

The (think tank) conference on Recent Developments in the Kosovo Region: Strategies and Options for a Peaceful Solution, was held in Athens, January 22, 1999. The organizer of the Conference was ELIAMETI (Hellenic Foundation for European and International policy) with the support of the Institute for peace U.S.A. (USIP) from Washington, Western European Union Institute for security studies (WEU) from Paris, NATO bureau for information and the media as well as the Greek Ministry of culture.

The following experts and diplomats from Europe and US took part in the Conference: Dr Franz – Lothar Altmann, vice-president of the Institute for Southeastern Europe, Munchen; Carl Bildt, former Prime minister and the leader of the opposition in Sweden; Dr Fraser Cameron, counselor for foreign policy DG1A, European commission; Mihai Carp, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Task Force, NATO Department for political affairs; professor Thanos Veremis, president of the ELIAMETI; dr Sophia Clement, Associate at the WEU-ISS, Paris, dr Stepen Larrabee, associate at the RAND Corporation, Washington; Prof. Theodore Couloumbis, General director of ELIAMETI; Harriet Hentges, Executive vice-president of the Institute for peace, U.S.; dr Du{an Janji}, director of the Forum for ethnic relations, Belgrade; Maqo Lakori, state secretary for European integrations, Albania; Boris Trajkovski, vice-minister for foreign affairs, Macedonia, dr Neboji{a Vu~ini}, professor of international law from Podgorica, Montenegro; Theodoros Pangalos, Minister of foreign affairs of Greece; Veton Suroi, chief editor KOHA Ditore, Prishtina.

The discussion was held on the development of the current situation, expectations of the involved parties, regional consequences, actions of the international community, room for compromise and a plan for a future action.

The principal message of the Conference was to uphold the political solution for the Kosovo crisis.

Carl Bildt emphasized that the FRY government “seriously provoked the interenational community” and that it is necessary to achieve a consensus on exigency to have the decisions of the UN Security council fully respected. The international community is partly held

responsible for the atrocities in Bosnia and for that reason it has to respond more determinantly and immediately, without waiting.

T. Panagalos

No one has a solution which could be offered and be satisfying to both parties. Especially not the Serbian government and Milo{evi} who didn't find a way to establish peace and respect of human rights in Kosovo. This is a "historical failing" which created an international problem that the international community has to deal with.

Minister Pangalos invited the official Belgrade to admit the observers and punish all those who are responsible for the massacre at the village of Ra~ak. The OSCE observers are needed and their presence is in the interest of both sides. Since it is difficult to retain the crimes on Kosovo under the jurisdiction of the International Court in Hague, Greece suggests to establish an ad hoc court for Kosovo.

Albanians should but also
give up the idea of independent Kosovo, which is strongly opposed by Greece and which also opposes the military solution. Kosovo will never gain its independence. In case this idea got supported it would initiate the borders' changing in the Balkans. This process would cause 30 – 40 years of war making. The borders in the Balkans must be sacred and changeless.

NATO's air raids are not an option for Kosovo, so this excludes Greece from participating in such actions. This decision does not relate to the logistical support of the NATO actions, though (use of bases and harbors if necessary). NATO attacks would have disastrous effects on the whole area of the Balkans. Yugoslavia is not Iraq, and in that regard cannot be directed an ultimatum nor be attacked like Iraq. The requests of the international community can directly be communicated but cannot be presented as an ultimatum. It is not possible to have the armies of Italy, Austria and Greece in the region of Kosovo. That is the reason why Europe is against an

eventual action for achieving the ultimatum, emphasized minister Pangalos.

Greece adopted its Program of actions for stability, on the basis of whom it wanted to help solving the problem. The Program was presented to S. Milo{evi} who accepted this proposal for cooperation, it was also presented to the government in Tirana (F. Nano expressed the will to cooperate, but was removed from the position of the prime minister of Albania) and was also made known to the Kosovo Albanians who didn't show willingness to cooperate. The main intent of this Program was to fully implement the agreement Milo{evi}-Holbrooke. Besides that, the border between Kosovo and Albania must be guaranteed and controlled by international forces.

Mihai Carpi

NATO will tend to play the central role in creating circumstances which will lead to a political solution. As a matter of fact, NATO will be operating with the objectif of either stopping the war or accomplishing political solution (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina). But, it's obvious that it will respond much faster than in Bosnia.

Practically, NATO has created different options, among whom is the option of combined attacks from air and sea.

The main goal of the NATO attacks is to pressure both sides to start negotiating. Although it is clear that NATO raids cannot be efficient if directed against the UCK.

