection of the individual and collective rights of citizens, preserving their ethnic territories and finding a way out by political solution; etc.

The Albanian negotiating team including PDD and Albanian extremist factions, requested in their platform the following: international control over this area; demilitarisation of the area by withdrawing the Serbian forces and imposing an international control over PMBLA; law order, governmental institutions, police, administration and judiciary, including further presence of such “International Administration” in the area until a definite solution is found, etc.

The beginning of March 2001 was followed by “jeep diplomacy” while the negotiations lasted for two weeks. Those were indirect negotiations - the negotiations through international mediators. The agreement on the cease-fire was signed on 15th and on 14th of March it enabled the joint Serb-Yugoslav security forces to enter the part of the GSZ, 25 km along the Yugoslav-Macedonian border within “sector B”. This zone includes three Albanian villages: Norca, Trnova and Miratovac. Such events were followed by some changes on the ground: the Albanians started activating the civilian sector; numerous non-governmental organizations that started working with civilians were established, while the political parties after organizing a peaceful protest against the arrival of Serbian and FRY forces, requested a common declaration to be transferred to their usual “peacekeeping activities”.

The international community led by the American administration financially supported the repair of infrastructure (first amount of 600.000 US$). Realization of other projects is ongoing and primarily related to the support of small and medium enterprises, training of local administration, and various non-governmental organization projects but there is no serious political negotiation improvement. Political measures foreseen by Covic’s plan and particularly those foreseen by the Albanian plan are being slowly and partially applied. Some of the Covic’s promises cannot be applied because of the existing legislation of local self-government and the elections. The Albanian demands from the field of national-minority rights should be satisfied by termination of discriminative laws on the Republic level and by passing a law on national minority rights as well. However, nothing has been done on that issue. Seeing that the field of politics and legislation were not promptly addressed, this domain could expect reactivation of crises, which would "support" and "justify" the Albanian "return to weapons".

All things considered, the only successfully achieved interest stands on the side of NATO: Strategically, there started a direct cooperation between VJ and NATO, which seems to be developed into complete involvement in NATO. That is particularly confirmed by the agreement on total control over the GSZ. To cut a long story short, the Serbian police and VJ undertook control over Kosovo border, including a significant part of risk that belongs to the KFOR task, i.e. the risk of NATO from its confronting with the Albanians and possible human victims and material losses. However, there is a 'hidden political risk' as well, which de facto understands the status changes from the administrative border into the border between Kosovo and Serbia.
Kosovo: Trauma of Serbian Nationalism

Kosovo has undergone significant changes after the establishment of the UN protectorate and arrival of KFOR forces in the spot. Its first period was more based on the improvised agenda rather than on the harmonized strategy. However, attention was primarily focused on establishment of cooperation between domestic actors and international representatives on the institutional-building process that has resulted into two first free and pluralistic elections ever held in the history of Kosovo: The local elections for 30 Municipal Assemblies in Kosovo held October 28th 2000 and Election for Kosovo’s parliament held on 17 November 2001 (Hysa, 2001: 21).

The 17 November elections in Kosovo confirmed the prognosis that Ibrahim Rugova and his LDK would win. Two surprising developments that merit attentions are the unexpectedly strong showing by Hashim Thaci and his party, and the relatively strong participation to the elections by the local Serbs. The Thaci vote represents a growing frustration among Kosovars that independence could well be a long way off and that a more radical approach are acceptable. The Serb turnout indicates that most Serbs believe, under subtle persuasion from Belgrade, that participating in Kosovo’s fledgling democratic structures is the only way to improve their plight. It is of extreme importance that participation of Serbs in the November elections was achieved and that their coalition Return has won 22 seats in the Kosovo parliament, 12 in direct polling plus 10 guaranteed under the law.

However, it transpires from practical behaviour of new government in Serbia and the FRY that they largely connect solution of future relations of Serbia and Montenegro with the question of the status of Kosovo.

Paradoxically, the willingness of the Serbs to invest in Kosovo’s institutional framework could drive the more radical Albanian elements to maintain the independence cause through the use of force for fear that the pre-election accord between the Yugoslav authorities and UNMIK has distanced independence.

The elections reaffirm the fact that the question of Kosovo’s status is more pressing than ever. For the EU and the rest of the international community the onus is on the Kosovars to demonstrate that they are capable of cleaning up crime, corruption and violence through their new institutions. The logic being that only a viable functional Kosovo, which is not a “failed” state, has the right to demand independence. Addressing the status issue today does not mean that Kosovo is granted independence but that the prospect of independence is on the table.

To respond to these questions, needs a comprehensive approach by simultaneously pushing for a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade along with a renewed commitment to fighting the forces – such as crime syndicates, vested economic and political interests of the old regime, and rhetorical chauvinistic state policies - that could wreak further havoc to the region and complicate significantly Kosovo’s (and Macedonia’s) attempts at normalcy. The comprehensive approach also entails sticking by basic principles such as insisting on multiethnic states, the guaranteeing of far-reaching minority and individual rights and democratic values (Bildt, 2001).
It cannot be denied that the position of the Serbs and other minorities (Montenegrins, Roma's, Muslims-Bosniacs, Gorans and Turks) in Kosovo since KFOR's arrival has been extremely difficult. From June till the end of 1999 there was noted a great number of cases of violence towards the non-Albanian population coming from the armed Kosovo Albanians, KLA members and criminals from Albania. Numerous settlements and municipalities, which used to have mixed population before the war, do not exist as such any longer. The Serbs within Kosovo live under two de facto different regimes: the north which is inhabited by them in a more compact way and supported from Serbia, they live under legal regime of Serbia and FRY, but still with the habits inherited from Milosevic's period, while in the rest of Kosovo territory they exist as an extremely small and weakly protected minority, concerning their legality and security. They live within the isolated enclaves under very bad economical and social conditions. Therefore, there is a strong need for resolving the problem of the Serbs by complete reconstruction and democratisation of Kosovo. That understands their more active involvement in economical, political and public life of local communities, as well as more active cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. Therefore, it will be difficult to preserve the remaining "Serb communities" without military presence - KFOR. So, the need for security improvement, law and order for both the individual and collective protection of rights in Kosovo does not exist. There is also a need for special protection and positive discrimination of the Serbs. The establishment of common constitutional-legal framework presents a step forward from the situation of legal insecurity and a step closer to the implementation of law order and security improvement; The "Hackernrup's Constitution" which appoints the Albanians, Serbs and other "communities", provides an initial political presentation in the Assembly; a strong local selfgovernment; a promoted list of bodies and politicians. In any case, the hottest point is the one on which the public is not basically informed, nor is being asked to give its support. It only confirms the fact that in Serbia does not exist a consensus on Kosovo issue, or any other justified strategy. Actually, the politics of Belgrade authorities towards Kosovo includes a feeling of frustration, which appeared due to the "Kosovo loss".

Kosovo really is a trauma of Serb nationalism. The nationalistic elite of Serbia and the regime of Slobodan Milosevic attempted to take direct control over Kosovo by performing the systematic campaign of marginalisation and discrimination, which during 1999 brought the war and ethnocide against the Albanians. That made Kosovo a trauma of Serb nationalism and a dark spot in the history of the Serb society. During 1998 and the beginning of 1999, a political propaganda of ethno-nationalistic "play on numbers" performed by Milosevic's war machinery was translated into "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovo. During March and April 1999, the Kosovo Albanians were being expelled to Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, while their personal documents (identification cards, passports, driving licenses, license plates, money, etc.) were taken away from them by the police and paramilitary forces. After withdrawal of the police and army and ceasing of the Serb administration, the exile of Kosovo Serbs took place. The Balkan experience reflects that inter-ethnic conflict ceases when both of two conditions is fulfilled: Firstly, when a strong power (army and police) aiming to create conditions for institutional building and an atmosphere of reconciliation takes place across the confronted sides; and secondly, when one of the confronted communities by violence, political and other means becomes reduced to a "bearable minority".

The duration of the Serb-Albanian conflict, promoted a huge inter-distance through strength of violence (killing, rap- ing, torturing, ruining and burning houses, administrative maltreating, etc). The "bearable minority" becomes very small and most likely isolated within its "parallel world" - within the territorial enclaves with stronger concentration of the Serbs. From this perspective the Serbs are facing a hard period of self-organizing and building of their own "parallel" civil society, which would enable their future integration within Kosovo society and the cooperation with the Albanians. According to the ten years old "parallel Albanian state", numerous non-governmental organizations offer their support to the Albanians, including the international public opinion as well: the Albanians are more easily accommodating themselves to the new, extremely difficult and complex economical, social and security conditions. For the Serbs it will be a more difficult and slower process. Actually, the abolishment of Kosovo autonomy and centralistic management of Kosovo imposed by Milosevic in the last decade of the twentieth century completely destroyed the bases for the local Serb elite existence. The Serbs became a pure transmission of Belgrade, while their close connection with the authorities made them dependent on the state economy and budget, which was in the meantime completely destroyed. The role of Milosevic's regime transmission influenced a very weak democratic oppositional potential among Kosovo Serbs, as well as it influenced an undeveloped civil society initiative. That is a reason the development of the individual civilian and minority institutions of Serbs and other non-Albanians is the most effective way for their emancipation apart from Milosevic's inheritance and dependence on the state and its "help". This process will be additionally impeded because it has to be developed under conditions created by the war and weakening of Serbia, i.e. FRY. The thing that Kosovo is de facto out of political and legal system of Serbia affected the change of the Serb status: They are a minority in Kosovo! All these
things are being carried out in the atmosphere of fear, an unexacting control with no instrument for adaptation to the new status.

In conclusion, one might say that Kosovo is faced with the following risks:
- fragility of the institution building process facing the challenge of the separation of the Albanian political body, absence of cooperation between Albanians and the "Others", especially Serbs, and non-existence of a clearly defined long-term strategy of the international community on the status of Kosovo;
- lack of institutions to deal with general crimes (more than six months took international police to complete its capacity building to start mission in Kosovo), lack of domestic capacities to deal with organized crime and lack of harmonized strategy to deal with inter-ethnically based crimes etc. (Hysa, 2001: 22 - 25).

In response to these risks, the following activities should be expected:
- the work of UNMIK to date should be reappraised with a view to finding possibilities of using the work on constitutional and legislative reforms for harmonization of the legislation of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia with the European legislation;
- the restoration and expansion of the civil society can play a significant role in the recovery and development of Kosovo and, consequently, the international community should support those activities. In that respect, UNHCR has a particularly important role in the development of cooperation with the Kosovo civil society, including national NGOs;
- needs of the Region, especially needs of Albania and Macedonia, must not be disregarded in haste to restore Kosovo. The Stability Pact is one of the key elements of the building of regional cooperation in political, economic and security spheres. No less important is the involvement of all the countries of Southeast Europe in NATO. This includes Partnership for Peace, the alliance of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and, for the countries that fulfill conditions, membership in the Alliance. This becomes possible with the introduction of the Action plan for membership, at the Washington summit in April 1999. At that moment, NATO manifested clearly its intention to expand additionally the zone of stability and security in Europe through the admission of other European democracies, which are able to contribute to common security (Judah, 2000).

"Lebanonization" of Macedonia and challenges of the domestic and international actors to manage the region

The entire population of Macedonia counts 2.2 millions of people, including various national and ethnic groups, where Macedonians present the majority, followed by the Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs and Wallahians. If it is to be judged according to the legislation, then all citizens of Macedonia are equal before the law. The constitution provides to the minorities the protection of their ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity, including the support from the Government to the education in minority languages in secondary schools and an official usage of minority languages.
in those areas where minorities present the majority of the population.

In the period the clashes escalated, the leading coalition included the two biggest Albanian parties and one Roma party. There are 25 Albanian members of the Parliament, 1 Macedonian Muslim, 1 Roma and a small number of Wallahians. However, ethnic tensions and prejudice do exist. According to its public attitude, the Government of Macedonia is declared for the policy of peacekeeping integration of all ethnic groups but, at the same time, faces with political resistance and maintenance of a wide-spread prejudice in terms of achieving the goal (students’ quotes, affirmative actions of school administration, education in mother tongue, etc.). The international community, particularly the USA, has been politically and militarily present in Macedonia since early nineties and the level of Macedonian authorities’ cooperation with them is very high. Till the last year, the international community representatives, especially the USA, reacted by an arrogant refusal of any warning that the armed clashes in Macedonia might be expected.

By the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001, the Albanian representatives became louder in their accusations on discrimination. They were underlining some arguments, such as:

- Insufficient presentation of the Albanian community within the army and police. And, although there were some announcements on the enforced authority attempts to recruit as much Albanians as possible, the police forces were predominantly Macedonian, even in those areas which are mainly inhabited by the Albanians. Macedonian police forces include 8.7% of minority members, 17% in Tetovo and 12% in Gostivar. In the last years the Government managed to achieve by its recruit policy, 22% of minorities out of total number of high police school students. It makes its greatest efforts to recruit more minority members in the military, as well. There are 25% of the Albanians serving the military, but the total number of deficit cadre counts only 12% of minorities and 15% of cadets in the Military Academy. 11% of civilians from the minority communities is employed in the Ministry of Defence having an Albanian Deputy Defence Minister and ten Albanian Generals.

- In 1999 there was 15% of minority member students; in 1998 there was 14% of them, while only a half of those minority students attends the university. In July 2001, the Government of Macedonia passed some laws related to the long-term requests of the Albanians on university lecturing in the Albanian language. The Law on high education enables establishment of private institute under the OSCE sponsorship plan, which understands teaching in the Albanian, English and Macedonian language. The institute was supposed to start working at the beginning of 2001. Such decision was supported by Xhaferi’s party, but not by a great number of Albanians who supported the idea on the Albanian University in Tetovo.

- During the last ten years, the Government of Macedonia has been continually rejecting legalization of usage of the Albanian language as their communication mean with the Government, Parliament; usage of the Albanian flag, etc.

The main factor of inner instability was the coalition Government of Georgievski and Xhaferi and particularly the political insincerity between these coalition partners. Before the war escalated, the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was repeated in the same way: Two extremely strong nationalismally covered partners attempted to reach their interests by using the joint institutions. After Kiro Gligorov and his Social-Democratic party left from the position, Macedonia in its political sense remained without influential factors, which would really work in favour of a unique democratic Macedonia. It became a space for trade. That could have been realized from the very beginning when the new government took place.

The beginning of Macedonian armed clashes has all characteristics of political confusion, just as that was the case with all previous beginnings of the armed clashes. One is sure: In February 2001, the Albanians initiated their organized armed activities on the border with Tanusevci village. Such activities were coordinated with the activities of the Albanian extremists from the south of Serbia and Kosovo. The Albanian guerrillas in Macedonia used the same tactic that proved successful in Presevo valley, while Kosovo was once again used as a
logistic base.

The existence of the connection between Kosovo, Presevo Valley and Macedonia is confirmed by the Albanian extremists' statements from that area, which claim they will spread the clashes all over Macedonia and saying that their aim is "Great Kosovo". There were established some new political parties, which were directly supporting and proclaiming the armed clashes (the National Democratic Party led by Kastriot Haxhirexha, for example), while those "moderate Albanians" from PDP through their leader Mahi Nesimi supported the same activities. Political massages of the extremists were transmitted from the list of unfulfilled wishes of Macedonian Albanian parties. That has to deal with the state of the two nations, two languages and two flags. Just like in Presevo, armed guerrillas demand constitutional reforms, while the "rebellion" program is identical with the program of the Albanian political parties. And, just like in Kosovo and in Presevo valley, they differ from their politicians only in terms of used methods. The Albanian political elite in Macedonia had a vision on gradual Albanian status improvement for a long -term period. Radicals did not want to wait that long. They believed Macedonia should be military provoked over the period it was already weak, in order to force it to give up. From the extremists’ point of view, such aim cannot be reached without creation of an ethnic Albanian military in Macedonia. Without the military and an autonomous territory, the Albanians will not reach their guaranteed rights and security. The Republic of Srpska within Bosnian union has such military and territory, although there is also the Kosovo Protection Corps in Kosovo and a "multi-ethnic police" in Presevo valley.