Thanos Veremis pointed out that ELIAMETI, by proposing its actions, started from a position that the agreement Milo{evi} - Holbrooke, is still valid, but the problem is being intensified by the military operations of the UCK. Great ambitions of both sides are evident and it would be harmful to stand by only one sides. There are three possible options for a political solution: autonomy, proposed in the documents of Ambassador Hill, third republic without the right to separate and a referenda on .

Alexis Haradides urged for Belgrade to be given a last chance to find a peaceful solution.

US strategy goals in the region were illustrated by S. LarrabeeCiljeve pointing to the following elements: 1) political solution for Kosovo where the military pressure is the instrument of forcing the parties to negotiate; 2) long-term goal is democratization of Serbia and its return and full integration into the international community; 3) support to the democratizaion and development of the reforms in Montenegro; 4) achievement of stability of Macedonia and Albania, and 5) creation of regional integration and taking part in the economic integrations.

In order to complete this strategy, a full cooperation between US and its European allies is essential.

V. Suroi stressed the importance of taking into consideration the fact that in the Kosovo case the solution is being sought between two societies and that the only possible outcome is to reach an agreement on temporary political solution.

Harriet Hentges believes it is necessary to solve the problem of conditional guarantees which is possible only through the international protectorate with limited duration and would result in the establishment of autonomy for Kosovo.

Dr Altman informed the participants on the position of the German government stating that the military operation is not certain at this point. Germany will regionally approach this issue, and not through direct involvement. The main point is how to find

for talks or how to bring the parties in conflict to a negotiating table. Besides this, it's very important what will be on the negotiating table, but this issue is not being discussed much. In that regard Altman presented principle elements of the "Temporary political framework for the Kosovo conflict" completed by the Center for scientific research from the Bertelsman scientific foundatio in January 1999.

It is suggested to create an international team of organizations, mainly NGOs, that have made proposals which lead to a temporary

solution of the high level autonomy. The idea is to have these organizations attempt to come up with a solution which would find its place on the negotiating table, as a proposition.

The implementation of the agreed solution should be supervised by the Contact group, which solves the question of the Russian participation and Altman considers it necessary.

So, the solution exists but the first step is missing. If Milo{evi} will not accede to the negotiations, he should be forced with military pressure. Air strikes are necessary but not sufficient, that is the reason why the ground troops would be needed also. Slobodan Milo{evi} is only a partner for talks and for achieving the agreement but not a partner for solving the problem.

Concerning further relations with S. Milo{evi} different views were brought up in the discussions, such as the need and possibility to “exploit” him, but also to eliminate him gradually from the political life of Serbia and international communication. In that sense the method that was used in the Pinoche case could be useful.

Estimating that neither side on Kosovo respected the ceasefire established on the basis of the Milo{evi} – Holdbruk agreement the special responsibility of the FRY government, Janji} stressed that in intensification of the conflict until the NATO armed intervention, Milo{evi} will be finding his political excuse for later or for preparing the nation for disastrous effects of his policy on Kosovo.

As the first step must be considered the interruption of the armed conflicts which will include the military pressure of the international community as well as name}e se prekid oru`anih sukobljavanja {to podrazumava i vojni pritisak medjunarodne zajednice kao i njeno kasnije u~e}e u razdvajanju i razoru`avanju zara}enih strana {to bio se moglo u~initi kroz Me{ovite vojno – politi~ke komitete.

S obzirom da strane u sukobu imaju krajnje suprotstavljene stavove i da je o~igledno odsustvo volje da se nadje kompromisno re{enja, a da sukob preti regionalnoj stabilnosti neophodna je da one budu prinudjene na direktne pregovore, {to se mo`e postiji Medjunarodnom

konferencijom koja bi formulisala okvir za privremeno rešenje i započela proces stabilizacije regiona. Privremeno rešenje je moguće unutar koncepta "specijalnog statusa". Osnovi elementi ovog koncepta su: 1) aktivna medijacija i garancije (kroz Komitet za primenu specijalnu statusa u kome bi bili predstavnici država Konatakt grupe i vodja privremene misije OEBS-a za Kosovo) međunarodne zajednice; 2) primena pristupa "korak po korak" kako bi se došlo do visokog stepena autonomije Regiona Kosova u federalizovanoj Srbiji i konfederalizovanoj Jugoslaviji; 3) vremensko ograničenej specijalnog statusa na pet do deset godina, a potom sistemom uzastopnih referenduma reazrešiti ostala otvorena pitanje statusa Kosova i teritorijano - političkog aranžmana za Kosovo i Srbiju; 4) stabilizacija i uspostavljanje saradnje u podregionu Centralnog Balkana (Albanija, Crna Gora, Makedonija, Srbija i Kosovo).