Due to the wrong steps made after the escalation of the armed clashes and led by certain period of panic, the Government decided to use its military-police activities against guerrillas, till the moment it manages to bring back a control over the whole territory. On the other side, it didn’t have enough strong army, nor it had a real agreement with the international community. It could be even said that the Government, led by its own nationalism, easily granted amnesty to international community, to the USA in particular and its "coalition partners" from the Albanian community. It pardoned them their part of responsibility for the war and new destabilization of the region. Namely, the clashes were, in their narrow meaning, from both communities considered as the clashes in which both nationalities have to protect their ethnicity.

According to Ohrid agreement between the confronted sides and NATO, it was created a possibility for the extension of NATO role. It is therefore, necessary to establish a new international arrangement. A problem on any possible UN SC obstructions would be "overcome" in that way. It is of great importance now to reach a consensus within NATO on future politic in Macedonia and Balkan, in general. The first reaction on Ohrid agreement, august 2001, confirms the same thing, starting from an unwillingness the NATO forces were sending their soldiers, through setting the conditions before Macedonian politicians. Such conditions understand realization of constitutional reforms only after the Albanians become disarmed and massively "transformed" from ONA into newly established Albanian National Army (ANA). Numerous indicators, even the political-propaganda of ANA itself, which demands "continuation of the fights to the final victory"- creation of "great Albania", point out that the new phase of political and armed clashes as well, is not excluded. The contribution to such opinion is given by the fact that the ethnic Macedonian side faces with a creation of radical political groups, which de facto have control over some parts of the territory. A possibility for the clashes renewal in Macedonia and the region is very likely to happen, since the causes, which enable such situation, still do exist. They are the following:

- A strong pan-Albanian nationalistic movement;
- A lack of stronger pro-Macedonian movement, which would guarantee building of the democratic, multi-ethnic society within the existing Macedonian boundaries;
- Centralization of power in Macedonia and non-resolving, furthermore identifying numerous economic and social problems, including the education problem, etc.
- A conflict of political and economical interests of numerous international and regional actors on various questions. One of these questions is the status of NATO presence in this part of Balkan;
- Non-resolving of the inner stability problem and an intensified development of Albania, including the status of Kosovo.

Albania: A Weak State

1990s opened up in the Balkans another national question, which like the Serbian one had characteristics of a regional question: that is the Albanian question. The Albanian question is complex, composed of a number of interrelated and interdependent issues, such as:

- Stabilization and democratisation of Albania itself inhabited by somewhat around the half of the Albanian population (three million). In addition to regional conflicts between the North and the South, vestiges of influence of tribal connections of Gegs and Tosks, internal stability is also aggravated by economic backwardness, isolation from the rest of the Balkans and Europe for many decades and, above all, lack of democratic political culture;
- Questions of the status or the state independence of Kosovo;
- Efforts of the Albanians to win in Macedonia a para-state entity (like Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina);
- Improvement of the status of the Albanian minority in Montenegro and in the south of Serbia.

Ethno nationalistic articulation of the Albanian issue "generates concerns and risks and threatens regional peace, sta-
bility and security. This perspective also turns the Albanians of the Balkans into a problematic people for the international community (Milo. 2001: 11). Ideas of the 19th century nationalism are widespread among the Albanians, including the ideal of pan-Albanian movement.

The Democratic Party of Sali Berisha, which in 1992 took over power from Ramiz Alia, successor of Enver Hoxa, supported hopes of accomplishing a national ideal - creation of a single Albanian state in the Balkans but its possibilities to contribute to realization of this idea were limited (Simic: 1998:xiii). With unrests that swept over Albania, since December 1996, associated with the collapse of pyramidal banks, that in March 1997 spilled over into the people’s rebellion leading to the collapse of the central power and the ruling Democratic Party, the Albanian movement outside Albania lost a reliable support in Tirana and was also embroiled in additional political divisions (Vikers, 1998:295 305). Thus, a clear division manifested itself among Kosovo Albanians into those who were supporting Berisha and those supporting requests of the political opposition in Albania. The leader of Kosovo Albanians Dr. Ibrahim Rugova sided with the opposition led by socialists by supporting the idea of a new constitution and new parliamentary elections in Albania. In that way Albanians from Kosovo lost a strong psychological support of Albania but as pointed out by Fehmi Agani, "the Albanian movement in Kosovo came into being and survived without help of Albania" (War Report, April 1997, 9). Thus, the realization of the national ideal - to unite all the Albanians, had to be postponed.

The events in Albania had two consequences for Kosovo: first, in an increasing insecurity and nervousness among Kosovo Albanian political leaders, along with the strengthening of radicalisation and reinforcement of military activities of the KLA, which used training camps in northern Albania. Due to internal armed conflicts, collapse of the military and police of Albania, huge quantities of arms (estimated at 70,000 pieces) came into the hands of citizens and organized crime. This was, along with efforts of defeated central authorities to transfer a part of the conflict outside the country and regain thereby their political influence, one of the important factors of accelerated turning of extremist Albanians outside Albania to armed fight, first in Kosovo and later in the south of Serbia and Macedonia.

With democratisation of Albania and political pluralization of the very Albanian movement in and outside Albania, the ideas of Great Albania were pushed back. According to Milo, this does not mean that the Albanians of Albania are less nationalistic than others or that they do not want close relations with their compatriots in other countries. The idea of Great Albania was not supported by any of big political parties but it has its advocates in the group of small, extremist political parties, such as Balli Kombetar (National Front), Levizja e Legalitetit (Legality Movement), Party of National Unity and Democratic Prosperity and National Recovery. Likewise, this idea is supported by intellectual circles and even the Academy of Sciences of Albania, which during the conflicts in Kosovo, in 1999, drafted a Platform for the Solution of the Albanian National Question (Milo. 2001: 44, 47 - 49). However, in the present-day circumstances, including also strong resistance on the part of the EU and the U.S.A. to the materialization of this idea, these political groups do not have any marked influence on citizens of Albania and there are small chances of having it in the near future.

Albania itself belongs to the group of « weak states » in the Balkans, and that means the following:

- The state does not represent broad social interests. Government institutions have a weak authority but there is no vacuum of authority. In fact, the missing authority of government institutions was passed on to individuals, groups of individuals with excessive and often uncontrolled authority; 
- At the Government level, the policy formulation capacities of the state institutions are underdeveloped. In the field of economy, Albania is faced with the following problems:
  - Very frail economic stability, far from sustainability; 
  - Poor capacities to draft national strategies; 
  - Inadequate infrastructure; 
  - A heavily import oriented and aid - dependent economy; 
  - Weak functioning of market mechanisms and instruments, and 
  - Extremely developed grey - economy, corruption and organized crime.

The civil society is also a new and insufficiently strong actor but an actor which will be increasingly vigorous in the life of Albania ((Ruli, 2001).
The Peace and Democracy Building Process

In the past ten years, in the territory of former Yugoslavia, a real political revolution and building of a new political class has been taking place. This is evidenced by all wars but also the rise of new leaders of elites, the best example may be being Milosevic. However, behaviour of Albanian leaders in Kosovo speaks also in favour of that. In addition, account should be taken of the fact that war in Kosovo played a dual, contradictory role in matters of security and identity. On the one hand, it confirmed prevalence of human rights over sovereignty. On the other hand, it showed the possibility of dealing simultaneously with minorities and majorities - taking into consideration that in South-eastern Europe the minority in one country is the majority in another, neighbouring country (UNDP, 2000: 17). However, despite casualties that count in millions, no ethnic questions in South-eastern Europe, and in the Balkans in particular, have been fully solved (Tatalovic, 1998: 66). That is why stability is taken as a priority for establishment of democratic relations, both at the level of individual societies and of the Region as a whole (Woodward, 2000:7).

In Kosovo, upon the restoration of peace, and with the arrival of KFOR and establishment of UNMIK, two priority objectives have been set:

- Stabilization of peace. In that context, it is extremely important to complete the process of disarmament of citizens, suppression of organized crime, specifically the trafficking in women, arms, drugs, cars, etc. Among the measures to be taken with a view to achieving the mentioned objective are the following: to increase the strength and improve the training of the police forces which should also incorporate members of local communities; establishment of independent judiciary and prosecution; education in non-violence, etc.;

- Peace building, which is in fact a process of democratic institutions and procedures building in Kosovo.

The attainment of these two objectives is not possible overnight. In addition, they would have to be accomplished in a situation where Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are, more than ever in their history, far from one another imbued with mutual hatred and conviction that they cannot live "under the same roof" (Milosevic, 1999:8). In this war as in other cases it has been confirmed that intolerance and rejection of diversity is a major cause of war. In its extreme form it leads to ethnic cleansing and genocide (Annan. 2001). To the contrary, the dialogue seeks to promote the understanding that the diversity of cultures can be a source of betterment and growth (Annan. 2001). For that reason, the work to promote tolerance is fundamental to both conflict prevention and peace building.

In order to achieve the desired objectives, one should take into account, among numerous ones, the following recommendations resulting from the preceding analysis and experiences in other cases of fractured societies:

Talks that might lead to negotiation have been conducted so far. To reach negotiations, it is necessary to achieve both in Serbia and FRY, and in the Albanian and international communities a consensus and on that basis a strategy for the solution of the Kosovo problem. The mediation role of the international community is also necessary. UNMIK should be developed more in a sense of communication than, as it used to be during the time of Kouchner’s leadership, as an arbiter. However, more than that, it is necessary that conflicting parties make some unilateral moves for the sake of regaining confidence. Among these measures, on the part of the authorities of Serbia and FRY, it is the amnesty and return of several hundred Albanians to their homes. Here comes also the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and individualization of guilt and responsibility for civilians having been the target of attacks. Protection of civilians and giving force to the international law has to be at the very top of the internal and international agendas. At that, it is an aggravating factor that Milosevic and organizers of his war machinery were not tried for war crimes. That might be, however, one of the strong measures in favour of the return of confidence;

The peace-building process necessitates fundamental constitutional and legislative reforms, building of democratic institutions and procedures.

As the conflict about Kosovo relates to a broader conflict of interests between Albanians and Slavs, affecting Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and the south of Serbia, there will not be stable peace unless peoples of Kosovo, Serbia and the UN SC reach a political accord on regional unity (Bildt, 2001: 154, 155). Absence of a peace accord on Kosovo might intensify tension between the Slav and Albanian interests in the Region, threatening with new wars and horrors. A true peace accord on Kosovo would have to be within full jurisdiction of the UN Security Council and accepted by all the countries of the Region, like the peace accord for B&H (Blic, Belgrade, 23.01. 2000).

Kosovo would become the Balkans Taiwan - an independent state recognized by no one. However, unfortunately for Kosovo, this does not mean that it will be developed rapidly and that high technology based economy will be developed (Judah, 2000). That is why it is necessary to find a pragmatic solution. In search for pragmatic solutions, it is an imperative to find answers on the future status of Kosovo (Surroli. 1998:5).

Looking for a final solution of the Kosovo status is an illusion for the time being. A special status is an interim solution making Kosovo a self-governing territory under the international civil administration and military protection, providing simultaneously convincing security, political, administrative, economic and cultural guarantees to Albanians, Serbs and other national communities, and to Kosovo as a whole. By peaceful and democratic means, including manifold referendums, a strong and efficient local self-government and appropriate administrative and territorial organization of Kosovo would be established. Regionalization which, to the largest
possible extent respects economic, demographic, cultural, historical and ethnic features, would also make possible full protection of the rights of national communities, including self-government for Serbs. Institutions of self-organization and self-administration of national communities, including the Serb one, would be instituted on the basis of democratic elections within each of the communities.

The autonomy of national communities includes:
- The Right to self-organisation and self-administration;
- The Right to official use of mother tongue;
- The Right to use the national flag and other symbols;
- The Right of dual citizenship of the RK and the Republic of Serbia or of the appropriate state union for all citizens of the RK who wish so;
- System of education, culture, information and sports, taking account of values and needs of the national community concerned;
- Proportionate representation on the command staff and in professional military and police units, and in other public services;
- The Right to collect a self-contribution for the purpose of self-financing along with the right to financial aid from the RK budget;
- The Right to international co-operation within the sphere of competence of self-government.

It is evident that Serbia will not be able to integrate Kosovo politically, economically and socially as long as it does not build itself as a democratic and efficient state. Expectations of Montenegro giving up reforms and democratisation that have already started for the sake of the preservation of a perspective less and unstable community such as the FR Yugoslavia is, are unreal. In fact, political and state acquiring of independence of Montenegro and Kosovo will continue. This does not, however, put an end to possibilities for economic, traffic and information co-operation, maintenance of cultural, scientific and similar ties. It is possible on this basis, after a special status of Kosovo has been established and after a consensus of the parties concerned has been reached and provided with international guarantees, to establish a Union of Independent Republics of Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, as a state and political framework of cooperation. A Confederation of Kosovo and Albania that would find its internal stability in the federal relationship of the South and North of Albania is not also excluded (Statement, 2000).

At the beginning of 2002, basic courses of the life of the Balkans that it will follow in the years to come can be discerned.

National questions that have been for decades occupying social and economic functions, and that the November elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina of strengthening joint government and economic functions, and that the November elections represent an important step towards establishment of democratic institutions of Kosovo self-government. Kosovo is irresistible on the path to democratic development and multi-ethnic co-operation. The question of the final state status will have, as in case of Republika Srpska, to give ground temporarily to questions of security and development. As Serbia and Montenegro are forced to search for a peaceful solution to their future relations, while even divorce is not excluded, the same is true of the future status of Kosovo. It proves to be here the case, as in numerous examples all over the world, that the process of acquiring independence and democratisation is a long and often painstaking one but inevitable in modern society. It is positive that learning and beginner's mistakes can be reduced if one follows the path of
co-operation with fellow townsmen (the example of Kosovo, co-operation of Albanians, Serbs and other communities), neighbours (the example of Kosovo, co-operation with Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia) and if we take as an example another former war battlefield - Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) and, of course, co-operation with the international community, above all with its representatives in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Should this co-operation be seen as a way to European and Euro-Atlantic integration, an inter-step seems to be desirable before that.

According to the rule: United, they are stronger! The time by 2005 is sufficient to make significant steps towards strengthening co-operation in the above-described areas of former war battlefields. A single customs union, free passport zone and even, as an example, uniform car registrations, look like easily achievable objectives because they are in the interest of every individual actor. Thus, the Western Balkans Benelux (Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro) is something that accelerates development of these countries and leads them, on a shortened journey, in the period between 2015 and 2020, into the European Union. We are not speaking either about political or state communities. That is neither possible nor anybody wants it! We are speaking about a united area with unimpeded communication, flow of people, goods and ideas. The Albanian - Serbian reconciliation is a backbone, the historical changeover of the Balkans from which wider frameworks of inter-Balkans co-operation, including directly Albania and Macedonia, can result.

Summary

Generally speaking, one might say that activities of the FER were focused on the following:
- Research aimed at establishing the basic ideas, concepts and actors of the existing situation as well as ideas, actors and factors of changes and dialogue;
- Making the dialogue easier by organizing a series of important meetings between both political and intellectual leaders of the Serbian and Albanian communities, maintaining regular contacts with influential persons in both communities and promoting meetings of outstanding persons from different ethnic communities.

However, these efforts were not given support of any significance either by political parties and the media in Serbia and Kosovo or national or foreign donors and diplomatic representatives in Belgrade (Sorensen, 1999:31). This only confirmed the then attitude of political actors in the country and international community towards Kosovo. That attitude may be described as pushing the problems aside.

Broaching, from its very inception in early 1990s, the problems of the status of Kosovo and Serb-Albanian relations, the objectives of FER have been:

In a situation of interrupted communications on the political, cultural, scientific and all other levels of public life, it is necessary to restore confidence in the possibility negotiation as the means of reaching a compromise to support a peaceful solution;

To establish contacts between the actors, including political leaderships such as Serbian and Yugoslav governments and Albanian party leaders though all other, particularly political channels of communication were severed;

By supporting implementation of individual projects, to contribute to a step by step creation of a political climate necessary for a dialogue, and suppress the speech of hatred, intolerance and violence.

Basic target groups of these actions were politicians and influential intellectuals, in view of their decisive influence on the Albanian and Serbian communities and, consequently, on the conflict itself.

The guiding principles of FER in trying to find the solutions for the Kosovo issue through the Serb-Albanian dialogue, were as follows:

The necessity to keep alive in public the topics of the Serb-Albanian relations and of Kosovo by provoking "positive events" i.e. organizing debates of the prominent and influential representatives of the elites of both communities;

The relaxation of the political atmosphere and clashing of intransigent positions, creating the climate of mutual trust, clarification of the nature of the Serb-Albanian conflicts and of standpoints of the most influential actors of the dialogue;

Maintaining communications between the leaderships of the communities in conflict, even in the worst moments of the crisis, such as war.