ELIAMET predlog za prevladavanje krize na Kosovu naglasak stavlja na akciju međunarodne zajednice. U tom cilju je potrebno da se uvažavaju predlozi koje je sačinio tim ambasadora Hill – a, ali da to nije dovoljno s obzirom da Hill ne uvažava regionalnu dimenziju problema. Baveći se interesima kosovskih Albanaca i Srba zapostavljeni su interesi susednih zemalja, to bi moglo a bude otvaranje Pandorine kutije zahteva različitih etničkih grupa u regionu za samoopredljenje. Kao bolje rešenje ELIAMETI predlaže Kofos – Veremis plan koji može da da početni impuls političkom rešenju vodeći računa i o eventualnoj nezavisnosti i to primenom "stepen po stepen, pobeda za pobedom" pristupa kao odredjujućim parametrom pregovaračkog procesa koji može ako treba da podrži i eventualni "plani razvod". Zapravo, predlaže se da se uzimaju u obzir ovaj predlog, Hilove planove i slične predloga sačinene novi predlozi koji bi trebalo da omekšaju pristupe obe strane.

Potreban je i odgovarajući balans između batine i šargarepe, kao i da se usvoje odgovarajuće mere pritiska i U^K. A unutar toga je izuzetno važno da se SR Jugoslaviji stavi u izgled pristup jugoistočnoevropskoj saradnji i kooperaciji kao i sveukupnim evropskim integracijama.

Posredovanje poput Holdbrukovog i Hilovog vode do dogovora kkoji nemoraju da vode i završnom političkom rešenju zato je potrebno i

uklju~ivanje odgovaraju}ih posredni~kih organizacija. Do sada su se kao glavni igra~i predstavili SAD (u ulozi pregovara~a), NATO (u ulozi prinudjiva~a) i OEBS (u ulozi onoga koji olak{ava pronala`anje re{enja). Zapostavljene su uloge evropske diplomatije koja je sada uglavnom predstavljena kroz ulogu Francuske, Nema~ke, Velike Britanije i Italije u Kontakt grupi. Korisno je da budu uklju~ene i zemlje jugoisto~ne Evrope. No za to je potrebno da evropske zemlje odmah uspostave koordinaciju svoga delovanja a koordinacija je potrebna i u nesporzumima evropskih saveznika i SAD oko korisnosti vazdu{nih napada. U tom cilju Atina se nudi da organizuje sastanak Kontakt grupe kao i jedan sastanak ministara spoljnih poslova iz jugoisto~ne Evrope. Od vitalne je va`nosti da se premosti razlika u odnosu na pogled Rusije na kosovsku krizu.

Slu`beni pristupi bi trebalo da budu potpomgnuti “track – two” diplomatijom konstruktivnim uklju~ivanjem nevladinih organizacija pre svega u sada{njem predpregovara~kom stadijumu. Takodje, i kada oficijalni razgovori budu zapadali u krizu.

Predlog Bertelsman fondacije takodje ukazuje na zna~aj uklju~enosti medjunarodne zajednice u re{avanje krize Kosova. Ovo uklju~ivanje se dogodilo kroz tzv. Progresivnu internacionalizaciju. Predla`e se osnivanje Trilaterlane posredni~ke komisije (TMC), a ~inili bi he predstavnici kosovskih Albanaca, vlasti Srbije i Jugoslavije i Kontakt grupa ~iji je zadatak da olak{a saradnju strana u dono{enju odluka.

Uspostavila bi se i Privremena skup{tina Kosova koja bi imala zakonodavnu vlast u pitanjima koja neugro`avaju teritorijalni integritet SRJ. Skup{tina bi bila dvodomna, a domovi sastavljeni po principu dr`avljanstva (gradjanstva) i edni~ke pripadnosti. Uspostavila bi se i Privremena vlada. Zadatak svih ovih tela je da olak{aju postizanje trajnijeg re{enja. To bi se re{enje moralo postiti u periodu od pet godina.

Za sve predstavljena programe zajedni~ko je slede}e: 1) ra~unaju na u~e}e medjunarodne zajednice u stvaranju uslova za pregovaranje ali i u porocesu primene postignutog dogovora; 2) predla`u privremeno re{enje bez prejudiciranja ijedne opcije kao i mogu}ih dugor~nih re{enja; 3) kao pruvremeno re{enje za status Kosova predla`e se

visok stepen autonomije unutar sadašnjeg teritorijalnog okvira; 4) ukazuju na značaj uključivanja u okvir rešavanaj pitanaj Kosova i regionalnog okvira kao i uvažavanje interesa susednih država.