Insistence on unconditional talks, respect for justified requests of each of the parties, and responsibility of participants in the dialogue for the observance of the agreed procedure;

The possibility to adjust the ideas, concepts and methods to the changing reality and improved knowledge of the Serb-Albanian relations and the status of Kosovo.
6) The prevailing model of identification for the Albanians is the one
fixing of what the Bosnian Serbs achieved through war -
Republic Srpska. The most important lesson the Albanians
learned was that the Dayton agreement valued the armed strug-
gle of Bosnian Serbs by recognizing the Republic Srpska in
 Bosnia, and that the international community understands only
the language of armed conflict, unlike the language of non-vio-

cence.
2) KLA was formed from "Marxist-Leninist" resistance groups that
were active in 1980s. However, in the period of 1996-1998,
the groups were "refreshed" by young Albanians, unhappy with
the situation in Kosovo and with Rugova's "Gandhi-like" policy.
From the end of 1997 until the end of February 1998, KLA was
rapidly arming itself and openly calling for armed struggle for
the independence of Kosovo. Volunteers, arms and money came
especially from Albanian communities in Europe, especially
Germany and Switzerland.
3) The "psychosis of being jeopardized" implies adoption and con-
solidation of the system of prejudices, beliefs and emotions,
which form a certain matrix for interpreting reality as a total
derangement of national identity. That is best shown through
the increased fear of demographic "wipe out", which stokes up
xenophobia and closing into oneself. All of this goes together
with numerous quasi-scientific interpretations of demographic
explosion of Albanians as their "infernal plan" to cause the
explosion of birth rate by "artificial means", all by the rules of
nazish German geopolitical theory of Lebensraum.
4) For example: A series of discriminating laws and official docu-
ments that put the Albanians in Kosovo in the legal status of "cit-
izens with limited rights"; "compulsive measures" in the econo-
my and mass dismissals of workers; closing the schools, dismiss-
ing teachers and organizing enrollment into schools in the
Albanian language, suspension of financing for the schools
which "do not adhere to the unified education program for
Serbia" etc. The consequence is that approximately 250.000 stu-
dents were unable to continue their education. In 1991, only
28,8% of students were allowed to enroll into secondary schools.
Numerous elementary and secondary schools were closed and
segregation on the national basis was introduced.
5) Predominant model of national self-identification of Serbs
belongs to the group of pre-political and pre-determined nation-
al identity. Ethnic background (birth or blood) and history are
decisive "elements" of a people's national self-identification.
6) The prevailing model of identification for the Albanians is the one
in which they observe themselves through negative characteris-
tics of Serbs. According to this notion, the picture of present-day
situation according to the Albanians looks like this: the Serbs
homogenize against the Albanians and the whole world in order
to decrease the negative consequences of their policy in Kosovo.
On the other hand, Albanians homogenize spontaneously, in
order to defend their national entity from the anti-Albanian
regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Essentially, Albanian national
movement found the source of its identity in the resistance to
Milosevic's regime. Accordingly, Albanians are the "dominant
ethnic group", not a minority, because they number 2 million
people. Albanians are "the only nation in Europe divided by
international borders". Self-determination and independence of
the Albanian nation are justified because it has never been rec-
ognized as equal to others in the Slavic environment, and
because continuing of its life out of its own legal system leads to
new conflicts.
7) Responsibilities of the military mission (the so-called security
presence) are multiple and far-reaching. Those are:
- prevention of the renewal of hostilities;
- securing retreat from Kosovo and prevention of possible attempts
at return of the Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces
into the area;
- demilitarisation (disarmament) of the Albanian rebel forces (KLA)
and other Albanian armed groups;
- ensuring safe conditions both for the return of refugees and dis-
placed persons to Kosovo and for activities of the civilian mis-
sion, establishment of the interim administration, and delivery of
humanitarian assistance;
- Taking care of the order and security in Kosovo until the responsi-
bility in the sphere is taken over by the UN civilian mission and
carrying out of the necessary border control. Basically, the full
responsibility for the safety - police affairs is in the hands of the
international community, including that section of the peace
process.
8) The civilian mission's presence include:
- seeing to the process of the establishment of "the substantial auton-
omy and self-government";
- performing basic administrative functions where and when needed;
organisation and control of interim institutions of democratic
and autonomous self-government until the final solution, includ-
ing the holding of elections;
- support to the political process that should lead to a solution of the
political status of Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet
agreements; supervision at the final stage of the transfer of
power from interim institutions to those established on the basis
of a final political solution; support to the recovery of economy,
especially of the key infrastructure;
- Securing civil order and legality, including the deployment of the
international police personnel and establishment of the local
police forces; taking care of the safe return of refugees and dis-
placed persons to their homes.
9) The underlying reasons are the following: unclear framework of the
UNMIK actions; lack of co-operation of the Kosovo
Albanian leaders with UNMIK going so far as to have in exist-
ence a parallel Albanian government and militia. Only in
late1999, the Albanian shadow governments acting in Kosovo,
though having not been recognised by the UN, were dissolved.
The leader of one of the "provisional governments" was Hashim
Thaci, the former KLA political leader, and of the other Ibrahim
Rugova, leader of the LDK; continuation of an erroneous policy
of Belgrade instigating Serbs not to take part in the work of the
interim joint bodies of the executive authority, administration
and judiciary.

In December 2000, UNMIK revoked all executive, legislative and
judiciary structures that existed before the war. A joint adminis-
trative structure was set up. That was done by an agreement on
the division of the provisional administration in Kosovo signed
by the Albanian leaders Hasim Thaci from the Democratic Party
of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova from the Democratic League of
Kosovo, Rexhep Qosaj from the United Democratic Movement,
10) The existence of a security vacuum is also illustrated by the fact that neither for full 90 days since the arrival of KFOR neither the control of borders with Albania was established nor the Kosovo police forces were formed. That directly affected the strengthening of the decision of the non-Albanian population that had fled not to return to Kosovo.

11) The price of the Kosovo conflict was high for all the parties concerned. Only the war cost FRY around 60 billion US dollars. The war in Kosovo additionally contributed to the population of FRY becoming the most destitute in Europe, even more than the Albanians were. The gross domestic product per capita amounted to $ 75 per month and $ 900 per year respectively in 1999, as stated by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) (Danas. April 23, 1999). The percentage of the Serbs living below the poverty level increased from 14 to 44 percent in only a year (1999/2000). The domestic gross product per inhabitant fell by 46 percent in 1999 over 1998, while industrial production fell by 44 percent. The foreign trade has been halved. It will take 15 years to bring the industrial production back to the level of 1998, provided the production increases at the rate of 4 percent per year and foreign investments begin flowing into the country (Vijesti. July 11, 2000).

The economy of Kosovo was in a bad condition even before the NATO bombing for which the responsibility lays with the government of Serbia which managed it poorly and which controlled major economic capacities. Economy before the conflict was mostly agriculture-oriented and, as such, it continues to provide for the majority of the population. The major industry was the iron and steel one and manufacturing enterprises associated with it. Agricultural production and food processing are also of importance. The leading exports were energy, ores and agricultural products. Aid from relatives from abroad and foreign aid were significant sources of national income. Grey economy was substantial. The population had low standards of living. Armed conflicts caused mass destruction of property, including economic enterprises. Unemployment among the Albanians is estimated to be between 40 and 75 percent. It is considerably higher than among the Serbs and Roma. Unstable environment does not provide an incentive to investors.

12) Political violence and political murders took lives of about 10,000 Albanians in the first 6 months of 1999. Since the retreat of the VJ in June, there were 20 to 30 murders on an average per week, in early June and in July, and by mid-November 1999, 379 persons were killed, out of which 135 Serbs and 145 Albanians. Many of those killings were ethnically motivated. However, there were a lot of crimes that were not ethnically motivated (U.S. Department of State.2000).

13) The July 1999, report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan states that the first wave of Serbian refugees set out for fear of future behavior of Albanians, while the second wave of refugees was caused by a large number of incidents - kidnappings, murders, setting Serbian property on fire, plunders, perpetrated by Kosovo Albanians (Danas, July 15, 1999).


15) Admittedly, the Soros Fund continued its activities in this field within the Foundation network. Adhering to the concept of affecting the non-nationalist segment of the public. What was done through the media project “Radio B 92” is of special relevance.

The Fund stuck to the principle of non-cooperation with political parties until 1996 and then it embarked on cooperation with “pro-civic opposition parties, and since the NATO attack ‘democratic nationalism’ prevailed in the policy of the local Fund and, hence, a more direct cooperation with political parties of such an orientation. That was an additional sign that the ‘civil option’, as a political orientation, vanished from the political scene of Serbia.

16) PER was the organizer and its local co-partner FER which was in charge of communicating with representatives of the opposition and ethnic minorities, Democratic Center Found’s (DC) leader Dragoljub Micunovic was in contact with SPS in order to ensure participation of SPS in the debate, and the Soros Fund Yugoslavia being the co-sponsor.

17) Vice-president of the ruling SPS Goran Percevic showed readiness and willingness to talk with Albanian leaders. In the course of discussion, with mediation of Dr Allan Kasoff, PER’s President, an accord was reached on direct talks to be organized in the following year in New York.


It was planned that The Survey will be used in 1998 in a series of round tables, i.e. training programs for journalists, young political leaders of both communities, and people who deal with the Kosovo problems within the federal and republican administrations. But, the activities have been postponed for spring 1998 due to lack of sufficient funding.


20) In the process of the preparation, FER cooperated with PER and was in contact with SPS representatives which, above all included SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic. Dacic, in consultation with Slobodan Milosevic, set only one precondition: that their participation in the Serb - Albanian talk in New York would not be used by State Department to weaken Milosevic’s position in the country. Since immediately before the meeting Madeleine Albright received representatives of the opposition (Vesna Pesic, Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Djindjic) associated in the coalition “Zajedno” (“Together”) that, supported by mass protests, fought
out the recognition of its victory in large cities in local elections held late in 1996, and who also were participants in the Serb-Albanian talks, SPS decided not to send any of its representatives. An extensive propaganda and media campaign was conducted in the country condemning participants in the talks as being "traitors of the Serbian national interests". Basically, it was a clear sign that Milosevic worried, more than about anything, including the solution of the Kosovo issue, about his survival in power.

21) Thus, for instance, FER’s fact-finding mission visited Kosovo, January 25-27, and met vice-presidents of the LDK, Fehmi Agani, Hidayet Hyseni, Mahmut Bakali and president of the Parliamentary Party Adem Demaci and took part in the proceedings of the All-Serbian Convention organized by the Serbian Resistance Movement and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Raska-Prizren Eparchy).

During visits to Macedonia in February and October, Dusan Janjic met the Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, President of the Macedonian Parliament Tito Petkovski, Minister of justice Djordje Spasov, Minister of the Interior Tomislav Cokrevski, President of Albanian Party for the Democratic Prosperity Abdurahiman Haliti, President of the Liberal Democratic Party Stojan Andov, and discussed ethnic relations in Macedonia, especially the Macedonian-Albanian relations.

During a visit to Tirana, Albania, Dusan Janjic discussed the prospects for the resolution of the Serb-Albanian conflict with Paskal Milo, current Foreign Minister of Albania, who collaborated on the project of the Soros Network for Serb-Albanian Dialogue, i.e. the Collection of Papers "Conflict or Dialogue".

22) The Letter, inter alia, says: "Mr. Milosevic,

I am calling upon you to stop. It is time for personal, civic and political courage and decisiveness. Only political talks and respect for principles of democracy and the rule of law must stop the confrontation of war in Kosovo. It is possible to pass from the phase of armed conflicts into the one of political agreements. Under the constitution, as the President of Yugoslavia, and as one of the most influential persons and leaders of the ruling parties, you are personally called upon and responsible for the preservation of Yugoslavia. Human casualties and destruction undermine the foundations of Yugoslavia and of keeping Kosovo within the confines of Serbia"…(Janjic, 1998).


This material provided the basis for discussions, following which it will have to be revised and published as a book. As neither the USIS nor the Open Society Fund provided financial support to FER, they were published as late as in 2001, in the journal Nova srpska politicka misao (New Serbian Political Thought).

Discussions covered three themes: Kosovo yesterday, today and tomorrow; national segregation as a dominant feature of everyday life in Kosovo; and possibilities and proposals for the solution of the Kosovo crisis.

24) Work on these documents, numerous public meetings with minority Leaders in Serbia, with representatives of Albanians and participation in consultations with leaders oh the Balkans Region, were "irritant" to the authorities, and especially so the visit to Belgrade, as a guest of FER, of former President of Bulgaria Zhelin Zhelev, and publication in the daily Danas of the "Statement on Kosovo".

Retaliating against such activities of FER, Milosevic’s police closed down FER office and exerted pressures on the Coordinator, Dusan Janjic, in May 2000. That was the reason why FER operations were isolated, from July to October, to Montenegro and Croatia. FER associates also took refuge outside Serbia. Otherwise, this repression was a part of a broader repression campaign of Milosevic’s regime against those who did not share his political views, such as individuals, independent media, journalists, opposition leaders and a numbers of NGOs.

25) A special status is an interim solution making Kosovo a self-governing territory under the international civil administration and protection, providing simultaneously convincing security, political, administrative, economic and cultural guarantees to Albanians, Serbs and other national communities and to Kosovo as a whole.

26) Autonomy of the Republic of Kosovo should include: exercise of the legislative powers through a two-chamber parliament of RK to be constituted on the basis of free and fair elections organized and controlled by UNMIK and OSCE. During the transitory period, a close cooperation and exchange of views would take place between parliaments of the Republic of Serbia and the RK, and the UNMIK. OSCE may take part in this process; independent executive bodies, including RK police; autonomous and independent judiciary in matters within the competence of RK; the right to develop agriculture, planning and carrying out veterinary and other controls of production and inventories; the right to plan control the exploitation of ores, water and other natural resources of Kosovo; the right to strategic planning of transportation; establishment, development and control of health services; urban planning and development of cities, villages and other settlements; planning, control and promotion of the human environment protection; establishment of institutions and development of the culture of social welfare; promotion, marketing, research and development of tourist trade; the right to collect appropriate taxes and contributions to the budget of RK; the right to pursue direct cooperation with international organizations with a view to protecting and promoting the autonomy of RK, collective and individual freedoms and rights.

27) Institutions of self-organization and self-administration of national communities, including the Serb community, would be instituted on the basis of democratic elections within each of the communities. In these elections, conducted under the control of OSCE, representatives of national communities in common bodies of the legislative, executive, administrative and judicial authorities of RK as well as in self-governing bodies of national communities would be elected.

The autonomy of national communities includes: the right to self-
organization and self-administration; the right to official use of mother tongue; the right to use the national flag and other symbols; the right of dual citizenship of RK and the Republic of Serbia or of the appropriate state union - for all citizens of RK who wish so; system of education, culture, information and sports, taking account of values and needs of the national community concerned; proportionate representation on the command staff and in professional military and police units, and in other public services; the right to collect a self-contribution for the purpose of self-financing along with the right to financial aid from the RK budget; the right to international cooperation within the sphere of competence of self-government.

28) In fact, FER began this campaign in cooperation with the Yugoslav Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights in August 1999, and in 2000 FER's experts were included in an informal team that prepared a model law on amnesty, supported in December 2000 by the President of FRY Vojislav Kostunica, which was taken by the federal government as a basis for its work. However, the federal government informed the public in January 2001 that there would not be a general pardon to those that committed acts of 'terrorism'. This meant that Albanians who were taken into custody during the war in Kosovo as 'terrorists' would not be amnestied and released. That motivated a public reaction on the part of the FER Coordinator Dusan Janjic. This reaction has been exceptionally well received in a part of the Serbian public, among Albanians in Kosovo and within UNMIK.

The open letter addressed to the federal minister of justice Momcilo Grubac says inter alia:

... You are saying: "The amnesty does not cover those who were charged and convicted for terrorism" (Vecernje Novosti of 12 January 2001). Further: "The criminal act of terrorism could not be covered by the Amnesty Act though major pressures were exerted to do it..."

...I must admit that I consider even now that there are reasons that the Federal Assembly should take into consideration and pardon Albanian prisoners. Those are:
- instituting of the rule of law and full respect and protection of human rights to have to apply to the entire territory of the FRY, including Kosovo, and to all citizens without regard to their national affiliation and, consequently, to members of the Albanian community;
- the exercise of legal powers of the federal authorities in Kosovo would be so verified, which is at the moment de facto under the civil administration of UNMIK, and under the military control of KFOR;
- that would create a legal and especially a moral obligation of all the agents in Kosovo, and of the bodies of UNMIK and KFOR in particular, to cooperate with bodies of the FRY in finding and releasing Serbs who were kidnapped or arrested by Albanian paramilitary and parapolice formations;
- The position of FRY bodies would be strengthened in the inevitable but hard process of negotiations on the status of the FRY and administration of it. That would also attest to the seriousness of the invitation to talk extended publicly by the President of FRY and individual federal ministers to Albanian leaders.

You are saying that there is a considerable number of cases "where proceedings or legal actions were not correctly conducted. Many cases qualified as terrorism do not fall under it" (Danas, 12 January 2001). That is encouraging because it indicates that your Ministry had an insight into concrete court procedures. However, the part in your statement that follows is surprising as you say that it was a mistake "which resulted from political views prevailing at that time."

I would like you to correct me if I am wrong but it seems to me that the policy of violation of human rights of all, and Albanians in particular, was pursued for years in Kosovo, that measures of repression and discrimination against Albanians were practiced, including the measures of expulsion for the purpose of ethnic cleansing. Also, it seems to me that there was war in Kosovo. Therefore, one cannot speak about mistakes, as it was the policy, which constituted the very gist of Milosevic's dictatorship. Naturally, that does not free from liability those Albanians who persecuted Serbs and others from Kosovo after the arrival of KFOR. However, as far as I know, such people were neither arrested nor are in prisons of Serbia.

Taking into account that the story about "mistakes" reminds me of unhappy games of transferring individual responsibility to the collectivity, to "all of us", I kindly ask you and your government to note that I - citizen Dusan Janjic exclude myself from that game.

29) In that context, it is extremely important to complete the process of disarmament of citizens, suppression of organized crime, specifically the trafficking in women, arms, drugs, cars, etc. Among the measures to be taken with a view to achieving the mentioned objective are the following: to increase the strength and improve the training of the police forces which should also incorporate members of local communities; establishment of independent judiciary and prosecution; education in non-violence, etc.

) The status of Kosovo issue should be solved with the least possible delay as the continuation of the present state of affairs has extraordinary negative effects: criminalization of the Region and institution of a strong "parallel" Albanian state (Krastev, 2000:9).

30) The status of Kosovo issue should be solved with the least possible delay as the continuation of the present state of affairs has extraordinary negative effects: criminalization of the Region and institution of a strong "parallel" Albanian state (Krastev, 2000:9).
### APPENDICES

#### Table 1:
**ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>MONTENEGRO</th>
<th>FRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>6,428,420</td>
<td>57,176</td>
<td>6,485,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>40,024</td>
<td>380,484</td>
<td>520,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>1,686,661</td>
<td>40,880</td>
<td>1,727,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>345,376</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>345,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>317,739</td>
<td>25,854</td>
<td>343,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>237,358</td>
<td>89,932</td>
<td>327,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>137,265</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>327,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>109,214</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>115,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>67,234</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>67,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>47,577</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>48,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>42,386</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>42,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>25,214</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>25,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>18,339</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>18,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlachs</td>
<td>17,557</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>17,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>11,501</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>11,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>8,340</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>8,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional affiliation</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>4,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>44,881</td>
<td>13,425</td>
<td>58,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>16,661</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>16,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>61,278</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>61,278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#### Table 2:
**KOSOVO - SERBS AND ALBANIANS LIVING IN WAR ZONES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total in Serbia**</td>
<td>6,258</td>
<td>6,979</td>
<td>7,642</td>
<td>8,447</td>
<td>9,313</td>
<td>9,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Serbs</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Albanians</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Due to Albanian "boycott" of the 1991 census, the figures are result of the estimation of the Yugoslav Federal Statistics Bureau.**

** In thousands.
### Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Montenegrins</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Gypsies</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Yugoslavs</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>28,050</td>
<td>171,911</td>
<td>498,242</td>
<td>11,230</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>498,242</td>
<td>11,230</td>
<td>7,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>31,343</td>
<td>189,869</td>
<td>524,559</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>34,583</td>
<td>524,559</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>9,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>37,558</td>
<td>227,016</td>
<td>646,605</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>25,764</td>
<td>646,605</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>10,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>31,555</td>
<td>228,264</td>
<td>916,168</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>916,168</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>11,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>27,028</td>
<td>209,497</td>
<td>1,226,736</td>
<td>34,126</td>
<td>12,513</td>
<td>1,226,736</td>
<td>34,126</td>
<td>11,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>20,356</td>
<td>194,190</td>
<td>1,596,072</td>
<td>45,745</td>
<td>10,446</td>
<td>1,596,072</td>
<td>45,745</td>
<td>17,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 4:
#### ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION IN KOSOVO IN %, 1948-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Montenegrins</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Gypsies</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Yugoslavs</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>11.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>17.332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Final results of the census for 1991 - official estimate.

NOTE: Data given for nationalities accounting for more than 0.5 percent of the total population at least (except Yugoslavs).

### Appendix I:
#### CHRONOLOGY OF SERB - ALBANIAN CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASES AND LEVELS</th>
<th>TIME PERIODS</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>1918-1941/45</td>
<td>Mutual violence and domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>1945-1966</td>
<td>Armed violence and administrative limitation of ethnic Albanian community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>1968-1981</td>
<td>Strengthening of Kosovo autonomy, national affirmation of ethnic Albanian community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>1981-1999</td>
<td>Conflicts concerning Kosovo status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Level</td>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>Strengthening of ethnic Albanian national movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Level</td>
<td>1986-1989</td>
<td>Political disputes on the status of Kosovo and ethnic Albanian community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Level</td>
<td>1989-1997</td>
<td>Suspension of autonomy and establishment of parallel Serbian and ethnic Albanian communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Level</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>Armed conflict (war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>1999-</td>
<td>Deployment of the international (UN) civilian and military missions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II:
THE NEW YORK'S JOINTLY AGREED POSITIONS

"Kosovo constitutes a serious problem that requires an urgent solution. Without international encouragement and assistance the current lack of confidence between the parties cannot be overcome or a lasting settlement reached.

The problem can only be resolved by mutual accord reached through dialogue that is entered into with no preconditions or prejudgment of possible outcomes.

The agreement must be based on the principles of democratization, mutual respect between the sides, respect for human rights, both individual and collective, and promotion of regional stability through respect for Helsinki principles concerning borders. An interim solution requires both democratic Kosovo and democratic Serbia".

Appendix III:
NGO'S STATEMENTS

"The Appeal by the Yugoslav Action Group of Yugoslav NGOs and Trade Union Confederation 'Nezavisnost', Belgrade, April 6, 1999, was said:

..."Faced with the tragic situation we have found ourselves in, and in the name of human ideas and values, as well as in accordance with all our past activities, we are demanding:

- Immediate discontinuance of the bombing campaign and all armed movements;
- Resumption of the peace process with international mediation at the regional-Balkan and European levels, as well as within the framework of the United Nations;
- Sharing of responsibility between the European Union and Russia and their contribution to the peaceful solution of the crisis;
- The end of ethnic cleansing process and immediate return of all refugees;
- Support to the citizens of Montenegro to preserve peace and stability, solve serious consequences of the refugee catastrophe and resume democratic processes that were under way;
- That the Serbian and international media inform the public in a professional manner rather than encouraging media war, inciting interethnic hatred, creating irrational public opinion and glorifying force as the ultimate accomplishment of the human mind.

We cannot meet these demands by ourselves..."

FER's Appeal for Humanitarian and Health Aid to the Population of Kosovo", Belgrade, June 2, 1999, pointed out:

"The population of Kosovo, especially hundreds of thousands of Albanians who remained in Kosovo in these difficult times, are experiencing the worst living conditions as a result of war operations.

We appeal to the authorities, the Red Cross of Serbia and Yugoslavia and other specialized local and international humanitarian and health organizations and NGOs to undertake all means at their disposal to:

- Prevent discrimination in the distribution of humanitarian aid and providing of health service.
- Enable access of local and international humanitarian NGOs to the entire territory of Kosovo in order to deliver food and other humanitarian aid and make possible the return of displaced persons;
- Organize and support the return of international NGOs and humanitarian organizations as well as to improve conditions for the return and registration of new international and local NGOs and humanitarian organizations;
- Support broad local and international action of solidarity, humanitarian aid, especially health care (medical examination, vaccination and treatment) of the imperiled population of Kosovo in order to prevent deaths and disease spreading on a massive scale."

In "A letter to Albanian friends", April 26, 1999, was said:

"Dear friends,

We are writing to you in these hard times of our joint suffering, murders and persecution of people. Columns of Albanians, among them being many of you and your other compatriots, had to leave their homes.

These days, murders and persecutions, ruined and burnt homes, destroyed bridges, roads and industrial facilities make a somber and painful picture of Kosovo and Serbia as if pre-saging that the future life were not possible. We, however, do believe that it is necessary and possible.

A better future of citizens of Kosovo and Serbia, the Serbs and Albanians, as fellow citizens of one and the same state or as closest neighbors will not come either by itself or overnight. But, to that end we can and have to act together. We know that it will be difficult, and sometimes even painful. The example of the German - French post-war conciliation and cooperation can be both an example and incentive to us.

For the sake of a future joint life, the pain of crime has to be talked about so that it might be, with a pardon, remembered. This personal and collective tragedy, both yours, and ours result from long standing erroneous policies of the most radical among us, and of the international community. Continuation of such policies leads to an abyss both Serbs and Albanians. Likewise, the way of a collective guilt is the way of frustration, continuation of hatreds and revenges without an end. That is why that way has to be given up. Our first step away from hatred, ethnic conflicts and bloody revenges is public pronouncement of the feeling of shame, humiliation and deep apology for all the victims and sufferers inflicted on you and your compatriots in ethnic hatred and war madness perpetrated in these days on behalf of our, Serbian people...

...Ethnic cleansing, the NATO bombing and armed clash-es has to stop. There should not be any new victims. All those who were expelled have to return safely to their homes and to live in a way becoming free and proud people.

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We are confident that both Serbs and Albanians will gather strength and courage to set on the way of peace, democracy, respect of human rights, mutual conciliation and appreciation. The dialogue, political negotiation and peace process have no alternatives. That is for all of us the only way out of war conflicts. That is the safest way of ensuring the return of the expelled to their homes, recovery of normal life and work, and of finding a solution to the status of Kosovo issue...

Appendix IV:
THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNICATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE MURDER OF FEHMI AGANI

"Murders of people, columns of refugees, devastated and burnt homes represent a painful picture of Yugoslavia and Kosovo at the very end of the 20th century. A victim of ethnic hatred is also Fehmi Agani, one of the leading moderate Albanian intellectuals and politicians, an advocate of and participant in all major attempts at establishing a Serb-Albanian dialogue, patient and persistent negotiator, and one of the founders of the Forum for Ethnic Relations.

Murderers of Fehmi Agani might have wished to frighten all those people who are in favor of a dialogue, of the Serb-Albanian conciliation, to send a message: We cannot live together! It is clear that such an act encourages the most radical ones to follow the way that leads both Serbs and Albanians to an abyss. However, the dialogue, political negotiation and peace process have no alternatives. That is the only way out of the Kosovo problem.

Serbs and Albanians are, in these bloody war days, inevitably faced with a new choice. A direct threat to life experienced today by citizens of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro diminishes their old fears of uncertainty of political changes. Serbs and Albanians have to pluck up courage and strength to make it up and organize their joint life. In that case, peaceful efforts of professor Agani would not have been futile.

On my own behalf, I express the feeling of shame to all victims of ethnic hatred and war madness, and particularly on account of evils that are being committed these days on behalf of my, Serbian people. It is up to the consciousness and responsibility of the others to judge their responsibility for what they did and are doing to the Serbs.

Dusan Janjic, FER Coordinator, Belgrade, 8 May 1999."
Appendix V:
GLOSSARY

Albanian: In the Serbian language and in the cultural context, there are two terms for a member of the Albanian community: "Šiptar" - derived from the Albanian word "Shqiptar", which indicates their ethnic and tribal origin; and "Albanac" ("Albanian"), which indicates their relation to the nation and state of Albania. The term "Albanac" became frequent in Kosovo as of 1968. Today, the latter term is in prevailing use and expresses connection with Albania proper as well as with the national status.

DC - Democratic Center is an organization from Belgrade with two identities, the first one is the face of a NGO later called Democratic Center Fund later called Center for Democracy, and the second one, since 1995, and the essential one, of a political party called Democratic Center organized by a faction of the Democratic Party (DS) and headed by the first president of the Democratic Party Dragoljub Micunovic who left DS after having been deposed as the president of DS.

DOS: Democratic Opposition of Serbia: The coalition of 18 parties, established for the purpose of local and federal elections in September 2000 which it has won and its presidential candidate Dr Vojislav Kostunica defeated Milosevic and became the President of FRY. DOS has also become, since the republican elections in September 2000, the ruling coalition in Serbia.

Ethnonationalism: a sub-type of a general process of identity forming. In terms of ethnic nationalism, membership in a nation is designated within the category “jus sanguineous”. Ethno-national country is supposed to be based on one ethnic group or nationality, with domination of ethnic loyalty.

Ethnic mobilisation: a process in which members of an ethnic community, in correlation with the other ones, develop a higher degree of group consciousness, when cultural and other unification criteria (along with religion) are used in order to establish distinct borders vis-a-vis others. Ideological core of ethnic mobilisation is ethnic centralism, setting one’s own ethnic community to the level where it is considered to be the highest and one and only value, whilst underestimating, even not recognising, other communities.

Ethnicity: Awareness of one’s national, ethnic identity as one of alternative forms of social organisation and class identity.

EU: European Union

FER: Forum for Ethnic Relations. It is a NGO, which was founded in 1989 as a network of 110 social scientists from former Yugoslavia, Europe and USA, specialising in the fields of national, ethnic relations and minority protection. It has completed a series of projects on ethnic and national issues.

Former Yugoslavia: State and social community that existed since 1918 until the civil war and international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states on January 15th, 1992.

JAC: Joint Advisory Council for Legislative Matters, established by UNMIK.

JUL: Jugoslovenska levica (JUL) - The Yugoslav Left, the political procommunist coalition led by Dr Mirjana Markovic, Slobodan Milosevic’s wife.

KFOR: Kosovo Force

KLA: Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, UCK (al) - Kosovo Liberation Army

Kosovo: This term for the Province is one of the most illustrative examples of general ethnification of public and political life and language. “The Old Serbia” is one of the terms in use as well. That is how Serbian politics and historiography named the region in the beginning of 20th century, emphasising that the “core of the Serbian State and culture” was there. The term is of the Turkish-Albanian origin, with the meaning of Kosovo county, which, before the Balkan war in 1912, contained territories of Sandzak, High Polimlje, Kosovo and Metohija, Northern Macedonia up to the city of Veles and Eastern Macedonia up to the river of Bregalnica. The term was connected to the concept of “Greater Albania”; today, it is a synonym for the Albanian point of view concerning the Province. The term “Kosovo and Metohija” is much longer in use in terms of the constitution and linguistics. In the first post-war (World War II) constitutions the term “Kosovo and Metohija” was used. However, it was later dropped and reinstated in 1990 by the constitutions of Serbia and FRY. The term “Kosovo and Metohija” is considered to be a synonym for the Serbian point of view concerning the Province. In this study the term “Kosovo” is used since it is usually used in present-day literature and in general public.

LDK: Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo), an Albanian political party led by Dr Ibrahim Rugova.

LKCK: Levizija Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves - National movement for liberation of Kosovo

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

PER: Project on Ethnic Relations is an U.S. based independent American - European NGO with headquarters in Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cupertino in Europe

SPS: Socijalisticka partija Srbije - The Socialist Party of Serbia. It was the ruling party in Serbia and FRY, led by Slobodan Milosevic, until the end of 2000.

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNMIK: United Nations Mission in Kosovo

VJ: Vojska Jugoslavije - Yugoslav Army.
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